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STATEMENT OF T H E ISSUES

1

D- : • tl le excessi ve fines prohii::: ~:

federal c o n s t i tut ions a pp1y t o c i v i 1 act i ons ?
Was the $4 0 mi 1 lion award of punitive damages
in inn m u s t

;;(| • sxcessi ^e*< '
3,

Do state and federal ive process guarantees

require

the implementation of additional substantive and procedural
protections in punitive damages cases?
4.

Did the trial court commit error in finding that the

Crookstons1 claims were not barred under a contractually imposed
statute of limitation?
5.

Were the damages awarded given under the influence of

passion and prejudice?
6.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in giving

fundamentally flawed jury instructions?
7.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in failing

to instruct the jury on the principle of comparative fault?
8.

Did the evidence at trial support a verdict against

Fire Insurance for fraud and intentional infliction of emotional
distress?
9.

Did the trial court commit error in awarding $175,000

in attorneys1 fees to the Crookstons?
10.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in

commenting on the evidence?
11.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in hearing

and granting Rocky Mountain State Bankfs Motion for Summary
Judgment without affording Fire Insurance at least a 10-day period
prior to the hearing on the motion?
12.

Did the trial court commit reversible error in hearing

and granting Rocky Mountain State Bankfs Motion for Summary
Judgment less than 30 days before the date set for trial?
13.

Did the trial court violate Fire Insurances right to
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15.
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this court to consider what effect the timing of the granting of
summary judgment in favor of Porky Mountain State Bank had on the
presentation uf the evidem.p in I IIH

instant case?
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This artion arises from the collapse of -in *nt
home located

Morth Salt Lake, Utah

plaintiffs

- -y Crookston and Rami i L, Crookston

Croo<s*

•-

Jot Located a*
2000)
they

11Jnv
^ *

I 'i 'N

I 11

Orchard I.rive

li - f ^-M f-d

The home was owned Ly the
(hereinafter

" r n n k s t" JIni p u i i"hase< 1 i 1111 I I 11 i 11n
In North S a l t Lake, Utah

'r-ookstons w a i t e d t o c o n s t r u c t
lie lui I M! i iiiij yllfini

t h e i r home on t h e l o t
iH

<l ? n n i i

e v e n t u a l , / d e c i d e c tu b u i l d an e n e r g y - e f f i c i e n t

il*
until

I'rookstons

" e a r t h home

at

In December, 1980, the Crookstons entered into
negotiations with Rocky Mountain State Bank (hereinafter "bank")
concerning a construction loan in the sum of $60,000 for the
purpose of constructing the home.

(R. at 3)

On or about December

11, 1980, the bank agreed to make such a loan on the basis that the
loan would be due on September 11, 1981,

(R. at 12)

In connection

therewith, the Crookstons executed a promissory note and delivered
a trust deed to the subject property as security for the loan.

(R.

at 3)
Pursuant to the requirements of the bank, relating to the
construction loan, the Crookstons contacted defendant-appellant
Fire Insurance Exchange (hereinafter "Fire Insurance") to obtain
insurance coverage on the construction project.

(R. at 4)

On

December 4, 1980, the Crookstons purchased a policy of insurance
from Fire Insurance Exchange.
had a policy limit of $67,000.

The policy issued, No. F60760092,
(R. at 4, 17-28, 1917)

The bank

was listed on the policy as the loss payee in the event of an
insured loss.

(R. at 21)

Construction on the residence took much longer than
expected.

Substantial amounts of work remained to be done on the

structure at the time the original construction loan matured in
September, 1981.

(R. at 4, 1749, 2010, 2181)

The bank refused to

extend the loan period on the construction loan until the
Crookstons deposited $12,000 with the bank.

(R. at 2397)

When the

Crookstons delivered $12,000 to the bank, a 90-day extension on the
loan was granted.

The extension was to expire in mid-December,
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December «
*a?

the earth home collapsed while dir 4

ceir.c r.iacec ~n top . : ~.e structure by a subcontractor.
;<--*:

-si irai ice t! i,c o\ igt: 1 thej i: :l • ..: v. . -

* — ^ « ;: -

agent or" *-:te r --e - „z>^azse

\
4

assignee ;;ne *- ;ts adluster-

R,

at 24C-L.

Fire Insurance

: handle trie claim,

(R

at 1 970)

"-..*- tu trie unique nature ui tne damaged home, Fire Insurance and
t:\er interested parties, i ncl udi ng the bank, had difficulty
r m d i n a * :;t:a;t;:s \Ai_iinq ~ : qive reoa: • estimates ;- tne /;ss

\rempt paymen^ cf *.:€ claim,
ad]us f :•!; •-*•

difficu"-

•-. -c

F

:*-e 4

-

ire Insurance's

-.*.,-----'-

\ .. -issert claims against the oan<

a^ "r-*^-^.')

v

-*?? a^d --e ! -> *- .- -sistent demands,

- - -.
Ralph Klemn

-/^

T h e home remained

i ^ "~• r -

'is^rance.

'~s damaged state for several

\J: le par t:l es e ,rer *
adjustment of the loss.

I i.

-: : e

(R. at 5)

On the afternoon of June 16, 1982, Alan Clapperton of Fire
.-•".' cv - ••*?-' A- i

-•.:- ^se: tative oi the bank about the loss.

that meeting, the f.s- * agreec
r

-r-- a draft slightly

bank.

(R

at 2 0 3 7

At

to settle its claim in consideration

-r excess o~ '?!2

t'" payable soie.\ :.: trie

2:0 4 0 41)

i t Li: le t:li i i ne of t! le set I.. J eniwn I between l*' i i e I n
the bank, the bank had approximately $42 000 available
undisbursed funds in the Crookstons' loan account.

This money was

re am J

conceivably available to the Crookstons to rebuild their home.
at 7, 2070)

(R.

Despite the Crookstons' desire to rebuild the home,

the bank expressed great reluctance about refinancing another
"earth home."

(R. at 1682)

Due to the bank's attitude and refusal

to allow use of the funds, the Crookstons were unable to rebuild
their home.
When they learned of the settlement between Fire Insurance
and the bank, the Crookstons consulted with their attorney to
discuss what alternatives existed.

The Crookstons considered

filing suit against Fire Insurance, but opted to file personal
bankruptcy.

(R. at 7-8, 1707-09)

When the bank received notice

that the Crookstons had filed for bankruptcy, the bank took steps
to foreclose on the property.

(R. at 2070-74)

Crookstons

subsequently quit claimed their property to the bank in lieu of
foreclosure.

(R. at 1714)

Crookstons1 attorney, H. Ralph Klemm, did not read the
subject insurance policy until after June 16, 1982, more than seven
months after the collapse of the home.

(R. at 17 39)

Counsel never

advised his clients of their rights under the policy, since he felt
that Fire Insurance had closed its claims file on the loss.

(R. at

1790-94, 2437)
On or about February 10, 198 3, the Crookstons filed suit
in the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County against
Fire Insurance and the bank.

Crookstons alleged that the actions

of the defendants caused them emotional distress and financial
ruin.

Crookstons claimed that Fire Insurance and the bank,
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individually and in concert, had acted in bad faith.

(R. at 9-10)

Fire Insurance cross-claimed against the bank, claiming a
right to contribution and indemnity.

(R. at 64-67, 917-22)

The

bank cross-claimed against Fire Insurance also claiming a right to
contribution.

(R. at 139-41, 1075-79)

On or about January 20, 1987, the Crookstons amended their
Complaint for a second time against Fire Insurance and the bank.
Crookstons1 Second Amended Complaint alleged numerous causes of
action against both defendants, including allegations of fraud and
misrepresentation and intentional infliction of emotional distress.
(R. at 1000-18)
Prior to trial, Fire Insurance moved for summary judgment
on the basis that the Crookstons' claims were barred by a
contractual statute of limitation.
bifurcate the proceedings.

Fire Insurance also moved to

Those motions were denied.

(R. at

513-29, 537, 923-25, 1428-32)
On March 17, 1987, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
ordered that the trial date of May 26, 1987, which had been
originally set by the Honorable David B. Dee, would remain in
effect-

(R. at 1063-65)
On Friday, May 22, 1987, counsel for the bank advised the

trial court by letter of the settlement reached between the
Crookstons plaintiffs and the bank.

(R. at 1241-42)

Counsel for

the bank also advised the court that in light of the settlement,
the bank had filed a Motion for Summary Judgment "directed to the
cross-claim of Fire Insurance Exchange against Rocky Mountain State
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Bank seeking contribution and indemnity."

(R. at 1241)

The letter

to the court and the bank's Motion for Summary Judgment were not
filed until May 26, 1987.

(R. at 1241-42, 1250-52)

On the afternoon of Friday, May 22, 1987, counsel for the
bank advised counsel for Fire insurance by telephone of the bank's
intention to file the Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R. at 1242)

The motion and supporting memorandum were not personally served
upon counsel for Fire Insurance Exchange until approximately 9:00
p.m. on Friday, May 22, 1987.

(R. at 3003)

Counsel for the bank

advised the court and other counsel by letter of their intention to
have the Motion for Summary Judgment heard on the next business
day, Tuesday, May 26, 1987, the same day that trial was set to
begin.

(R. at 1242)

court holiday.

Monday, May 25, 1987 was Memorial Day, a

No formal Notice of Hearing was ever filed in

conjunction with the bank's Motion for Summary Judgment.
On Tuesday, May 26, 1987, at the hour of 9:00 a.m.,
approximately one hour prior to the commencement of trial, the
trial court heard argument on the bank's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

(R. at 1257, 2995-3013)

Fire Insurance objected to the

lack of adequate notice of the hearing and the untimeliness of the
motion.

(R. at 1538-40, 2998-99)

At the hearing, the Crookstons

indicated that at trial they now intended to pursue only claims for
breach of contract and intentional tort against Fire Insurance.
(R. at 1249, 2996, 2998)

Crookstons' counsel expressly stated that

they would not proceed at trial on any claim of negligence against
Fire Insurance Exchange.

(Id.)
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The bank's motion was premised on the theory that no right
of contribution arises in favor of an intentional tortfeasor, such
as Fire Insurance Exchange.

(R. at 1243-48, 2995-3013)

Following

brief argument, the court granted the bank's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

(R. at 1257, 1538-40)

Fire Insurance then moved for a

continuance to permit it to file a Third-Party Complaint against
the bank.

(R. at 3008)

requested continuance.

The trial court refused to grant the
(R. at 1257)

The matter went to trial in the absenct of the bank.
Following a six-day trial, the jury returned a verdict in excess of
$4.8 million against defendant Fire Insurance on claims of fraud
and misreptesentation, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.

(R. at 1543-46)

Fire Insurance filed

post-trial motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, new
trial or remittitur.

The motions were denied.

(R. at 2959-62)

At

a later date, the trial court awarded the Crookstons $175,000 in
attorneys1 fees.

(R. 2964-67, 2972-73)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The excessive fines clauses of both the United States and
Utah Constitutions apply to punitive damage awards in civil cases.
Even assuming that those clauses do not directly apply, due
process of law requires their application in civil proceedings.
The $4.0 million award of punitive damages in the instant case is
unconstitutionally excessive.

The total damages awarded, in

excess of $4.8 million, evidences the influence of juror passion
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and prejudice.
The federal and state due process clauses require
additional substantive and procedural protections, beyond those
normally accorded civil defendants, to be implemented in punitive
damage cases.
Crookstons' claims were time barred under a contractual
statute of limitation due to their failure to file suit within one
year of the collapse or loss of their home.
The jury was not properly instructed in several critical
regards.

Fire Insurance's failure to except to the court's error

is not a bar since the jury instructions were fundamentally
flawed.
The evidence at trial was insufficient to support the
verdict against Fire Insurance for fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

The trial court further

committed error in commenting on the testimony of the Crookstons'
expert witness.
The trial court erred in awarding attorneys' fees to the
Crookstons since such an award was not provided for under contract
or statute.

The court abused its discretion in awarding $175,000

in attorneys' fees to the Crookstons.
The timing and notice requirements imposed both by Rule
56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4(d) of the
Rules of Practice of the Third Judicial District Court are intended
to permit a non-moving party an adequate and meaningful opportunity
to respond to a motion for summary judgment.
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The bank's motion

for summary judgment was served on Fire Insurance's counsel less
than one full business day prior to the hearing on the motion.
Hearing on the matter was held just one hour before trial of the
case.

Fire Insurance objected to the ill-timed motion for summary

judgment and requested additional time to respond.

The trial

court's failure to adhere to the hearing and notice requirements
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the local Rules of
Practice before granting the motion resulted in prejudice to Fire
Insurance and denied said defendant its right to due process under
the law.
The trial court committed reversible error in finding that
there was no right of contribution between Fire Insurance and the
bank.

The court erred in finding that there is no right to

contribution among intentional tortfeasors.

The Utah

Legislature's enactment of §§78-27-39 and 78-27-40(3) (repealed
1986), patterned after the 1939 version of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, clearly provides for
contribution among all tortfeasors, including intentional
tortfeasors.
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(1985) .
2.

Ingraham v. Wright is Not Controlling.

While Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977), suggests
in dicta that the Eighth Amendment applies only to criminal
actions, Ingraham simply holds that the cruel and unusual punishment clause is inopposite in a civil suit.

The excessive fines

clause of the Eighth Amendment clearly was not at issue in
Ingraham.
The Ingraham Court's dicta that the Eighth Amendment may
apply only to criminal proceedings is based upon the false assumption that the scope of each of the amendment's three guarantees is
and was intended to be identical.

The Court's misconception of the

scope and origin of the Eighth Amendment guarantees has been
soundly criticized.
Punitive Damages:

See, Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and
Some Lessons From History, 40 Vand. L.Rev.

1234-35 (1987).
Careful reading of Ingraham reveals that the court did
not state categorically that the various provisions of the Eighth
Amendment could have no application outside the criminal context.
In fact, Ingraham explicitly contemplates that some punishment
might be treated as criminal even though not so labelled.
Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669, n. 37.
While bail, fines, and punishments are more traditionally
associated with the criminal process, the United States Supreme
Court previously assumed that the Eighth Amendment excessive bail
clause applied to civil cases.

See Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S.
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524, 544-46 (1952).

Before Ingraham, several courts either

recognized or implied that the excessive fines clause applied to
civil sanctions, including punitive damages.

See Toepleman v.

United States, 263 F.2d 697, 700 (4th Cir. 1959), cert, denied, 359
U.S. 989 (1959); Abel v. Conover, 104 N.W.2d 684, 688-89 (Neb.
1960); and Keller v. Keller, 52 Wash.2d 84, 323 P.2d 231, 235
(1958) .
3.

Constitutional Guarantees Should Not Be
Determined by "Labels".

The application of federal and state prohibitions against
excessive fines must turn on a functional analysis rather than on
artificial labels.

The United States Supreme Court in Trop v.

Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 94 (1958), stated, "How simple would be the
tasks of constitutional adjudication and of law generally if
specific problems could be solved by inspection of the labels
pasted on them!"
The Eighth Amendment, properly viewed, "functions as a
restraint on the broader system of punishment rather than simply
the process through which criminals are prosecuted."

Note, The

Constitutionality of Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment, 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1699, 1702-03
(1987).

A fine that is prohibitively excessive in a criminal set-

ting is no less excessive if rendered in a civil setting.

In fact,

monetary penalties imposed in a criminal prosecution are
functionally equivalent to punitive damages awarded in a civil
suit.

Punishment clearly does not become necessarily less harmful

or less coercive simply because it is labelled "civil" rather than
-15-

"criminal".
The procedural safeguards in the United States
Constitution and the Utah Constitution necessarily reflect the
view that particular safeguards must be maintained to ensure a
proper balance between the government's power and the individual's
freedom from undue interference with his life, liberty, and
property.

The constitutional guarantee of due process protects

that relationship and provides flexibility for courts to maintain
the necessary balance in the face of changed circumstances.
The interpretation of the federal and state due process
guarantees can and must be guided by the more specific
constitutional safeguards, since the latter provide a bench mark
against which other situations can be measured.

The framers of

the federal and state constitutions could not have intended to
permit the government to circumvent the specific safeguards,
including that against excessive fines, merely by labelling a
proceeding "civil."

Allowing the government unlimited power to

punish a citizen in the same manner, and for the same purpose as
in a criminal prosecution under the label of a "civil" proceeding
is clearly inconsistent with due process of law.

If specific

constitutional safeguards were to be applied only to explicitly
criminal proceedings, and if due process were permitted to be
circumvented by the use of a label, the specific safeguards found
in the United States and Utah Constitutions would become
meaningless.
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4.

Punitive Damages Are Functionally Equivalent to
Criminal Fines.

The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
certain punishments must be treated as criminal for purposes of
the Eighth Amendment, even though they are not explicitly labelled
as such.

Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 669, n. 37. As a result, the

Eighth Amendment is a flexible concept:
[T]he words of the [Eighth] Amendment are
not precise, and . . . their scope is not
static. The Amendment must draw its meaning
from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.
Trop, 356 U.S. at 100-01.
Punitive damages, such as those imposed against Fire
Insurance Exchange, are the functional equivalents to criminal
fines.

Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive

Damages, 72 Va. L. Rev. 139, 148 (1986).

In their criminal law

treatise, LaFave and Scott write, "Paying damages (especially
"punitive damages") for torts or contract breaches is not much
different from paying fines for criminal violations."

1 W. LaFave

and A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law, §1.3(a) at 16 (1986)
(footnote omitted).

Likewise, Prosser and Keeton recognize

punitive damages as a "rather anomalous" invasion of criminal law
into "the field of torts." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton and D.
Owen, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts, §2 at 9 (5th Ed. 1984).
Numerous courts and commentators label punitive damages
as "quasi criminal" sanctions, rather than damages.

See Smith v.

Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 59 (1983) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886); Womack v. Gettelfinger,
-17-

808 F.2d 446, 451 (6th Cir. 1986); Seltzer, Punitive Damages in
Mass Tort Litigation:

Addressing the Problems of Fairness,

Efficiency, and Control, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 37, 43 (1983); and
Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures:

A Framework

for Constitutional Analysis, 60 Minn. L. Rev. 379, 414 (1976).
A sanction which is penal in purpose or effect may be
properly considered a criminal penalty.

The distinction between

civil and criminal penalties is constitutionally significant.
United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248, reh'g. den., 448 U.S.
916 (1980).

When a state sanctions a defendant "for the purpose

of punishment" rather than as a "incident of some other legitimate
governmental purpose," Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979),
due process requires additional procedural protections and
restrictions.
(1963).

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 167

So long as a sanction is designed primarily to punish,

the sanction may not be imposed without according the defendant
procedural safeguards beyond those commonly available in civil
cases.

Id. at 248-51.
Whether a sanction imposed by statute is criminal or

civil is a matter of both legislative intent and statutory purpose
or effect:
Our inquiry . . . [into whether a penalty is
civil or criminal] has traditionally
proceeded on two levels. First, we have set
out to determine whether Congress, in
establishing the penalizing mechanism,
indicated either expressly or impliedly a
preference for one label or the other.
Second, where Congress has indicated an
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intention to establish a civil penalty, we
have inquired further whether the statutory
scheme was so punitive either in purpose or
effect as to negate that intention.
Ward, 448 U.S. at 248-49 (emphasis added).
Punitive damages are clearly penal in nature since they
serve the traditional goals of punishment and deterrence.

This

Court in Kesler v. Rogers, 542 P.2d 354, 359 (1975), notes the
following goals of punitive damages:
They are: punishment of the defendant for
particularly grievous injury caused by
conduct which is not only wrongful, but
which is wilful and malicious so that it
seems to one's sense of justice that mere
recompense for actual loss is inadequate and
that the plaintiff should have added
compensation; and that the defendant should
suffer some additional penalty for that
character of wrongful conduct; and also that
such a verdict should serve as a wholesome
warning to others not to engage in similar
misdoings.
See also, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v.
Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1981) ("Punitive damages by definition are
not intended to compensate the injured party, but rather to punish
the tortfeasor whose wrongful action was intentional or malicious,
and to deter him and others from similar extreme conduct.")
Similarly, the jury in the instant case was instructed
that punitive damages could be assessed "as punishment to Fire
Insurance Exchange . . . and as a wholesome warning to others
. . . ."

(R. at 1515)
Since punitive damages mainly serve the criminal goals of

retribution and deterence, rather than the traditional
compensatory goals of the civil law, they serve as a surrogate for
-19-

criminal sanctions "by punishing misbehavior through the civil law
that may go unpunished or underpunished in the criminal law."
Note, supra, at 1703.
Courts and commentators recognize the similarities between
punitive damages and criminal fines.

The Court in Gertz v. Robert

Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974), stated that "[punitive
damages] are not compensation for injury.

Instead, they are pri-

vate fines levied by civil juries to punish reprehensible conduct
and to deter its future occurrence." Indeed, punitive damages
"serve the same function as criminal penalties and are in effect
private fines."

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 82

(1971), (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Even if the penal purpose of punitive damages were not so
obvious, consideration of the doctrine reveals that punitive
damages are so punitive in effect as to negate any intention that
such damages are civil in nature.

Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martlnez

establishes the test for determining when additional protections
are due to defendants in nominally civil actions.

The defendant

in Kennedy was denaturalized under the National Act of 1940 for
leaving and remaining outside of the United States to evade military service.

The Court invalidated the statute because it

deprived the defendant of his citizenship as punishment without
the safeguards guaranteed by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
factors that historically have required additional procedural
safeguards are:
[1] Whether, the sanction involves an
affirmative disability or restraint, [2]
-20-

The

whether it has historically been regarded as
punishment, [3] whether it comes into play
only on a finding of scienter, [4] whether
its operation will promote the traditional
aims of punishment — retribution and
deterrence, [5] whether the behavior to
which it applies is already a crime, [6]
whether an alternative purpose to which it
may rationally be connected is assignable
for it, and [7] whether it appears excessive
in relation to the alternative purpose
assigned . . . .
Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted).
While the factors are neither exhaustive nor conclusive,
careful consideration and analysis of the seven factors listed in
Kennedy demonstrate that punitive damages are penal in effect.
See, Grass, The Penal Dimensions of Punitive Damages, 12 Hastings
Const. L.Q. 241, 248-314 (1985).
5.

Historical Support For Application to Punitive
Damage Awards.

There is also substantial historical support for applying
the protections of the excessive fines clauses to punitive damage
awards in civil actions.

The scope of the Eighth Amendment

prohibition against excessive fines preserves at least the same
rights and privileges enjoyed by the English and the Colonists
during the colonial period.

The United States Supreme Court has

repeatedly looked to the English antecedents of the Eighth
Amendment to determine the substantive meaning of that Amendment.
Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983).

The Court, in summarizing the

nature of this reliance, stated:
Although the Framers may have intended the
Eighth Amendment to go beyond the scope of
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its English counterpart, their use of the
language of the English Bill of Rights is
convincing proof that they intended to
provide at least the same protection —
including the right to be free from
excessive punishments.
Id. at 286.
In defining and asserting their rights as Englishmen, the
Colonists in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries turned
primarily to two documents, the Magna Carta and the English Bill
of Rights of 1689.

The language of the Eighth Amendment is taken

verbatim from the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which in
turn was taken from the English Bill of Rights of 1689.
285, n. 10.

IcL at

The framers of the Constitution understood that the

English Bill of Rights was but one expression of their rights and
liberties.

The rights declared in that document were by and large

re-enactments of rights previously recognized.

H. Hazeltine, "The

Influence of Magna Carta on American Constitutional Development,"
Magna Carta Commemoration Essays 182, 189-90 (H. Maiden Ed. 1917).
The concept of proportional monetary punishments was well
established in England.

Examination of early English history

demonstrates that Magna Carta and the English Bill of Rights were
intended, in part to eliminate the pernicious evil of
disproportional monetary punishments.
Under early Saxon law, there was no distinction drawn
between crime and tort.

T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the

Common Law, 422-23, 425-26 (5th Ed. 1956); 2 F. Pollock and F.
Maitland, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward
The First, 449-53 (2d Ed. 1898).

Indeed, prior to the Norman
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Conquest in 1066, most wrongs were punished by requiring the
wrongdoer to pay compensatory damages, known as "wers" or "bots",
to the person wronged.

In addition, further payment, known as

"wites," was imposed as a sum "due to the community, on the ground
that every evil deed inflicts a wrong on society in general, as
well as upon its victim."
1958).

W. McKechnie, Magna Carta, 285 (2d Ed.

At first, the maximum size of wites was generally uniform,

often established by local rules.

Id.

at 285.

This early

practice of imposing extra-compensatory damages for evils done to
society as well as to the victim of the wrong, remains the bedrock
of the punitive damage doctrine upon which the instant award of
$4.0 million was imposed against Fire Insurance Exchange.
Some time following the Norman Conquest, the relatively
fixed and certain system of "wites" was superceded "by a system,
or lack of a system, by which the convicted party was 'in the
King's mercy.' . . . ."

J. Jolliffe, The Constitutional History of

Medieval England, 225 (3d Ed. 1954).

This system of payments to

the crown, known as amercements, placed the wrongdoer's life and
property at the King's mercy, on the ground that "offenses against
the established order were offenses also against the King."
McKechnie, supra, at 80.
During the post-Norman Conquest era, amercements were
limited, at least in theory, only by the grace of the crown.
at 286.
revenue.

Id.

The crown utilized amercements as an important source of
During the reign of John, amercements were seen

principally as instruments of extortion.
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Id. at 22.

The seemingly

unbridled power to impose excessive amercements was a point of
major concern which led up to the drafting and presenting of Magna
Carta to King John at Runnymede on June 15, 1215.

Three chapters,

Chapters 20, 21 and 22, of Magna Carta, as accepted by John,
addressed the problem of excessive monetary amercements.

The pri-

mary clause, Chapter 20, reads as follows:
A freeman shall not be amerced for a slight
offence, except in accordance with the
degree of the offence; and for a grave
offence he shall be amerced in accordance
with the gravity of the offence, yet saving
always his "contenement"; and a merchant in
the same way, saving his "merchandise"; and
a villein shall be amerced in the same way,
saving his "wainage" — if they have fallen
into our mercy: And none of the aforesaid
amercement shall be imposed except by the
oath of honest men of the neighourhood.
Magna Carta, Chapter 20, as quoted in McKecknie, supra, at 284.
Chapters 21 and 22 of Magna Carta apply the principles of Chapter
20 to barons, earls, and the clergy.

Id. at 295, 198.

The amercement clauses in Magna Carta clearly required
proportionality between the wrong committed and the amount of
punishment exacted.
critical.

The amercement clauses' protections were

One historian notes that the amercement clauses were

considered vital to the protection of the mass of the people.
Thompson, Magna Carta:

F.

Its Role in the Making of the English

Constitution, 1300-1629, 44 (1948).
The amercement clauses and the principle of proportionality of punishment were applied by the English equally to civil
and criminal wrongs alike.

Thompson, supra, at 33.

See, e.g., 55

Selden Society 2, 3 (Cas. No. 2 ) ; 55 Selden Society 45 (Cas. No.
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34); and 57 Selden Society 9, 11 (Cas. No. 5).
Gradually over the next half millennium, the term
"amercement" fell from common usage and was replaced by the word
"fine."

During the thirteenth century, "fine" was a sum

voluntarily paid to the crown as essentially a bribe or other
means of buying justice to escape punishment.
at 292-9 3.

McKechnie, supra,

Thirteenth century amercements, in contrast, were sums

involuntarily imposed as punishment.

Over the course of four or

five centuries, the "option" of buying justice was eliminated.
The elimination of the voluntary aspect of "fines" was accompanied
by the word "fine" taking on its more modern meaning and the
general demise of the word "amercement".
29 3.

McKechnie, supra, at

See generally, Massey, supra.
In the early seventeenth century, during the era of

Charles II, the Court of Star Chambers imposed heavy fines.

In

order to more fully protect themselves from the Stuart kings, the
English drafted a Declaration of Rights.

Article X of the

Declaration of Rights addressed the problem of disproportionate
monetary punishments.

The original expression of the grievance

was:
The requiring excessive bail of persons
committed in criminal cases, and imposing
excessive fines and illegal punishments to
be prevented.
L. Schwoerer, The Declaration of Rights, 1689, at 300 (1981)
(Emphasis added).
eliminated.

The reference to criminal cases was eventually

By eliminating the limiting language, the drafters

must have intended to make the grievance applicable to civil cases
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as well as criminal cases.

Such an intent would be consistent

with the drafters1 desire to make their declarations as all
encompassing as possible in order to frustrate any new and
ingenius royal device of judicial oppression.

In this regard, one

commentator has stated:
Article X explicitly addressed the issue of
fines, while it implicitly reaffirmed
ancient rights with respect to amercements.
The DecJaration of Rights excessive fines
clause thus should be read as simultaneously
prohibiting excessive fines and amercements,
whether imposed by judge or jury, in both
civil and criminal proceedings.
Massey, supra, at 1256.
At the time when amercements were most prevalent in
England, full and adequate compensatory damages, as they are
currently known, did not exist.
52 3.

Pollock and Maitland, supra, at

However, once compensatory damages were recognized as a

legitimate recovery, English legislators began to inject penal
functions into the law of damages.

The first Statute of

Westminster included provisions for double and treble damages,,
However, the common law doctrine of punitive damages did not
appear until the practice of amercements had fallen into disuse.
"Exemplary damages" were not imposed until Huckle v. Money, 2
Wils. K.B. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768, C.P. (1763).

One commentator

has stated that the decision in Huckle supports the belief that:
Common law punitive damages emerged at a
time when the amercement existed in form
only and enjoyed no use in practice. If
amercements were still a viable part of the
common law in 1763, the amercement could
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have been employed to punish [the
wrongdoer]•
Massy, supra, at 1267.
The evolution of punitive damages and the attendant
demise of amercements, suggest that the functions performed by
amercements, being so ingrained in English legal tradition, were
merely assumed by the later doctrine of punitive damages.

The

historical occurrences in England at the relevant time periods
were marked by a restructuring of royal authority and private
rights.

The Glorious Revolution resulted in the crown's tool of

amercements being restructured to fit into a common law system of
punitive damages.
As stated supra, the Eighth Amendment patterns its
excessive fines language after the English Bill of Rights and
Magna Carta.

The framers' lifting of the pertinent language from

the earlier English documents brought with it centuries of history
which convincingly demonstrates the amendment's applicability to
monetary fines imposed for punishment and deterrence.
In theory and in practice the English concept of
proportionality of punishment forbids excessive punishment of any
kind.

The magnitude of a fine is chiefly a function of amount,

not its characterization as penal or civil.

Early English history

establishes that the issue of excessiveness is directly related to
the arbitrariness of the penalty.

The adoption of the Eighth

Amendment was "intended to provide at least the same protection
including the right to be free from excessive punishments," that
our English forebears enjoyed.

Solem, 46 3 U.S. at 286.
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Only a

—

finding that the federal and state prohibitions against excessive
fines applies to punitive damage awards in civil actions will
result in those prohibitions being little more than hollow
pronouncements.
B.

Even if the Prohibitions Against Excessive Fines are
Not Directly Applicable to Civil Actions, Those
Protections are Subsumed in the Guarantee of Due
Process of Law.

Both the United States Constitution and the Constitution
of the State of Utah guarantee that life, liberty and property may
not be taken without due process of law.

U.S. Const., Amend. XIV;

Utah Const., Art. I, Sec. 7.
The due process clauses of the United States Constitution
have long been held to incorporate the fundamental liberties and
protections secured by Magna Carta.

See, Murray's Lessee v.

Hoboken Land & Improv. Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272, 276 (1855).
Those fundamental liberties and protections included the protection
against excessive monetary punishment.
The basic constitutional requirement of due process of
law is fundamental fairness.

The content of federal and state due

process guarantees is not limited to the specific provisions of
either the Bill of Rights or the Utah Constitution.
Winshlp, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).

See, In Re

The protections of due process have

been characterized as follows:
Due process requires, in whatever context,
that legal proceedings be consistent with
"fundamental fairness"; that they be
consonant with "ordinary notions of fair
play and settled rules of laws"; that they
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accord with "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice"; and they not
offend "the community sense of fair play and
decency." However phrased, the message is
clear: Due process mandates at all times,
in all circumstances, and for all defendants,
"fundamental fairness" at the hands of the
law.
Jefferies, supra, at 152 (emphasis in original).
The guarantee of due process is not a static concept.
The United States Supreme Court has held that changes over time in
society and in the application and impact of a legal doctrine may
justify reconsideration of the doctrine.
3039 U.S.

In Williams v. Winter,

235, 239-40 (1970), the court invalidated a time-

honored practice in the criminal law system, by stating:
[N]either the antiquity of a practice nor
the fact of steadfast legislative and
judicial adherence to it through the
centuries insulates it from constitutional
dLuacjc . . . .
The need to be open to reassessment of
ancient practices other than those
explicitly mandated by the constitution is
illustrated by the present case since the
greatly increased use of fines as a criminal
sanction has made nonpayment a major cause
of incarceration in this country.
Notwithstanding the fact that punitive damages have
traditionally formed a part of the common law, changed
circumstances and increased use of these sanctions require an
openminded re-examination of the doctrine of punitive damages.
Over time punitive damages have changed from a relatively rare
remedy reserved for cases of only the most eggregious and
outrageous behavior, to a common place part of virtually every
prayer in every tort action and insurance bad faith case.
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The

recent explosion of punitive damage claims and awards has been
fully documented.

M. Petersen, S. Sarma, M.

Damages, Emperical Findings, (1987).

Shanley, Punitive

The rapidly escalating

number and size of punitive damage awards and the broadening scope
of circumstances for the imposition of such fines clearly justify
a serious and thorough reconsideration of the constitutional
validity and public policy justifications of punitive damages.
England undertook such a reconsideration and drastically limited
the availability of punitive damages.

See Rookes v. Barnard, A.C.

1129; 1 All Eng. Rep. 367 (1964).
Application of the constitutional protections against
excessive punishments, as well as other constitutional substantive
and procedural safeguards, are warranted today since the framers
of our state and federal constitutions likely did not foresee the
gravity of the problem created by the present use of punitive
damage awards.

It is unlikely that the framers contemplated the

proliferation of civil actions intended predominantly to punish,
nor foresaw the potential for private citizens to appoint
themselves as private prosecutors with the power to impose on
fellow citizens a monetary punishment solely to promote classically
penal and governmental purposes of deterrence and retribution.
These recent developments have also been accompanied by a geometric
explosion and expansion of the ability of plaintiffs to recover
full and adequate compensatory damages.

Due process of law

requires that this court impose additional substantive and
procedural restrictions on the imposition of punitive damages.
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At

a minimum, federal and state due process protections should require
that the constitutional prohibitions against excessive punishment
be applied.
POINT II,
THE 4.0 MILLION DOLLAR AWARD OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES AGAINST FIRE INSURANCE WAS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY EXCESSIVE.
While there is no constitutional requirement that a
penalty match precisely some sort of ideal standard, the seemingly
unprecedented award of punitive damages in the instant case is
clearly constitutionally excessive.

In Solem v. Helm, the United

States Supreme Court identified three objective criteria for
assessing the proportionality of a criminal penalty.

These

criteria, while not uniformly applicable to the instant case,
suggest analogous guidelines for the control of punitive damages
in civil cases.

In Solem, the court considered whether a sentence

of life imprisonment imposed on a recidivist convicted of uttering
a $100 check on a nonexistent account was constitutionally
excessive.

The court looked to three factors:
(i) The gravity of the offense and the
harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences
imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions.

Solem, 463 U.S. at 292.
The gravity of Fire Insurance's conduct is uncertain.

The

legislature and the courts of the State of Utah have not set any
limit on the size of punitive damage awards which may be imposed in
bad faith cases.

Due to the absence of legislatively imposed
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guidelines, the relative harshness of the $4.0 million punitive
award is difficult to assess.

By any common-sense standard,

however, a punitive fine of $4.0 million for the failure to pay
approximately an additional $30,000 on an insurance claim is
constitutionally excessive.
The second line of inquiry established by Solem is more
illuminating.

The legislature has made criminal certain types of

serious offenses by corporations against the public.

Corporate

misconduct under Utah Code Ann. §76-3-302 (1953) is punishable by
a maximum fine of $10,000.

The harshness and disproportionality

of the punishment imposed in the instant case is clear:

Fire

Insurance Exchange's fine is 400 times larger than the maximum
monetary criminal fine deemed appropriate by the Utah legislature
to punish and deter corporations engaged in similar conduct.
The third criteria suggested in Solem concerns sentences
authorized for the same crime in other jurisdictions.

Fire

Insurance Exchange is unaware of any other statefs statute which
permits an insurance company to be fined $4.0 million for having
engaged in similar conduct.
The appropriate, objective measure of the excessiveness
of a punitive damage award imposed by a civil jury should be the
relationship of

a punitive damage award to the monetary

punishment

exacted by the legislature of that jurisdiction for the same or
similar conduct.

Without such guidelines, jurors in punitive

damage cases will continue to operate without meaningful guidance
or bounds established either legislatively or judicially.
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The

individual determination of such juries will continue to evidence
the type of "subjective judgments" which the United States Supreme
Court has "eschewed."

McCleskey v. Kemp,

U.S.

, 95

L.Ed.2d 262, 283 (1987) .
POINT III.
FEDERAL AND STATE DUE PROCESS GUARANTEES
REQUIRE ADDITIONAL SUBSTANTIVE AND
PROCEDURAL PROTECTIONS IN PUNITIVE DAMAGE
ACTIONS.
In Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the United
States Supreme Court established an analytical framework for
determining the level of due process protection required in a
particular type of case.

The court stated:

[Identification of the specific dictates of
due process generally requires consideration
of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by
the official action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interests
through the procedures used, and the
probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards, and
finally the government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional
or substitute procedural requirement would
entail.
Id. at 335 (citation omitted).
At a minimum, due process requires a more definite
substantive standard for determining when punitive damages may be
awarded, a more definite standard for determining the maximum
amount of punitive damages which may be awarded, bifurcation of
the issues of liability and punitive damages, and a higher burden
of proof for awarding punitive damages.
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A.

Due Process Requires a More Definite Substantive
Standard for Determining When Punitive Damages may
be Awarded.

The doctrine of punitive damages is accompanied by an
utter lack of meaningful standards upon which a judge or jury may
base an award of punitive damages.

The absence of adequate

standards results in awards frequently being based upon the
caprice and prejudice of the factfinder.

In a case involving the

propiety of an award of punitive damages in a civil rights suit
brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Powell, strongly indicted punitive
damages:
[T]he court fails utterly to grapple with
the cogent and persuasive criticisms that
have been offered of punitive damages
generally.
*

*

*

Despite . . . attempted justifications,
the doctrine of punitive damages has been
vigorously criticized throughout the
Nation's history . . . .
The year after
§198 3 was enacted, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court declared, "The idea of [punitive
damages] is wrong. It is a monstrous
heresy. It is an unsightly and unhealthy
excrescence, deforming the symmetry of the
body of the law." Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H.
342, 382 (1872). . . .
Punitive damages are generally seen as a
windfall to plaintiffs, who are entitled to
receive full compensation for their injuries
— but no more. . . . [T]heir imposition is
unaccompanied by the types of safeguards
present in criminal proceedings. This
absence of safeguards is exacerbated by the
fact that punitive damages are frequently
based upon the caprice and prejudice of
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jurors . . . .
We observed in Electrical
Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50-51 Note 14
(1979), that "punitive damages may be
employed to punish unpopular defendants.
Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. at 57-59.

(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

Justice Rehnquist further argued against the imposition of
punitive damages stating that, "A vaguely defined, elastic
standard-like 'reckless indifference1 gives free reign to the
biases and prejudices of jurors . . . ." :rd. at 88.

The lack of

adequate substantive standards surrounding awards of punitive
damages decreases judicial and social economy.

See Ellis,

Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56
So.Cal.L.Rev. 1 (1982).
The multiple layers of vague, overlapping, and elastic
definitions in punitive damage actions create, in effect, no
standard at all.

The arbitrary and unpredictable nature of

punitive damage claims is described in Devlin v. Kearny Mesa
AMC/Jeeps/Renault, Inc., 155 Cal.3d 381, 388, 202 Cal.Rptr. 204,
208 (1984), as follows:
The process for which a factfinder finds
punitive damages is somewhat contradictory.
On the one hand, the court or jury must be
sufficiently disturbed to conclude the
defendant must be punished. On the other
hand, although outraged, the factfinder cannot
be vindictive. The channeling of just the
correct quantum of bile to reach the correct
level of punitive damages is, to put it
mildly, an unscientific process complicated
by personality differences. Conduct which
one person may view as outrageous another
may accept without feeling, depending on such
diverse characteristics as an individual's
background, temperament and societal concerns.
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The process is further complicated by the lack
of objective criteria from either the Legislature
or the courts as to "how much" is necessary to
punish and deter, (Emphasis added,)
B.

Due Process Requires a More Definite Standard for
Limiting the Maximum Amount of Punitive Damages
Which may be Awarded in Any Given Case.

In Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,

U.S.

, 100 L.Ed.2d 62 (1988), the United States Supreme Court was
asked to decide whether a punitive damage award of $1.6 million
violated the due process, contract, and excessive fine clauses of
the federal constitution.

The Court did not, however, reach those

claims since they were not raised and passed upon in the lower
proceedings.

Nonetheless, Justices O'Connor and Scalia in

concurring noted that significant due process questions surround
the seemingly unlimited power of juries to award unlimited
punitive damages:
Appellant has touched on a due process issue
that I think is worthy of the Courtfs
attention in an appropriate case.
Mississippi law gives juries discretion to
award any amount of punitive damages in any
tort case in which the defendant acts with a
certain mental state. In my view, because
of the punitive character of such awards,
there is reason to think that this may
violate the Due Process Clause.
Punitive damages are awarded not to
compensate
for injury but, rather, "to
punish reprehensible conduct and to deter
its future occurrence." Gertz v. Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). Punitive
damages are not measured against actual
injury, so there is no objective standard
that limits their amount. Hence, "the
impact of these windfall recoveries is
unpredictable and potentially substantial."
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Electrical Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 50
(1979). For these reasons, the Court has
forbidden the award of punitive damages in
defamation suits brought by private
plaintiffs, Gertz, supra, at 349-350, and in
unfair representation suits brought against
unions under the Railway Labor Act,
Electrical Workers, supra, at 52. For
similar reasons, the Court should scrutinize
carefully the procedures under which
punitive damages are awarded in civil
lawsuits.
Under Mississippi law, the jury may award
punitive damages for any common law tort
committed with a certain mental state, that
is, "for a wilful and intentional wrong, or
for such gross negligence and reckless
negligence as is equivalent to such a
wrong." 483 So.2d 254, 269 (Miss. 1985)
(opinion below). Although this standard may
describe the required mental state with
sufficient precision, the amount of the
penalty that may ensue is left completely
indeterminate. As the Mississippi Supreme
Court said, "The determination of the amount
of punitive damages is a matter committed
solely to the authority and discretion of
the jury." ][d. , at 278. This grant of
wholly standardless discretion to determine
the severity of punishment appears
inconsistent with due process. The Court
has recognized that, "Vague sentencing
provisions may pose constitutional questions
if they do not state with sufficient clarity
the consequences of violating a given
criminal statute." United States v.
Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123 (1979).
Nothing in Mississippi law warned appellant
that by committing a tort that caused
$20,000 of actual damages, it could expect
to incur a $1.6 million punitive damage
award.
Banker's Life, 100 L.Ed.2d at 78, 79.
The striking absence of objective standards leads to
excessive and highly disproportional punitive sanctions.
1515-17.

See R.

The arbitrariness and excessiveness of punitive awards
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can be avoided only by a legislative or judicial pronouncement
specifying in advance the range of punishment permissible in a
given case.

As the United States Supreme Court stated in Grayned

v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1979):
[I]f arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement is to be prevented, laws must
provide explicit standards for those who
apply them. A vague law impermissibly
delegates basic policy matters to . . .
judges . . . and juries for resolution on an
ad hoc and subjective basis, with the
attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application. (footnotes
omitted).
The lack of objective standards likewise gives little, if any,
notice to wrongdoers of the potential penalty they may suffer as a
result of their wrongs, nor does it allow for meaningful judicial
review.

See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 486 U.S. 609

(1984) .
C.

Due Process Requires the Issues of Liability and
Punitive Damages to be Decided in a Bifurcated Trial.

Prior to trial, Fire Insurance moved to bifircate the
proceeding in order to prevent undue prejudice to the defendants.
(R. at 92 3-26)

The motion was based, in part, on the ground that

evidence relating to the Crookstonsf tort claims might improperly
influence the jury's ability to fairly determine other critical
issues and claims.

(R. at 927-35)

The motion was denied.

(R. at

537)
Due process required that the trial court bifurcate the
instant trial, especially in view of the inherently prejudicial
nature of evidence of Fire Insurance's wealth being injected into
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the case.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that
allowing a jury to consider wealth and punitive damage cases is
likely to create prejudice and lead to excessive and unpredictable
recoveries.

In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S.

247 (1981), the court held that punitive damages could not be
awarded against a municipality.

The court's decision in part was

influenced by the likelihood that evidence of a municipality's
wealth would create undue prejudice:
Because evidence of a tortfeasor's wealth is
traditionally admissible as a measure of the
amount of punitive damages that should be
awarded, the unlimited taxing power of
municipality may have a prejudicial impact
on the jury, in effect encouraging it to
impose a sizable award. The impact of such
a windfall recovery is likely to be both
unpredictable and, at times, substantial,
and we are sensitive to the possible strain
on local treasuries and therefore on
services available to the public at large.
Id. at 270-71.
The prejudicial impact of allowing evidence of an
insurance company's wealth to go to the jury before liability for
compensatory damages is determined is likewise apparent.
commentator has stated:
[I]t is probable that this very evidence,
instead of aiding the jury to assess a
proper verdict, may prejudice them against
the defendant and prevent an impartial
judgment, not only on the size of the
verdict, but in deciding who shall win the
case. It is a good guess that rich men do
not fair well before juries, and the more
emphasis played on their riches, the less
well they fair.
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One

Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 Harv.L.Rev. 1173, 1191
(1931).

See also, Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming

Punitive Damages, 69 Va.L.Rev. 269, 285, 291 (1983).
The admission of evidence of a defendant's wealth taints
the entire judicial proceeding, not just the amount of damages
awarded.

While trial judges and appellate courts frequently remit

or reverse an award of punitive damages on the basis of passion
and prejudice, reduction of such awards alone, however, may not be
sufficient.

Once evidence of wealth is admitted, the jury may

assign liability on considerations wholly removed from
culpability.

In this regard, one commentator has noted:
By allowing the jury to hear evidence of
wealth during the culpability phase of the
trial, the initial decision to punish may
not have been properly deliberated.
Therefore, any subsequent penalty assessed
by the jury would constitute an excessive
assessment method since there is no way to
determine if the jury found liability on
grounds independent of wealth. Even given
judicial remittitur, the reasonable method
of assessment seems speculative at best.

Grass, supra, at 310.
Introduction of evidence of a defendant's wealth may
likewise violate other federal and state constitutional
protections.

Fire Insurance is guaranteed the equal protection of

the laws under both the United States Constitution and the Utah
Constitution.

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; and Utah Const., Article I,

Section 2.
It has long been established that justice should not
depend upon a party's wealth or poverty.
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The United States

Supreme Court in Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956),
stated, "There can be no equal justice where the kind of a trial a
man gets depends on the amount of money he has."

Concern about

the prejudicial effect of information regarding the relative
wealth of defendants has long been recognized as the principal
basis for excluding evidence of whether an individual defendant is
insured.

W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, §83, at 549

(4th Ed. 1971).

See Rule 411, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Yet, in a

punitive damage case evidence of a defendant's wealth is freely
paraded before the jury.
Under the law of punitive damages, the wealthier the
defendant, the greater the permissible and likely assessment.
Such an approach makes punishment largely depend on status.
wealthy are punished more severely than the poor.

The

The United

States Supreme Court has clearly established that punishment of
status is inappropriate and generally constitutionally
impermissible.

Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).

See also, Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970) (court struck
down a long-recognized practice whereby the amount of punishment
was increased by the defendant's lack of assets).
D.

Due Process Requires a Higher Burden of Proof to be
Imposed in Punitive Damage Proceedings.

The jury in the instant case was instructed that it could
award punitive damages against Fire Insurance if a preponderance of
the evidence established that "the insurance company's employees'
conduct was willful and malicious, or such conduct was done with a
knowing and reckless indifference toward, and disregard of, the
-41-

Crookstons1 rights."

(R. at 1515)

Under such a standard of proof,

the jury returned a verdict of $4.0 million in punitive damages
against Fire Insurance,

The court's failure to require a higher

standard of proof before awarding punitive damages, however,
violated Fire Insurance's right to due process.
Due process requires that defendants in proceedings which
are essentially criminal in nature be afforded additional
procedural safeguards.

As commonly applied to criminal

proceedings, due process requires at a minimum an enhanced degree
of proof.

See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
In determining the appropriate standard of proof, it is

important to recognize that there is no personal right to recover
punitive damages.

See In Re Paris Air Crash Cases, 622 F.2d 1315,

1319 (9th Cir. 1980).

In essence, the doctrine of punitive

damages permits plaintiffs to act as private prosecutors to effect
deterence and retribution.

A litigant seeking punitive damages

vindicates a public interest, rather than a personal right or
interest.

Id.

The Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144,
167 (1963), established the test for determining when certain
protections guaranteed by the United States Constitution to
criminal defendants must be given to defendants in nominally civil
actions.

See, supra at p. 18, for full discussion of the Kennedy

test.
Due to the penal nature of punitive damages, due process
requires that the plaintiff be required to show by at least clear
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and convincing evidence that an award of punitive damages is
appropriate.

Such a view has been suggested and adopted by an

increasing number of commentators, legislatures and courts.

The

Indiana Supreme Court in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, 442
N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1982), noted the propriety of requiring the clear
and convincing evidence standard in awarding punitive damages.
The court stated:
In determining whether or not we should stray
from the traditional "preponderance of the
evidence" standard, it should be particularly
noted that there is no right to punitive damages.
Indianapolis Bleaching Co. v. McMillan, (1917)
64 Ind. App. 268, 272, 113 N.E. 1019. We have
repeatedly said that such damages may be awarded
in an appropriate case, as punishment for the
offense and to deter similar misconduct. It
has never been implied that a plaintiff has any
entitlement to such damages. Rather, he is
merely the fortunate recipient of the "windfall."
It cannot be said, therefore, that a plaintiff
seeking such a bonus is denied any right, if
he be held to a degree of proof higher than
is required in other actions. In fact, it is
incongruous to permit a recovery of that to
which there is no entitlement upon evidence
that barely warrants a recovery of that which
is the plaintifffs absolute right. Yet, that
is precisely what may occur when the inference
of obduracy, from which punitive damages may
flow, is permissible, but not compelled, from
the same conduct from which compensatory damages
flow, as a matter of right. To avoid such
occurrences, punitive damages should not be
allowable upon evidence that is merely consistent with the hypothesis of malice, fraud,
gross negligence or oppressiveness. Rather
some evidence should be required that is
inconsistent with the hypothesis that the
tortious conduct was the result of a mistake
of law or fact, honest error of judgment, overzealousness, mere negligence or other such
noniniquitous human failing. For, just as we
agree that it is better to acquit a person
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guilty of crime than to convict an innocent
one, we cannot deny that, given that the injured
party has been fully compensated, it is better
to exonerate a wrongdoer from punitive damages,
even though his wrong be gross or wicked, than
to award them at the expense of one whose error
was one that society can tolerate and who has
already compensated the victim of his error.
The public interest cannot be served by a policy
that favors the latter over the former. And,
just as the requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt furthers the public interest
with respect to criminal cases, a requirement
of proof by clear and convincing evidence
furthers the public interest when punitive
damages are sought.
The propriety of the clear and convincing
evidence standard is particularly evident in
contract cases, because the breach itself for
whatever reasons, will almost invariably be
regarded by the complaining party as oppressive,
if not outright fraudulent.
* * *

A rule that would permit an award of punitive
damages upon inferences permissibly drawn from
evidence of no greater persuasive value than that
required to uphold a finding of the breach of
contract—which may be nothing more than a
refusal to pay the amount demanded and subsequently
found to be owing—injects such risk into refusing
and defending against questionable claims as to
render them, in essence, nondisputable.
Id. at 362-363 (emphasis added).

See also, Roginsky v.

Richardson-Merrell, 378 F.2d 832 (2d Cir. 1967); Linthicum v.
Nationwide Life Insurance Co., 150 Ariz. 326, 723 P.2d 675, 681
(1986); Gavica v. Hanson, 101 Idaho 58, 608

P.2d 861, 864 (1980);

Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985); Wangen v. Ford

Motor

Co., 97 Wise.2d 260, 294 N.W.2d 437 (1980); Minn. Stat. Ann.
§549.20 (1986); Or. Rev. Stat. §30.925 (1981); and Colo. Rev. Stat.
§13-25-127(2) (1973) (beyond reasonable doubt).
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POINT IV.
CROOKSTONS1 ACTION WAS BARRED UNDER A
CONTRACTUALLY IMPOSED STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS.
At trial, Fire Insurance Exchange moved for summary
judgment on the ground that the Crookston's action was barred by a
contractually imposed statute of limitations.
motion was denied.

(R. at 1428-32)

(R. at 513-29)

The

The insurance policy issued to

the Crookstons contained the following limitation:
No suit or action on this policy for the
recovery of any claim shall be sustainable
in any court of law or equity unless all the
requirements of this policy shall have been
complied with, and unless commenced within
12 months next after inception of the loss.
(R. at 18)
It is undisputed that the damage to the Crookstons1 home
occurred on December 2, 1981.

The Crookstons waited until

February 10, 1983, nearly 15 months after the collapse to file suit
against Fire Insurance.

(R. at 2-11)

The failure of the

Crookstons to comply with t!le policy time-to-sue limitation should
have resultred in summary judgment being granted in favor of Fire
Insurance.
Under Utah law, contractual limitations of time in which
to bring actions on insurance policies are valid, binding and
enforceable.

Hibdon v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 657 P.2d 1358

(Utah 1983 ) ; Hoeppner v. Utah Farm Bur., 595 P.2d 863, 865 (Utah
1979); Anderson v. State Farm & Casualty Co., 583 P.2d 101, 103
(Utah 1978); Anderson v. Beneficial Fire & Casualty Co., 21 Utah
2d 173, 442 P.2d 933, 934 (1968).
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To this general rule, the Utah Supreme Court has attached
a number of caveats.
reasonable.

First, the contractual limitation must be

Hoeppner, 595 P.2d at 86 3.

Second, the insured must

be at least constructively aware of the limitation, i.e., must
have had a copy of the policy,

id. at 865.

Lastly, the insurer

must deny the claim prior to the running of the contractual
limitation period.

Anderson, 583 P.2d at 103.

Where these

requirements are satisfied, a contractual time-to-sue limitation
must be found to be valid, binding and enforceable.
The record on appeal clearly establishes Fire Insurance's
right to rely upon the subject policy's time-to-sue limitation.
The policy's contractual limitation was reasonable.

The subject

provision mirrors substantially the limitation found in the Hibdon
policy which this Court sustained and enforced.

Furthermore, the

time limitation, one year, complied with then existing pertinent
state statutes.

See, Utah Code §31-19-19 (1953) [repealed].

The

record demonstrates that the Crookstons had a copy of the subject
policy and, therefore, had either constructive notice or actual
knowledge of the time-to-sue limitation.
17 38-39)

(R. at 518-21, 969,

The record also shows that Fire Insurance adjusted the

Crookston's loss in June, 1982, more than five and a half months
prior to the running of the policy time-to-sue limitation.
518-21, 969-72)

(R. at

Under the facts of this case, the trial court

erred in denying Fire Insurance's motion for summary judgment.
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POINT V.
DAMAGES AWARDED WERE EXCESSIVE AND EVIDENCED
PASSION AND PREJUDICE ON THE PART OF THE JURY.
A.

Compensatory Damages.

Under U.R.C.P. 59(a)(5), a new trial is warranted where
damages are excessive and appear to have been given under the
influence of passion and prejudice.

The Court in Bennion v.

LeGrande Johnson Constr. Co., 701 P.2d 1078, 1084 (Utah 1984),
states:
[A] reviewing court will defer to a jury's
damage award unless the award indicates that
the jury disregarded competent evidence,
or that the award is so excessive beyond
rational justification as to indicate the
effect of improper factors in the determination . . . .
(Citations omitted.)
The compensatory damages awarded in the instant case
were excessive and reflect the influence of passion and prejudice.
Crookstons presented evidence of economic damages in the sum of
$323,399.

(R. at 2472) In addition, the Crookstons requested

damages for emotional trauma and suffering.

In support of this

claim, the Crookstons relied, for the most part, on unbridled
speculation and conjecture.
i'it I z i -a J
compensatory damages.

the jury awarded the Crookstons $815,266 in
(R. at 15 34 3 8, 154 3-46)

Assuming that

$323,399 of that award represented economic damage, nearly $500,000
of the con ipensator> award can only be attributed to the claim for
mental distress.

Such an award, however, is clearly excessive in

light of the evidence presented at trial and previous Utah case
law

m

First Security Bank of Utah v. J. B. J. Feedyards, 65 3
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P.2d 591, 598 (Utah 1982), the Court reduced a mental anguish award
of $25,000 to $12,500, by stating:
As to the amount of such damages, however, we
can find no justification for the relatively
large sum awarded to the intervenor. Damages
for mental anguish are an extreme remedy which
should be dispensed with caution. In none of
the cases cited by the parties have mental
anguish awards even approach the $25,000 awarded
here. Although intervenor undoubtedly suffered "
emotionally as a result of plaintiff's wrongful
action, he alleged no permanent damage nor any
other circumstance which might justify the
extraordinarily large amount awarded by the
court below. While the finder of fact has
wide latitude in determining damages, this
court has authority to reduce the amount that
the trial court's award where "all reasonable
minds would conclude [that] the limits have
been exceeded." (emphasis added).
First Security Bank, suggests, at a minimum, that the
instant award for mental suffering is grossly excessive.

The

award's excessiveness is further buttressed by the fact that
little, if any, competent evidence was provided at trial to
establish the alleged emotional damages.
medical treatment for their condition.
no medical expenses.

The Crookstons sought no
(R. at 2198)

They incurred

No therapy or medications were ever

prescribed.
The court in Gumbs v. Pueblo International, Inc., 82 3
F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1987), noted the growing need for courts to
review damages awards.

In Gumbs, the plaintiff slipped and fell

on salad oil in the defendant's store.
verdict of $900,000.
$575,000.

Gumbs sued and won a jury

The trial court reduced the award to

The Third Circuit, however, held that the damage award,

even after remittur, was excessive.
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In ordering a further

remit ...

...-• Third Circuit stated,

lf

[W]e do not believe that

$575,000 is within even the outermost limits of the range of
reasonable and acceptable verdicts for the injury that plaintiff
sustained . . . ."

id. at 773.

In ordering a further remittur of

damages, the court stated:
[T]his court takes note of the increasing
willingness of the appellate courts to review
damages awards. There is no doubt that this
trend is a response to the increasingly outrageous amounts demanded by plaintiffs and
awarded by juries. A jury has very broad
discretion in measuring damages; nevertheless,
a jury may not abandon analysis for sympathy
for a suffering plaintiff and treat an injury
as though it were a winning lottery ticket.
There must be a rational relationship between
the specific injury sustained and the amount
awarded.
Id.

(Emphasis added)
Upon a careful review of the record, the jury's award of

damages in the instant case was grossly excessive.

The jury, moved

by passion and prejudice, treated the Crookstons' claims as though
they "were a winning lottery ticket." There is no rational
relationship between the specific injuries allegedly sustained by
the Crookstons and the amount awarded.
nut t er "' " *w

The verdict must, as a

he i euluceH .

Punitive Damages.
Punitive damages are the exception rather than the rule
and shoii] d be cauti ousl y i mposed . Von Hake v. Thomas , 7 05 P , 2d
766, 771 (Utah 1985).

An award of punitive damages is contingent

upon a finding that the defendant's conduct was willful and
malicious or in reck] ess cli sregar d of the ri ghts of others
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Gleave

v. Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 749 P.2d 660, 670
(Utah App. 1988); Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2d 80, 84 (Utah App.
1987).

See also, First Security Bank, 653 P.2d at 598.

A punitive

damage award should not be sustained upon review if the award
appears to have resulted from passion and prejudice.

I<3. at 599;

Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 771.
In determining whether passion and prejudice influenced
an award, the court should examine several factors, including:
[T]he amount of the actual damages awarded,
the nature of the wrongdoer's acts, the facts
and circumstances surrounding the wrongful
acts, the relative wealth of the wrongdoer,
the probability the wrongdoer might act in
the same way in the future, the relationship
between the parties, and the effect of the
misconduct on the lives of the victims and
others.
Von Hake, 705 P.2d at 771.

Application of several of these

factors to the present case demonstrates the excessive nature of
the punitive damage award and evidences the influence of juror
passion and prejudice.
1.

Nature of the Wrongdoer's Act.

The Crookstons argued at trial that Fire Insurance was
guilty of intentional infliction of emotional distress and fraud.
The Crookstons claim that the entirety of Fire Insurance's conduct
and, in particular, its settlement with Rocky Mountain State Bank
amounted to malicious and outrageous conduct.

However, no evidence

was introduced at trial that Fire Insurance or its agents had any
ill will or acted maliciously toward the Crookstons.
A review of similar cases reveals that Fire Insurance's
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conduct as a matter of law was less than outrageous.

See, e.g.,

Pacific Nat, Ins. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.3d 399, 233 Cal.Rptr.
189 (1986), petition for reh'g granted, 738 P.2d 1114, 238
Cal.Rptr. 553 (1987) (automobile insurer's allegedly unreasonable
settlement offers and failure to pay even if wholly unreasonable,
were not sufficiently outrageous conduct to support cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Crossley v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 155 Mich. App. 694, 400 N.W.2d 625 (1986)
(outrageous conduct not found where insurer had rejected proof of
loss for fire damage and accused insured of arson and fraud without
any evidence); Saltou v. Dependable Ins. Co., Inc., 394 M,w.2d 629
(Minn. App. 1986) (outrageous conduct not found where insurer
delayed processing insured's insurance claim, issued a check; for
substantially less than the amount due and made check for loss of
personal property payable to insureds and lienholder jointly);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277 (Fla. 1985)
(group medical insurer's action in withholding further benefits
until provided with proof of ineligibility of insured for Medicare,
not outrageous cono ,- '

Bowe v. Eaton, 17 Wash.App. 840, 565 P.2d

826 (1977) (allegations that, following injured party's rejection
of insurer's offer to pay a certain amount for lost wages, insurer
responded by advising that i1 would nn\m r»new its offer until the
injured party's condition Iiad sufficiently stabilized failed to set
forth sufficiently aggravated conduct, despite allegation that
insurer kiu»w t hat iirjnred pat ty was totally dependent on wage payments for her support).
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Assuming, arguendo, that Fire Insurance's conduct rose to
the level of actionable intentional infliction of emotional
distress, its conduct did not demonstrate such a degree of ill will
to warrant the vast sum awarded.

Fire Insurance's allegedly

reckless conduct was largely influenced by the fact that it faced
a unique claim and the real possibility of double liability.

Both

the Crookstons and Rocky Mountain State Bank had rights under the
issued policy for certain insurance proceeds.

(R. at 21)

The par-

ties made repeated and insistent demands for payment under the
policy.

(R. at 1975)

These facts suggest that any misconduct was

motivated not out of vindictiveness or ill will toward the
Crookstons, but rather out of a desire to avoid double liability.
While Fire Insurance's conduct may have been wrong and negligent,
the circumstances of this case do not reflect such a high degree of
malice to justify the extreme amount of punitive damages awarded by
the jury.
With respect to the Crookstons' claims of fraud and
misrepresentation, Utah law "requires a showing of false
representation of an existing material fact, made knowingly or
recklessly for the purpose of inducing reliance thereon upon which
plaintiff reasonably relies to his detriment."

As discussed,

infra, the Crookstons failed to establish by clear and convincing
evidence the requisite elements of a cause of action for fraud.
However, assuming, arguendo, that Fire Insurance's conduct did
rise to the level of actionable fraud, the evidence did not show
sufficient malice to warrant a punitive damage award of $4.0
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million.
rhe Court in Bundy v. Century Equipment Co., 692 P.2d 754
(Utah 1984), held an award of punitive damages to be excessive in
part on the ground that there was no evidence that the defendants
acted out of vindictiveness or ill will.

At trial, the jury

returned a $75,000 award of punitive damages based on fraud.
After the trial court remitted and the punitive damages award to
$25,000, the defendant appealed.
On appeal, the court remanded the case for a
redetermination of an appropriate award of punitive damages, in
part because:
[The] facts suggest that defendant's
misconduct was motivated not purely out of
vindictiveness or ill will towards
plaintiffs, but rather, at least to some
extent, out of a desire to recover what was
owing . . . .
Thus, defendants' conduct
under these circumstances, although
reprehensible, did not reflect a high degree
of malice. In addition, such unique
circumstances do not demonstrate a
probability that defendant will repeat such
misconduct in the future.
Id., at 759.
2.

Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the
Wrongful Acts.

This i :ase arose under circumstances where Fire Insurance
owed duties to both Rocky Mountain State Bank and the Crookstons.
The potential for mistake and errors of judgment was significant.
Punitive -iafiiaqes are not awarded,, however, for mere inadvertence
or error in judgment.

See, Behrens v. Raleigh Hills Hospital,

Inc., 675 P.2d 1179, 1186 (Utah 1983).
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Although hindsight may

suggest that Fire Insurance should have proceeded upon a different
course of conduct, Fire Insurance should not be penalized for an
error of judgment under such circumstances.

See, Tyson v. Safeco

Ins. Companies, 461 So.2d 1308 (Ala. 1984); State Farm General
Ins. Co. v. Clifton, 86 N.M. 757, 527 P.2d 798 (1974).
3.

Relative Wealth of the Wrongdoer.

In Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983), the
Court held that punitive damages could not be awarded without
first making findings of fact with regard to a defendant's net
worth or income.

In this case, evidence was provided that Fire

Insurance's net income in 1986 was $22 million.

(R. at 2516)

In light of this fact, the jury's punitive damage award amounted
to nearly two and one-half months of Fire Insurance's net income.
Such an award has been found in other jurisdictions to be
excessive.

See, Egan v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 620 P.2d 141,

169 Cal. Rptr. 691 (1979) (award of $5 million in punitive damages
against insurer was excessive as a matter of law where it
represented two and one-half months of insurer's entire net income
in one year).
4.

Probability That the Wrongdoer Will Act the Same
Way in the Future.

No evidence was provided at trial suggesting that
Fire Insurance may conduct itself in the same way in the future.
As a result, a new trial may be appropriate to reconsider the
punitive damages award in light of such evidence.
P.2d at 772; Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d at 1219.
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See, Bundy, 692

5.

Relationship Between the Parties.

In Holland v. Moreton, 10 Utah 2d 390, 353 P.2d 989, 995
(1960), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Where there is a wrong involving the violation
of a duty springing from a relation of trust or
confidence, and the wrong is of a gross and
aggravated nature, the malicious conduct
necessary to justify punitive damages may be
found.
In this case,

the controversy arose in the context of a

first-party insurance contract.

The relationship between an

insurer and its insured was thoroughly explored in Beck v. Farmers
Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

In Beck, the insured

brought action against his insurer for alleged bad faith refusal to
settle a claim for uninsured motorist benefits.

The insurer moved

to dismiss the bad faith claim on the ground that it had no duty
"to bargain with or settle plaintiff's uninsured motorist claim."
Id. at 797.

The trial court granted the motion.

In reversing the

lower court's action, the Court noted that the parties' duties and
obligations in t•>fiduciary.

Id. a* ^

..5

:"'--ty

""hus

context are contractual rather than
no relationship of trust and

reliance is created by an insurance contract.

IcL

Practically

speaking, an insurer an :il its insured are adversaries.

Lyon v.

Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., 25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739,
745 (1971) overruled on other grounds 701 P.2d 798 (1985).

Since

there were no breaches of fiduciary duties in the instant case, the
staggering award of punitive damages s): iou] d not be sustained.
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7.

Effect of Wrongdoer's Conduct on the Lives of
Victims and Others.

When viewed in comparison to previous reported Utah
cases, the alleged effect of Fire Insurance's conduct on the
Crookstons did not justify an award of $4 million in punitive
damages.

For example, in Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37 (Utah

1980), the award of punitive damages was upheld where there was
evidence of permanent psychological damage resulting from
prolonged sexual assault and abuse.
The evidence presented at trial provides only a tenuous
nexus between Fire Insurance's alleged misconduct and the alleged
effect on the lives of the Crookstons.

Assuming arguendo, that

the resultant harm to the Crookstons did arise from Fire
Insurance's conduct, such harm, given Utah law, does not justify
such a large punitive damage award.
POINT VI.
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED DUE TO THE
ERRONEOUS STATEMENTS OF LAW FOUND IN JURY
INSTRUCTION NOS. 28 AND 29.
Jury Instruction No. 28 purported to establish that the
plaintiffs' claim for fraud and misrepresentation against
defendant had only six essential elements.

(R. at 1509-10)

However, the Utah Supreme Court in Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141,
247 P.2d 273, 274 (1952), held that an action in deceit based on
fraudulent misrepresentation consists of nine essential elements.
Instruction No. 28 clearly fails to contain all of the essential
elements of fraud.

The jury was not instructed that the

"fraudulent misrepresentation" must concern a presently existing
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fact,

in addition, the jury was not instructed that the

"fraudulent misrepresentation" must have been made by Fire
Insurance for the purpose of inducing the Crookstons to act upon
it.

Furthermore, the jury was not instructed that it must find

that the Crookstons actually relied on the "fraudulent misrepresentation in ignorance of its falsity."

An instruction which

incorrectly states the law, as does Instruction No. 28, provides
ground for ordering a new trial.

See, Everton v. Blair, 99 Idaho

14, 576 P.2d 585 (1978) .
Instruction No. 29, likewise, fails to accurately state
the applicable law.

(R. at 1511)

Jury Instruction No. 29

provided:
In the absence of information such as would
cause a reasonable person to inquire further,
the plaintiffs or their agents would be
entitled to rely on the factual representations
of the insurance company.
While the above-stated jury instruction would accurately
state the law i n mai ijr contexts, it wa- ^l"olly inapplicable and
inaccurate in a first party insurance dispute.

The right to rely

upon a representation must be considered in light of the
relationship existing between the parties.
Utah 2d 2L- \

300 P. 2d 819, 622 (1956).

Lawrence v. Ward, 5

The relationship between

the Crookstons and Fire Insurance was contractual in nature,
rather than fiduciary.

Beck, 701 P.zu dt duu.

At the time the

alleged fraudulent misrepresentations were made, the parties were,
practically speaking, adversaries.

Lyon, 480 P.2d at 745.

The

Court in Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 37 8, 42 3 P.2d 659,
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662 (1967), described the right to rely on another contracting
party's representations as follows:
In regard to this alleged cause of action
for negligent misrepresentation, it is
pertinent to keep in mind that there is
recognized a defense somewhat analogous
to contributory negligence in other tort
actions. The one who complains of being
injured by such a false representation
cannot heedlessly accept as true whatever
is told him but has the duty of exercising
such degree of care to protect his own
interests as would be exercised by an
ordinary, reasonable and prudent person
under the circumstances; and if he fails
to do so, is precluded from holding someone
else to account for the consequences of his
own neglect.
See also, Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349,
364 (Ind. 1982).
Instruction No. 29 purports to create a presumption in
favor of the Crookstons' right to rely on the representations of
Fire Insurance and its agents.

Yet, the law is clear, the parties

were, practically speaking, adversaries at all times.

The nature

of the relationship between the parties, as a matter of law, put
the Crookstons on notice that they did not have any right to rely
upon the representations made by Fire Insurance.

The jury should

have been instructed that the Crookstons had the duty of
exercising reasonable care to protect their own interests under
the circumstances of this case.

The Crookstons were not entitled

to "heedlessly accept as true" whatever Fire Insurance told them.
While trial counsel for Fire Insurance did not
specifically except to Instruction Nos. 28 and 29, this Court in
its discretion and in the interest of justice may grant a new
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trial for the errors contained in those instructions.

U.R.C.P. 51

provides:
No party may assign as error the giving or
the failure to give an instruction unless he
objects thereto . . . .
Notwithstanding the
foregoing requirement, the appellate court,
in its discretion and in the interest of
justice, may review the giving of or failure
to give an instruction.
Likewise, U.R.C.P. 59 provides ample authority for a
trial court to order a new trial due to clearly erroneous jury
instructions.

Rule 59(a) provides in pertinent part:
Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a
new trial may be granted to all or any of
the parties and on all or part of the issues,
for any of the following causes . . . .
(1)

Irregularity in the proceedings of the
court, jury or adverse party, or any
order of the court, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial.
* * *

(7)

Error in law.

This Court has recognized that under certain circumstances, an erroneous instruction may provide sufficient ground
for the granting of a new trial even though the aggrieved party
failed to object to the suspect instruction.

In Williams v.

Lloyd, 16 Utah 2d 427, 403 P.2d 166, 167 (1965), the court held:
It is true that the requirement is not
absolutely rigid, but that under the rule,
and our decisions, a review of error without
said objection may be had. But this will
be done only under unusual circumstances
where the interests of justice urgently so
demand.
See also, State v. Bell, 563 P.2d 186 (Utah 1977); Wagner v.
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Olsen, 25 Utah 2d 366, 482 P.2d 702 (1971); McCall v. Kendrick, 2
Utah 2d 364, 274 P.2d 962 (1954).
The Court in Henderson v. Meyer, 533 P.2d 290 (Utah
1975), recognizes a court's inherent power to grant relief from a
judgment where plain error appears in the record.

In Henderson,

the plaintiffs did not move for a directed verdict on the issue of
liability.

Following a verdict for the defendant, plaintiffs

appealed on the grounds that there was insufficient evidence to
support the verdict and that the issue of liability should not
have gone to the jury.

This Court reversed the judgment of the

lower court with directions to enter judgment for plaintiffs on the
matter of liability.

In so doing, the Court held:

The law is to the effect that one who does
not move for a directed verdict generally
has no standing to urge on appeal that the
evidence does not support the judgment.
However, an exception exists where plain
error appears in the record and it would
result in a miscarriage of justice to
affirm the judgment.
Id. at 291-292 (emphasis added).
Other jurisdictions similarly hold that a new trial may
be granted on the basis of erroneous or improper jury instructions
despite the aggrieved party's failure to object to the
instructions.

See First National Bank v. Campbell, 198 Colo. 344,

599 P.2d 915, 916-17 (1979); Montgomery v. Murray, 481 P.2d 755,
760

(Okla. 1971); Wasden v. Seaboard Coast Line Railroad Co., 474

So.2d 825 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App. 1985); Easton v. Bradford, 390 So.2d
1202 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1980); Bickford v. Wall, 371 So.2d 172
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1979); Shank v. Fassoulas, 304 So.2d 469
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(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1974); Penn v. Hartman, 525 S.W.2d 773 (Mo.App.
1975)•
The failure to properly instruct the jury in this case in
relation to Instruction Nos. 28 and 29 constitutes plain error.
The jury ultimately returned an unprecedented award of damages in
an insurance bad faith case.

The award was in part predicated

upon the jury's finding that Fire Insurance had engaged in
fraudulent conduct.

The instructions outlining the elements of

fraud, and the right of the Crookstons to rely on Fire Insurance's
representations, were plainly incorrect statements of law.

To

permit such an unprecedented award of punitive damages to be
rendered under such circumstances would result in gross injustice.
This Court should, therefore, exercise its discretion and find
that Fire Insurance's failure to except to the subject
instructions does not bar the granting of a new trial due to
fundamentally flawed jury instructions.
POINT VII.
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE
JURY ON THE CROOKSTONS' DUTY OF GOOD FAITH
AND IN FAILING TO COMPARE THE CROOKSTONS'
BAD FAITH TO THAT OF FIRE INSURANCE.
Jury Instruction No. 24 properly set forth the duty of
good faith and fair dealing of Fire Insurance in regard to the
Crookstons' claims.

(R. 1504-05)

The jury did not, however,

receive any instruction regarding any duty of good faith and fair
dealing on the part of the Crookstons.

The jury, on Interrogatory

No. 5 of the Special Verdict, answered the following question in
the affirmative:

"Did the defendant Fire Insurance Exchange
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violate its duty of good faith and fair dealing in its treatment of
plaintiffs1 claim?"

(R. at 1544)

There was no corresponding

question to elicit a determination as to whether the Crookstons
violated their duty of good faith and fair dealing.

The court's

failure to so instruct the jury and its failure to ask the jury to
determine whether the Crookstons breached any such duty of good
faith and fair dealing was error.
The Court in Beck v. Farmers ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795,
801 (Utah 1985), held that, "[A]s parties to a contract, the
insured and the insurer have parallel obligations to perform the
contract in good faith, obligations that inhere in every
contractual relationship."

(Emphasis added.)

Since the

Crookstons had a parallel obligation to perform the contract in
good faith, Fire Insurance was entitled to have the jury
compare the Crookstons1 bad faith, if any, to that of Fire
Insurance.
The California Court of Appeals in California Casualty
General Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 173 Cal.3d 274, 218 Cal.Rptr.
817 (1985), recognized that under most circumstances a defendant
insurer is entitled to have the jury instructed in regard to the
plaintiff's bad faith.

In California Casualty, plaintiff

instituted the action to recover compensatory and punitive damages
for California Casualty's alleged breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

California Casualty answered and later moved for leave

to amend their answer to add the following fourth affirmative
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defense:
The plaintiff and her former attorney are guilty
of bad faith conduct in the prosecuting, handling
and management of the uninsured motorist claim
referred to in plaintiff's first amended complaint
and as a proximate cause of their bad faith acts,
omissions, and failure to provide full and
complete information to the defendants and their
insuror [sic], these defendants request that any
damages awarded against them for bad faith be
reduced by the amount of the bad faith conduct
of plaintiff and her former attorney.
California Casualty, 218 Cal.Rptr. at 819.

The trial court denied

California Casualty's motion to amend.
The California Court of Appeals vacated the trial court's
order denying California Casualty's motion to amend their answer,
and stated:
There can be little question but that an insurer
which provides uninsured motorist coverage has a
reasonable expectation that if the insured
suffers a loss claimed to be covered under the
uninsured motorist provisions of the policy,
the insured will promptly and accurately furnish
it with all the information and evidence pertinent to the claim that is known to the insured.
If a failure of the insured to do so results in
delaying or impeding the investigation of the
claim by the insurer or delays or makes improvident the insurer's payment of the claim, any
economic loss and emotional distress caused by
the insured by virtue of any such nonpayment or
delay in investigation or payment will have
been caused either wholly or in part by the
conduct of the insured. We perceive no sound
reason, nor is it suggested, why the doctrine
of comparative fault enunciated and applied
to negligent conduct by the California Supreme
Court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d
804, 119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, and later
applied as between a strictly liable defendant
and a negligent plaintiff (Daly v. General
Motors Corp. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 725, 144 Cal.Rptr.
380, 575 P.2d 1162) and as between two tort-

-63-

feasors, one of whose liability was based on
strict products liability and the other on
negligence (Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart
(1978) 21 Cal.3d 322, 146 Cal.Rptr. 550, 579
P.2d 441) should not be applicable to bad faith
cases.
Id. at 823.

See also, Hendel v. United States Fidelity and

Guaranty, 192 Cal.3d 684, 237 Cal.Rptr. 667 (1987).
While the concept of comparative bad faith has not been
expressly adopted in Utah, adequate basis in law exists for
holding that the jury in the instant matter should have been
instructed in regard to the concept of comparative bad faith.

The

Utah Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37 to §78-27-43
(Supp. 1987), expressly recognizes the concept of comparative
fault.

The Utah Liability Reform Act specifically defines "fault"

to mean:
[A]ny actionable breach of legal duty, act,
or omission proximately causing or contributing
to injury or damages sustained by a person
seeking recovery, including, but not limited to,
negligence in all its degrees, contributory
negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability,
breach of express or implied warranty of a product,
product liability, and misuse, modification or
abuse of a product.
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37(2) (Supp. 1987) (emphasis added).

The

Utah Liability Reform Act also expressly provides for separate
special verdicts on total damages and proportion of fault.

Utah

Code Ann. §78-27-39 (Supp. 1987).
Although the occurrences complained of in the Crookstons1
complaint occurred before the Utah Liability Reform Act was
enacted, the concepts of comparative fault embodied within that
Act should control in the instant case.
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At the very least, the

jury should have been instructed that the Crookstons had a legal
duty of good faith and fair dealing towards Fire Insurance and the
effect of any breach of that duty by the Crookstons.

Trial counsel

for Fire Insurance requested such instructions, but the court
refused to submit them to the jury.

(R. at 1385-87)

The failure

to properly instruct the jury as to the insured's duty of good
faith and fair dealing, and the failure to require the jury to
compare the Crookstons1 bad faith with that of Fire Insurance
necessitates a new trial on the matter.
POINT VIII.
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DIRECTED A VERDICT IN
FAVOR OF FIRE INSURANCE ON THE CROOKSTONS1
CLAIMS OF FRAUD AND INTENTIONAL INFLICTION
OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS.
At the conclusion of the evidence, Fire Insurance moved
for a directed verdict on the claims of fraud and intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

(R. at 2672-74)

The trial

court apparently never ruled on the motion prior to entry of
judgment in favor of the Crookstons.

The evidence at trial was

insufficient as a matter of law to support a verdict in favor of
the Crookstons on either the claim of fraudulent misrepresentation
or the tort of outrage.
The record demonstrates that the Crookstons failed to
establish anything more than a breach of implied and express
contractual duties on the part of Fire Insurance.

In the absence

of substantial evidence to sustain the juryfs verdict on their
other claims, the Crookstons cannot recover in tort.
P.2d at 800.

Beck, 701

All damages flowing from any contractual breach of
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duty by Fire Insurance are ex contractu, rather than ex delicto.
See DCR Inc. v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433, 435-436 (Utah 1983).
Since the damages allegedly sustained by the Crookstons arose only
out of the breach of contractual obligations, plaintiffs may not
recover punitive damages, even if the breach was intentional or
maliciously motivated.

Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co., 660 P.2d

229, 232-233 (Utah 1983).
A.

Crookstons Failed to Establish Sufficient Evidence
to Support the Jury's Finding of Intentional
Infliction of Emotional Distress.
1.

The Standard of Proof for the Tort of Outrage.

The Utah Supreme Court first recognized the tort of
outrage in Jeppsen v. Jensen, 47 Utah 536, 155 P. 429 (1916).

In

Jeppsen, the plaintiff sought recovery for injuries to her health
and nervous system allegedly sustained through the defendant's
willful, wanton, and unlawful acts.

The defendant allegedly

entered the plaintiff's home and in a loud and threatening voice,
and with violent abusive language, threatened to shoot and kill
plaintiff's husband.

The defendant knew that the plaintiff was

weak and ill from a recent child birth.

The plaintiff was so

terrified by the defendant's actions that she became ill and was
confined to her bed for two days.

The trial court's judgment for

the defendant was reversed and remanded with instructions to grant
a new trial, on the basis that the complaint stated a sufficient
cause of action:
We are of the opinion that the acts described
in the complaint are such as bring this case
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clearly within the rule that damages may be
recovered for injuries to health or for shock
to the nervous system, although caused by
terror or fright alone, and where there is
no actual bodily injury inflicted upon the
injured person and none such intended by
the wrongdoer. Such acts cannot be considered
as merely ordinary negligent acts for which
no recovery, from fright alone, is, as a
general rule, permitted.
Jeppsen, 155 P. at 431.
Later in Samms v. Eccles, 11 Utah 2d 289, 358 P.2d 344
(1961), the plaintiff sought to recover damages for injuries
resulting from emotional distress.

The defendant had persistently

annoyed the plaintiff with highly insulting, obscene and indecent
proposals that she have illicit sexual relations with him.

The

trial court dismissed the plaintiff's action, finding that the
plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.
In holding that the trial court erred in dismissing the
plaintiff's action, the court noted:
[S]uch a cause of action may not be based
upon mere negligence, the best considered
view recognizes an action for severe
emotional distress, though not accompanied
by bodily impact or physical injury, where
the defendant intentionally engaged in some
conduct toward the plaintiff, (a) with the
purpose of inflicting emotional distress,
or (b) where any reasonable person would
have known that such would result; and his
actions are of such a nature as to be
considered outrageous and intolerable in
that they offend against the generally
accepted standards of decency and morality.
Samms, 358 P.2d at 346-347.
In Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d
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315 (1976), the Massachusetts Supreme Court outlined the four
essential elements for the tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress:
It must be shown (1) that the actor
intended to inflict emotional distress or
that he knew or should have known that
emotional distress was the likely result
of his conduct; (2) that the conduct was
"extreme and outrageous," was "beyond all
possible bounds of decency" and was "utterly
intolerable in a civilized community";
(3) that the actions of the defendant were
the cause of the plaintifffs distress; and
(4) that the emotional distress sustained
by the plaintiff was "severe" and of a
nature "that no reasonable man could be
expected to endure it."
Agis, 355 N.E.2d at 318-19 (citations omitted).

See also,

Restatement (Second) of Torts §46(1) (1965): Fletcher v. Western
National Life Ins. Co., 10 Cal.3d 376, 89
2.

Cal. Rptr. 78 (1970).

Fire Insurance's Conduct Was Not Sufficiently
Aggravated or Extreme to be Actionable.

The theory of intentional infliction of emotional
distress was late in developing because courts saw the potential
danger of vexatious and fictitious claims.

When the cause of

action for intentional infliction of emotional distress was
recognized, a very heavy burden of proof was imposed upon the
party seeking recovery.

In order to state a cause of action, the

acts complained of must be "outrageous" and "beyond all possible
bounds of decency."

See Restatement (Second) of Torts §46,

comment (d) (1965).

Such a cause of action may not be based upon

mere negligence, nor upon gross negligence.

See, Samms, 358 P.2d

at 346; and In Re Baker, 18 B.R. 243 (W.D. N.Y. 1982).
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Restatement (Second) of Torts §46, comment (h) (1965)
allows for the summary determination of whether a party's conduct
may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to
permit recovery under the theory of intentional infliction of
emotional distress.

The Court in Gygl v. Storch, 28 Utah 2d 399,

503 P.2d 449 (1972), clearly indicates that it is the court's duty
to determine whether the complained of activity is so outrageous
and extreme and so offends the generally accepted standards of
decency and morality that the matter must go to the jury.
A review of other insurance bad faith cases demonstrates
that the Crookstons failed to establish as a matter of law that
Fire Insurance's conduct was sufficiently severe to be actionable
for the tort of outrage.
394 N.W.2d 629 (Minn. App.

In Saltou v. Dependable Ins. Co., Inc.,
1986), the plaintiffs sued their

insurer, Dependable Insurance Company, and its agent for
the insurer's failure to pay a claim.

The plaintiffs alleged

intentional infliction of emotional distress, fraud, and unfair
and discriminatory insurance practices.

The defendants' motions

for summary judgment were granted by the trial court.
In affirming the lower court's action, the Minnesota
Court of Appeals held that the tortious acts complained of by the
plaintiffs did not constitute the independent tort of outrage:
The tortious acts appellants allege, however,
are all connected with Dependable's failure to
pay appellants' insurance claim in the manner
appellants felt it should have been paid. The
failure to pay an insurance claim, in itself,
no matter how malicious, does not constitute
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a tort; it constitutes a breach of an insurance
contract. Haagenson v. National Farmers Union
Property and Casualty Co., 277 N.W.2d 648, 652
(Minn. 1979). "When the insurer refuses to pay
or unreasonably delays payment of an undisputed
amount, it breaches the contract and is liable
for the loss that naturally and proximately
flows from the breach." Olson v. Rugloski,
277 N.W.2d 385, 387-88 (Minn. 1979). Punitive
damages are not recoverable for breach of
contract unless the breach was accompanied by
an independent tort. Id. at 388.
Where an implied covenant of good faith has
been maliciously broken, a malicious motive
may be important in determining whether a
material breach has occurred but is immaterial
in determining damages for contract breach.
Wild v. Rariq, 302 Minn. 419, 234 N.W.2d 775
(1975). "[E]xtra-contract damages are not
recoverable for breach of contract except in
exceptional cases where the breach is accompanied by an independent tort." Haagenson,
277 N.W.2d 648, 652 (Minn. 1979).
Id. at 633 (emphasis added).
After setting out a standard for first-party insurance
bad faith claims, substantially similar to that adopted in Beck
v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), the Saltou
court stated:
In Haagenson, the plaintiff was injured when
he came into contact with damaged power lines
as he was attempting to enter an automobile.
The Haagensons contended that their insurer's
refusal to pay plaintiffs' no-fault claim was
intentional, malicious and in bad faith and,
thus, constituting intentional infliction of
emotional distress. The Haagenson court held
that, even assuming the defendant insurance
company had no reason to contest plaintiffs'
claim, punitive damages were not recoverable
for bad-faith breach of contract on a theory
of intentional infliction of emotional distress.
A malicious motive in breaching the contract,
the court held, did not convert a contract
action into a tort action. Id.
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Similarly, appellant's allegations in support
of their tort claim merely support a claim of
bad-faith breach of contract and, in view of
Haagenson and Wild, did not make out an
independent tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. Although bad faith failure
to pay insurance claims is not to be encouraged,
and respondents took advantage of appellants'
vulnerable mental and economic condition,
appellants must show more than malicious failure
to pay an insurance claim in order to recover
extra-contractual damages.
Id., at 633 (emphasis added).

See also, Metropolitan Life Ins.

Co. v. McCarson, 467 So.2d 277, 279 (Fla. 1985); Crossley v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 155 Mich. App. 694, 400 N.W.2d 625, 628 (1986);
Pacific National Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal.3d 399, 233
Cal.Rptr. 189, 193 (1986), petition for reh'q granted 738 P.2d
1114, 238 Cal.Rptr. 553 (1987); Combs v. Insurance Company of
Illinois, 146 111. App. 3d 957, 497 N.E.2d 503, 508 (1986).
The actions of Fire Insurance and its agents do not meet
the minimum actionable standards for the tort of outrage.

While

the complained of conduct may have been improper, it did not
necessarily rise to the level of being sufficiently aggravated as
to constitite "outrageous conduct." Assuming arguendo that Fire
Insurance's conduct in handling the claim was malicious, such
evidence does not necessarily establish a cognizable claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Even a malicious

motive in a defendant's breaching the contract does not convert a
contract action into an independent tort action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress.

Saltou, 394 N.W. 2d at 633.

This Court has recognized that a breach of contract,
standing alone, does not call for punitive damages even if
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characterized by extreme bad faith, malice or recklessness.

The

Court in Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d
743, 750 (1982), stated:
It is true that in some jurisdictions punitive
damages may be awarded in cases involving contracts where the breaching party's conduct is
characterized by extreme bad faith, malice or
recklessness. We prefer the standard articulated
by the Kansas Supreme Court in Gonzales v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 217 Kan. 262, 535 P.2d 919
(1975), which states that a breach of contract,
standing alone, does not call for punitive
damages even if intentional and unjustified,
but such damages are allowable if there is some
independent tort indicating malice, fraud or
wanton disregard for the rights of others.
(Citations omitted.)
Likewise, as stated in Jorgensen v. John Clay and Co.,
660 P.2d 229, 232-233 (Utah 1983):
The general rule is that punitive damages
cannot be awarded for a breach of contract.
However, we and other jurisdictions have
allowed punitive damages where the breach
of contract amounts to an independent tort.
We recognize the rule in some jurisdictions
which, rather than requiring an independent
tort, allows the award of punitive damages
if the contract was breached willfully and
maliciously. Despite dicta in some cases,
we have not and do not adhere to this rule.
(Emphasis added.)
Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 800 (Utah
1985), holds that in a first-party relationship between an insurer
and its insured, any breach of the insurance contract or the
implied duty to act in good faith, without more, gives rise only
to a cause of action in contract, not one in tort.

Beck does

state, however, that in "some cases the acts constituting a breach
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of contract may also result in breaches of duty that are
independent of the contract and may give rise to causes of action
in tort," Id., at 800, n. 3.

As discussed supra, the Crookstons1

right to punitive damages hinges upon their ability to establish
breaches of duty, independent of the contract, that give rise to
causes of action in tort.

The record on appeal demonstrates that

the Crookstons failed to meet that burden.
3.

Crookstons' Injuries Do Not Constitute
Severe or Extreme Emotional Distress.

In order state a cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress, the Crookstons must likewise
establish that they have, in fact, suffered severe or extreme
emotional distress.

Comment (j) to Restatement (Second) of Torts

§46 (1965) provides that it is for the court to determine whether,
on the evidence, severe emotional distress can be found.

Once

again, the party seeking recovery for intentional infliction of
emotional distress must establish that the emotional distress
sustained was "severe" and of a nature "that no reasonable man
could be expected to endure."
The case law clearly demonstrates that the alleged emotional injuries, embarrassment and humiliation suffered by the
Crookstons cannot be properly characterized as "severe emotional
distress."

In Woodman Accident and Life Ins. Co. v. Bryant, 784

F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1986), the court held that the mere fact
that the plaintiff in a bad faith action lost sleep due to the
insurer's refusal to pay medical bills did not rise to an
actionable level.
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In Moolenaar v. Atlas Motor Inns, Inc., 616 F.2d 87 (3d
Cir. 1980), the plaintiff asserted that the citizen's arrest made
by the defendants, owners and managers of a hotel, for plaintiff's
violation of a hotel dress code caused him severe emotional
distress.

The plaintiff asserted that he had lost weight due to

the anxiety caused by his arrest, that his sleeping patterns were
adversely affected, and that he was embarrassed by newspaper
reports of the event.

The court held that the plaintiff's

embarrassment and humiliation could not be characterized as severe
emotional distress.

Id.

at 89.

In USA Oil, Inc. v. Smith, 415 So.2d 1098 (Ala. 1982),
writ denied, 415 So.2d 1102 (Ala. 1982), the plaintiff employer
appealed from a lower court decision which awarded a former
employee damages on her counterclaim for intentional infliction
of emotional distress.

At trial the defendant testified that the

plaintiff's conduct had affected her sleep and caused her to have
crying spells.

The appellate court reversed the award for

emotional distress.
It has been stated that "the breach of contract
practically always causes mental vexation and feelings of
disappointment in the plaintiff; but he seldom thinks of asking
for a money payment therefor."

5 Corbin, Contracts §1076 (1964).

While the Crookstons undoubtedly sustained some mental and
emotional upset as a result of the Fire Insurance's alleged breach
of contract, such is not actionable unless it rose to the level
of being so severe "that no reasonable man could be expected to
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endure," Samms, 358 P.2d at 347.
The record on appeal demonstrates that the Crookstons did
not suffer such severe distress that no reasonable man could be
expected to endure.
2383-2448.

R. at 1994-2025, 2110-43, 2192-2231 and

While the record establishes that the Crookstons were

upset and distraught, there was no medical testimony to support or
substantiate the nature or extent of their emotional distress.
The frustrations, aggravations, and traumas allegedly sustained by
the Crookstons are not infrequently endured by other members of
society under a variety of circumstances.

The loss of sleep, the

loss of appetite, the loss of enjoyment of life, and the loss of
motivation are all part of the price of living in society.

The

mental distress established by the Crookstons at trial is wholly
inadequate to support a recovery for the tort of intentional
infliction of emotional distress.
4.

Crookstons' Emotional Upset Was Not the
Proximate Result of Fire Insurance's Conduct.

Even assuming arguendo that Fire Insurance's conduct was
outrageous and that the Crookstons sustained sufficient emotional
distress to maintain a cause of action for the tort of outrage,
the record fails to establish that the Crookstons' emotional
distress was actually and proximately caused by Fire Insurance's
conduct.

The testimony at trial was replete with evidence that

the Crookstons1 emotional distress began long before any of the
allegedly improper acts of Fire Insurance.

The construction of the

home in North Salt Lake took much longer than expected.
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(R. at

2180)

The protracted construction and cost overruns forced the

Crookstons into a precarious financial situation.

As Mr. Crookston

testified, when the house collapsed, the Crookstons "collapsed."
(R. at 2209-10)

As Mr. Crookston testified at trial, the collapse

of the home was the most significant emotional trauma ever
sustained by him or his family.

(R. at 2209-10)

While some

actions and conduct on the part of Fire Insurance may have been
improper, such were not the proximate cause of the Crookstons1
emotional distress.

Therefore, the verdict in favor of the

Crookstons on their claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress cannot stand.
B.

The Verdict in Favor of the Crookstons on the Claim
of Fraud and Misrepresentation is Unsupported in
Law and in Fact.

This Court in Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah 141, 247 P.2d
273, 274 (1952), held that actions based on fraudulent
misrepresentation must establish nine essential elements.

A

plaintiff in an action based on fraud must prove each of the
elements by clear and convincing evidence,

id.

A verdict

returned based on mere suspicion and innuendo is not sufficient to
support a verdict of fraudulent conduct.
Inc., 607 P.2d 293 (Utah 1980).

See Taylor v. Gasor,

Crookstons1 failure to provide

clear and convincing evidence to support the jury's finding on
every element of fraud is demonstrated by a careful review of the
facts elicited at trial.
Crookstons pointed to seven alleged incidents of
actionable fraudulent misrepresentations on the part of the
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defendant.

Those allegations include:
1.

That Fire Insurance misrepresented in its policy
that it would pay the Crookstons an amount
sufficient to demolish, clean and rebuild
the subject structure, and also provide
certain living expenses;

2.

That during the period of March 31, 1982
to June 16, 1982, Fire Insurance's agents misrepresented that they had no authority to
settle the Crookstons1 claims;

3.

That on June 16, 1982, Alan Clapperton
misrepresented to the Crookstons'
counsel that Fire Insurance was not yet
in a position to settle the Crookstons1
claims, and that he would include the
Crookstons' counsel in any settlement
negotiation;

4.

That Fire Insurance misrepresented that
the only amounts due and owing under the
policy for damage to the Crookstons'
home was approximately $27,000;

5.

That Fire Insurance misrepresented that
the bid submitted by Phipps was
reasonable and represented the full
amount needed to completely restore the
structure back to its pre-loss
condition;

6.

That Fire Insurance misrepresented that
its payment of approximately $32,000 to
Rocky Mountain State Bank extinguished
any claims that the Crookstons had; and

7.

That Fire Insurance misrepresented to
the Crookstons that it would pay no more
money under the policy than the sums
already paid out to Rocky Mountain State
Bank.

When the evidence produced at trial in support of the
allegations of fraud are measured against the yardstick of Pace v.
Parrlsh, it is clear that the Crookstons failed to establish at
least one of the requisite elements of fraud for each of their
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seven allegations.
The first allegation is that Fire Insurance misrepresented
in its policy that it would pay for the reasonable costs to
demolish, clean, and rebuild the home, and also provide certain
living expenses.

(R. at 2692)

The subject policy was originally

issued before construction on the subject structure was even
initiated.

Generally, breached promises or expressions of future

intention are not actionable for fraud.

This rule applies as long

as the intention to perform was made in good faith at the time,
even though the promisor changes his mind and fails or refuses to
perform in the future.

Only a promise accompanied by the present

intention not to perform made in order to mislead is actionable.
See Cerritos Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1, 645 P.2d 608 (Utah
1982); and Berkeley Bank For Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798
(Utah 1980).
There was not a scintilla of evidence produced at trial
to support the contention that Fire Insurance at the time it
issued the subject policy never intended to perform its
obligations thereunder.

The fact that promises are broken does

not necessarily mean that a party has engaged in a deliberate
scheme to mislead or to defraud.
The loss occasioned by the collapse of the earth home was
a highly unusual, if not unique, loss.

The parties had great

difficulty in getting contractors to submit repair estimates.

Not

even Rocky Mountain State Bank was able to convince a contractor
to tender a bid.

(R. at 1687-88, 1976-77, 2035, 2557)
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Adjusting

this atypical loss was a difficult and laborious task.

Fire

Insurance's adjusters spent more time and effort in adjusting this
loss than called for under company policy.

(R. at 19 35)

While

errors in judgment and mistakes may have been made, Fire
Insurance's actions were void of any ill will or malice towards the
Crookstons.
Fire Insurance issues hundreds of policies on a daily
basis.

The company's Ogden branch office handles over 4,000

claims a year.

(R. at 2587)

The overwhelming majority of those

claims are handled expeditiously and to the complete satisfaction
of policyholders.

(R. at 2587-89)

There was no evidence presented

at trial that Fire Insurance, at the time the Crookstons' policy
was issued, did not intend to perform its obligations thereunder.
The scope of coverage under the Crookstons' policy was
indistinguishable from that of countless other policies issued by
Fire Insurance.

The fact that the Crookstons maintain that they

did not receive all the coverage they had contracted for, falls far
short of establishing that the policy was issued with only the
illusion of insurance coverage.
The second allegation of actionable fraudulent
misrepresentation is that Fire Insurance's agent misrepresented
that he did not have any authority to settle the Crookstons'
claim.

(R. at 2692)

Crookstons elicited testimony that

"authority" had in fact been given from Fire Insurancefe regional
office in Pocatello, Idaho.

It is important to remember that the

relationship between the Crookstons and their insurer is governed
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solely by the contract entered into by the parties.

The Utah

Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the view that a fiduciary
relationship exists between an insurer and its insured in the
context of a first-party dispute.

See Beck, 701 P.2d at 800.

Indeed, in the context of a first-party dispute between an insurer
and its insured, they are "in effect and practically speaking,
adversaries."

Lyon, 480 P.2d at 745.

Due to the relationship that existed between the parties
during the time the loss was being adjusted, there was no duty on
the part of Fire Insurance to divulge the nature or extent of its
settlement authority from its regional office.

It cannot be

seriously contended that one has a duty to disclose one's
settlement authority in an "adversarial" relationship.

In light of

the relationship of an insured and its insurer in a first-party
dispute, there simply was no duty of disclosure.

Absent a duty to

disclose the nature or extent of its settlement authority to the
Crookstons, any reliance by them on any such representation was
wholly unreasonable and unjustifiable.
Assuming arguendo that there was reasonable reliance, for
which there was no specific testimony produced at trial, it is
inconceivable that the Crookstons were damaged in any way from
that particular "misrepresentation."

They were represented by

counsel during the time the alleged misrepresentations took place.
If they had somehow compromised their claim as a result of this
"misrepresentation," the misrepresentation might be actionable.
However, the Crookstons did not in any way compromise or
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jeopardize their claim or contract rights in reliance upon the
representation of Fire Insurance's agents.
The third allegation of actionable fraudulent
misrepresentation is that Alan Clapperton misrepresented to the
Crookstons1 counsel on June 16, 1982 that Fire Insurance was not
yet in a position to settle, and that he would notify counsel at
such time that the company was in a position to settle.
269 3)

(R. at

Once again, the record does not establish by clear and

convincing evidence that the Crookstons relied in any way on this
representation.

Even if they did rely, such reliance was

unreasonable and unjustifiable.

Furthermore, the Crookstons failed

to demonstrate at trial how this particular "misrepresentation"
damaged or jeopardized their claims or rights.
The fourth allegation of actionable fraudulent
misrepresentation is that Fire Insurance misrepresented that the
only amount due and owing under the policy was approximately
$27,000.

(R. at 2693)

Crookstons elicited testimony at trial to

support their view that the subject policy included coverage for
the cost of cleaning up the building site and for providing certain
living expenses after the loss.

Assuming arguendo that Fire

Insurance failed to pay any amounts alleged to be due and owing for
cleanup of the building site, or for certain living expenses,
the fact that some promises embodied in the written contract were
breached does not necessarily require a finding of fraud.
This allegation of actionable fraudulent misrepresentation
is in essence nothing more than a statement as to the legal
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effect of the insurance contract between the parties.

The Utah

Supreme Court in Gadd v. Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, 1044 (Utah 1984),
recognized the general rule that "misrepresentations of law or
the legal effect of contracts and writings does [sic] not
constitute remedial fraud."

(Quoting Adamson v. Brockbank, 112

Utah 52, 185 P.2d 264, 276 (1947)).

While there are exceptions

to this general rule, the Crookstons had no right to rely on the
representations of Fire Insurance's agents.

Such a rule was

recognized in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d
349 (Ind. 1982).

In Armstrong, the court specifically rejected

the view that an insurance contract creates a presumption of
trust and competence on one side and a corresponding influence on
the other.

The court stated:
[W]e are aware of no instance where it has
been held or even urged that the relationship
between an insurer and insured entitles the
insured, after a dispute has arisen, to rely
upon the insurer's interpretation of the contract. This is not to say that the insurer
is under no duty to refrain from making
fraudulent representations and to act in good
faith but only that it is not bound to be
correct. Were it otherwise, there simply
could be no direct adjustment of claim.

Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
In a context other than an insurance contract, the Utah
Supreme Court has held that:
The one who complains of being injured by
such a false representation cannot heedlessly
accept as true whatever is told him, but has
the duty of exercising such degree of care to
protect his own interests as would be exercised
by an ordinary, reasonable and prudent person
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under the circumstances; and if he fails to do
so, is precluded from holding someone else to
account for the consequences of his own neglect.
Jardine v. Brunswick Corp., 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 P.2d 659, 662-663
(1967).

See also, Wolfe v. Brunqardt, 215 Kan. 272, 524 P.2d

726, 735 (1974) ("In the ordinary business transactions of life,
men are expected to exercise reasonable prudence and not rely
upon others with whom they deal to care for and protect their
interests.").
The fundamental point in regard to this allegation of
actionable fraudulent misrepresentation is whether there has been
reliance.

Reliance is a belief which motivates an act or an

omission to act.

There is no evidence that Clappertonfs

statement motivated the Crookstons to take or omit to take a
particular course of action which resulted in damage to their
claims or contractual rights.

There was no reliance.

Crookstons did rely, their reliance was unreasonable.

Even if the
See

Woodlawn Fraternal Lodge v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 510 So.2d
162 (Ala. 1987) (it is unreasonable as a matter of law to rely on
oral statements when one is in possession of written documents
that would put one on notice as to the validity of those
statements).
The three remaining allegations of actionable fraudulent
misrepresentation, that the Phipps1 bid was reasonable and would
cover all costs required to restore the home back to its pre-loss
condition, that payment of approximately $32,000 to the bank
extinguished the Crookstons1 rights to additional sums under the
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policy, and that no additional funds would be paid out under the
policy, all likewise fail.

(R. at 2694)

There was no clear and

convincing evidence establishing that those representations
concerned a "presently existing material fact," that the Crookstons
in fact relied on those representations, that such reliance was
reasonable and justifiable, and that the Crookstons sustained some
damage from those misrepresentations.

Crookstons never

compromised, or even exercised, their rights under the insurance
contract.

This is not a case where the insured was induced into

compromising its rights by way of a release or otherwise due to a
misrepresentation made by the insurer.

Crookstons took no

detrimental action, and their contractual and legal rights have not
been diminished in any way due to any act or conduct on the part of
Fire Insurance.

In the absence of clear and convincing evidence on

each of these points, the jury's verdict on the count for
fraudulent misrepresentation is unsupported in law and in fact.
POINT IX.
THE TRIAL COURT'S $175,000 ATTORNEY'S FEES
AWARD WAS IMPROPER AND EXCESSIVE.
Following its denial of Fire Insurance Exchange's posttrial motions, the trial court determined that the Crookstons were
entitled to an award of $175,000 in attorney's fees.
2964-67)

(R. at 2956,

The award of attorneys' fees was improper since there

was no statutory or contractual basis therefor.

See, Espinoza v.

Safety Title Insurance Co., 598 P.2d 346 (Utah 1979).

This court

has heretofore restricted the recovery of attorneys' fees to those
incurred in the enforcement of express contractual covenants.
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Cluff v. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498, 499 (Utah 1976).

While a few

jurisdictions allow the recovery of attorneys' fees in actions
based on fraud, a majority of courts refuse to make such awards.
See, Annot., 44 A.L.R.4th 776, 782, §3 (1986).

Since there is no

Utah law on point and no relevant statutory authority, the trial
courtfs award of attorneys1 fees was unfounded.
Even assuming the award was proper, the trial court abused
its discretion in awarding fees in the amount of $175,000, in
addition to the 40% contingency fee counsel was already entitled to
receive.

(R. at 1019-20)
Normally, an award of attorney's fees is in the sound dis-

cretion of the trial court and will not be overturned in the
absence of a showing of a clear abuse of that discretion.
v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1110 (Utah 1982).

Sears

However, Judge

Frederick's award of $175,000 was clearly an abuse of the trial
court's discretion.
In Cabrera v. Cottrell, 694 P.2d 622, 624-25 (Utah 1985),
the Court set the standard for determining the reasonableness of
attorney's fees:
A court may consider, among other factors,
the difficulty of the litigation, the
efficiency of the attorneys in presenting
the case, the reasonableness of the hours
spent on the case, the fee customarily
charged in the locality for similar
services, the amount involved in the case
and the result attained, the expertise and
experience of the attorneys involved.
Consistent with the foregoing factors, counsel provided
his own affidavit and deposition testimony to support the
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attorney's fees award.

(R. at 2773-2800, 2997)

Notwithstanding

this approach, two major problem areas are evident.

First, the

award resulted almost entirely from counsel's self-serving
opinions, a result disfavored under Utah law.

Specifically, in

Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, 657 P.2d 1279
(Utah 1982), the Court held that the statement of one party's counsel at a post-trial hearing did not provide adequate evidentiary
bases for the equal apportionment of attorney's fees between the
parties:
In this case, the parties by stipulation
presented detailed billing records to the
court as the evidentiary basis upon which
the court could determine a reasonable
attorney's fee award for the prevailing
party. The record indicates, however, that
the court's decision to apportion the
liability equally was not based on this
evidence, but rather was derived wholly from
the post-trial statement of counsel.
Id. at 1287.
In so ruling, the Court looked to Sharp v. Hui Wahine,
Inc., 49 Haw. 241, 413 P.2d 242 (1966).

In Sharp, a litigant was

denied attorney's fees after successfully prosecuting a
foreclosure suit, because counsel had offered only his opinion to
support the award he sought.

The Hawaii Supreme Court stated:

Counsel submitted neither evidence of the
customary charges of the bar nor any expert
testimony other than their own self-serving
opinions to show their reasonableness of
their fees. As has been aptly stated:
" . . . While the mortgagee's attorney may
not be an incompetent witness, it is not
good practice to make an award [of an
attorney fee] predicated only on his
opinion."
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Id. at 246-247 (quoting 59 C.J.S. Mortgages §812e(2) at 1554
(1949)).

See also, Paul Mueller Co., 657 P.2d at 1288; Freed

Finance Co. v. Stoker Motor Co., 537 P.2d 1039 (Utah 1975);
Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 45 P.2d 1044 (1971); Mason v.
Mason, 108 Utah 428, 160 P.2d 730 (1945).
The trial court in this case relied exclusively upon the
self-serving subjective opinions of counsel to show the
reasonableness of the requested fees.

By way of affidavit and

deposition testimony, counsel outlined why a substantial attorney's
fee award was both reasonable and justifiable.

Such an approach

is, however, inconsistent with established Utah law.
Furthermore, the evidence in support of the fee award was
inadequate to support such a large award of fees.

Specifically,

counsel presented detailed billing records to the court as the
evidentiary basis upon which a reasonable attorney's fee award
could be determined.

(R. at 2773-2800)

The record before the

trial court showed 1,026.9 hours spent on behalf of the Crookstons
and the underlying cause of action.

Counsel further stated in his

affidavit that there would be an additional 50 to 80 hours for
which there were no time slips.

(R. at 2774)

Based upon the evi-

dence that counsel for the Crookstons had spent approximately 1,100
hours on this case, the award of fees computes out to be in excess
of $159.00 per hour, for all time spent on the entire case,
including paralegal and clerk time.

This is clearly in excess of

even counsel's highest billing rates during the relevant time
period.

(R. at 2997)
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The trial court's award is also flawed in another
respect.

The Court in Utah Farm Production Credit Association v.

Fox, 627 P.2d 62, 66 (Utah 1981), held that a party is entitled
only to those fees resulting from its principal cause of action.
Based upon its holding in Fox, the Utah Supreme Court in Paul
Mueller Co., determined that only those hours attributable to the
prosecution of the main causes of action are compensable and not
those attributable to the defense of counterclaims, etc.

657 P.2d

at 1288.
In the instant case, counsel's request for attorney's
fees included an itemization of all time spent on the case,
including time spent in pursuing claims against other parties,
i.e., Rocky Mountain State Bank.

As a result, the trial court's

award is clearly excessive and evidences an abuse of discretion.
The award must, therefore, be reversed.
POINT X.
THE TRIAL COURT'S COMMENT ON THE EVIDENCE
WAS PREJUDICIAL.
U.R.C.P. 51 provides in pertinent part, "The court shall
not comment on the evidence in the case . . . .fl

In Crawford v.

Manning, 542 P.2d 1091 (Utah 1975), the Court found reversible
error, in part, due to the improper comments of the trial judge
respecting wrongful death actions.

The Court stated, "The state-

ment was uncalled for and may have suggested that the statute giving a right to sue for damages for the wrongful death of a parent
was something to be criticized."

Id. at 1092.

In the instant case, the trial court also committed error
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in commenting on the evidence.

On the fifth day of trial, during

the testimony of the Crookstons1 expert witness, economist Paul
Randle, the following exchange occurred:
Q. Do you have any explanation
whatsoever why the Crookstons didn't seek
their right of appraisal under the policy
with the insurance company?
A. I don't have any idea why not,
except I've dealt with people in financial
matters for a long, long time, people with
far greater sophistication than the
Crookstons have -- and people are
financially illiterate. I'm not just talking about the Crookstons, I'm talking about
doctors and lawyers and judges and college
professors.
The Court:

I'll affirm that.

(Laughter)
(R. at 2506-07)
The court's comment was uncalled for and highly improper.
While such a comment may not by itself be sufficient to merit
reversal, that comment combined with the other irregularities that
occurred at trial, warrant a new trial.
POINT XI.
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN FAILING TO ALLOW FIRE INSURANCE ADEQUATE
OPPORTUNITY TO RESPOND TO THE MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The bank served its motion for summary judgment and
memorandum in support of its motion for summary judgment on Friday,
May 22, 1987, the day prior to the start of a three-day Memorial
Day weekend.

On May 26, 1987, just five calendar days and one

working day after the bank served its motion for summary judgment,
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the motion was granted by the trial court.

Furthermore, argument

on the motion for summary judgment was held, despite objection by
counsel for Fire Insurance, just one hour prior to the scheduled
The granting of the bank?s motion for

six-day trial of the case.

summary judgment without allowing the opposing party adequate time
to respond constitutes reversible error.
U.R.C.P. 56(c) provides non-moving parties at least ten
days1 notice of the hearing on a motion for summary judgment:
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon.
The motion shall be served at least ten days
before the time fixed for the hearing. The
adverse party prior to the day of hearing
may serve opposing affidavits.
Although some courts have found the ten-day notice
requirement of Rule 56(c) to be jurisdictional, the Utah Supreme
Court in Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d 274,
508 P.2d 538, 541 (1973), held that the notice provision of U.R.C.P.
56(c) is not jurisdictional.

See also, Western States Thrift &

Loan Co. v. Blomquist, 29 Utah 2d 58, 504 P.2d 1019, 1021 (1972);
and Security Title Co. v. Payless Builders Supply, 17 Utah 2d 179,
407 P.2d 141, 142 (1965).

But see, Torres v. First State Bank, 550

F.2d 1255 (10th Cir. 1977); Adams v. Campbell County School Dist.,
483 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1973); Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co., 480 F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973); and Enochs v.
Sisson, 301 F.2d 125 (5th Cir. 1962).
In Jensen v. Eames, 30 Utah 2d 423, 519 P.2d 236, 238
(1974), the Court noted that the time limitation and notice
provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are not hard and
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fast rules.

While trial courts are afforded some discretion in

waiving procedural notice requirements, it is clear that under
certain circumstances a trial court's failure to require strict
compliance with the rules warrants reversal.

See Mickelson v.

Shelley, 542 P.2d 740, 742 (Utah 1975) (trial court abused its
discretion where defendants were required to go to trial without
adequate notice of the trial date).

See also, Hein's Turkey

Hatcheries, Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant, Inc., 24 Utah 2d 271,
470 P.2d 257 (1970) (defendant's motion for summary judgment filed
on day of trial held untimely).
This Court's adoption of a harmless error standard in
dealing with non-compliance with procedural time limitation and
notice provisions means that a trial court's ruling will not be
disturbed absent objection to the timing or notice of the hearing.
Walker, 508 P.2d at 541.

In addition, a trial court's ruling

dispensing with a notice requirement will not be reversed unless
the party opposing the motion can demonstrate prejudice.
States Thrift & Loan Co., 504 P.2d at 1021.

Western

Prejudice, at least

in part, is determined by whether the party had "actual notice and
time to prepare to meet the questions raised by the motion of an
adversary."

Jensen, 519 P.2d at 238.

The prejudicial effect of not affording a party adequate
time to defend against a dispositive motion, filed on the eve of
trial, was noted by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Beck v.
Borden, Inc., 724 F.2d 44 (6th Cir. 1984).

In Beck, the

plaintiff's former employee brought an action against his employer,
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alleging that it negligently failed to make contributions on his
behalf to a union pension fund.
of January 24, 1983.

The trial court set a trial date

Defendant's motion for summary judgment was

filed and served on counsel for the plaintiff on January 17, 1983.
The trial court gave plaintiff until 4:00 p.m. on January 19, 1983,
to respond.

Plaintiff objected that such short notice placed an

unreasonable and unfair burden on him to prepare an adequate
response.

The district court granted the plaintiff's motion for

summary judgment on January 24, 198 3.
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that he was entitled to
reversal because of the trial courtfs failure to follow the
requirements of Rule 56(c).

In response, the defendant contended

that Rule 56(c) was flexible and that any error of the trial court
was harmless because plaintiff had failed to show any prejudice.
In reversing and remanding the action for further
proceedings, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Upon consideration of the briefs and oral
arguments of counsel together with the
record on appeal this court concludes that
the district court committed reversible
error in this case, in Kistner v. Califano,
579 F.2d 1004, 1006 (6th Cir. 1978), we discussed the time requirement of Rule 56(c):
Noncompliance with the time provision
of the rule deprives the court of
authority to grant summary judgment,
Adams v. Campbell County School Dist.,
483 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1973), unless
the opposing party has waived this
requirement, United States v. Miller,
318 F.2d 637 (7th Cir. 1963), or there
has been no prejudice to the opposing
party by the court's failure to comply

-92-

with this provision of the rule.
Qppenheimer v. Morton Hotel Corp., 324
F.2d 766 (6th Cir. 1963) .
There is no indication that the plaintiff
waived the requirement in the present case
and his memorandum in opposition set forth a
claim of prejudice. Plaintiff was entitled
to ten days to prepare a response to the
motion. The fact that Borden waited so late
to file its motion for summary judgment put
the trial court in a difficult position. In
the absence of a waiver by the plaintiff of
the ten-day requirement of Rule 56(c) the
district court should have either denied the
motion or set it for hearing ten days hence,
reserving any ruling until that time. It is
generally held that motions for summary
judgment are inappropriate on the eve of
trial. See Management Investors v. United
Mine Workers of America, 610 F.2d 384, 389
(6th Cir. 1979) .
Beck, 724 F.2d at 45 (emphasis added).
Courts generally limit the harmless error rule to
extraordinary cases in which it is clear that the nonmoving party
suffered no prejudice from a shortening of the time to respond.
Due to the dispositive nature of summary judgment motions,
appellate courts have encouraged strict compliance with the time
provisions of Rule 56(c).

In Finn v. Gunter, 722 F.2d 711 (11th

Cir. 1984), the court reviewed a district court's sua sponte action
converting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss into a summary
judgment motion without affording the nonmoving party the ten-day
notice required by Rule 56(c) before granting partial summary
judgment,

in reversing and remanding the action, the court stated:
It is clear why we strictly follow the
notice requirement of Rule 56- A motion to
dismiss may result in a rejection of the
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complaint but it does not finally resolve
the case. When this type of motion is
before the court counsel are generally
addressing questions of law. A summary
judgment, on the other hand, carries far
greater impact since it results in a final
adjudication of the merits. "The very
intimation of mortality when summary judgment is at issue assures us that the motion
will be rebutted with every factual and
legal argument available." Georgia Southern
& Florida Railway Co. v. Atlantic Railroad,
37 3 F.2d at 498. Appellee argues that Finn
has already provided everything that he
could. Appellant says there is additional
material that can and will be filed. What
is important is that Finn must be given an
opportunity to present every factual and
legal argument available. Proper procedures
must be followed.
Id. at 713.
Courts have likewise restricted the application of the
harmless error rule where a party petitions for waiver of the
time and notice requirements of Rule 56(c) on the eve of trial.

In

Gutwein v. Roche Laboratories, 739 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1984), the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals was asked to review the trial
court's granting of summary judgment where the motion was filed
only five days before trial.

In Gutwein, the plaintiff brought

suit against the defendant drug manufacturer claiming that the
defendant's products caused him to lose his eyesight.
engaged in discovery over a three-year period.
eventually set for September 12, 1983.

The parties

Trial was

On September 7, five days

before the trial, defendant moved for summary judgment based on
lack of evidence on the issues of causation and duty to warn.

In

opposing the motion for summary judgment, plaintiff's counsel
submitted medical literature suggesting a causal link between the
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plaintiff's injuries and the defendant's product.

In addition,

plaintiff's counsel argued that the short notice precluded him from
obtaining supporting affidavits in opposition to the motion.

After

a hearing on September 12, in which plaintiff's counsel again
objected to the lack of notice, the trial court granted summary
judgment for the defendant.
On appeal, the plaintiff once again contended that he was
deprived of adequate

opportunity to oppose the motion.

The

defendant conceded that its motion for summary judgment did not
comply with Rule 56(c), but urged that the trial court's decision
be affirmed on the ground that the plaintiff could not demonstrate
prejudice.

In reversing and remanding the trial court's granting

of summary judgment, the Second Circuit noted that the harmless
error rule should not apply to motions for summary judgment filed
on the eve of trial:
In Winbourne v. Eastern Airlines, 632 F.2d
219 (2d Cir. 1980), we expressed a
preference for strict adherence to the tenday rule, noting that the opposing party
must be allowed "adequate opportunity" to
respond. While we may have left the door
open for application of a harmless error
rule, id. at 223 n. 6, we believe that the
use of such a rule must be limited to
extraordinary cases in which the ten-day
notice is impractical, and it is absolutely
clear that the non-moving party suffered no
prejudice from a shortening of the period.
This follows we believed from the non-moving
party's burden of production and the need
for time to marshall and prepare documents
indicating the presence of a disputed
factual issue. Since preparation of papers
to oppose a motion for summary judgment may
differ materially from preparation for
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trial, the better practice is to establish
discovery schedules which allow such motions
to be made and considered prior to the trial
date and simply to deny motions which do not
afford the necessary notice.
*

*

*

The fact that this case was scheduled
for trial on September 12 is not cause for
shortening the ten-day period on the grounds
that the appellant's evidence had to be
marshalled within the shorter period anyway.
Opposition to the motion for summary judgment
required the preparation and execution of
documents by the 12th, tasks considerably
different from summoning witnesses for oral
testimony at a trial beginning on the 12th.
It may be, therefore, that granting either
more time to prepare opposition to the
motion or going ahead with the trial would
have led to a different result in the
instant case.
We believe that where a party claims an
inability to prepare adequate opposition to
a motion for summary judgment within a
shortened response period, the non-moving
party must be afforded the full response
period mandated by Rule 56(c), absent reason
to believe that that claim is demonstrably
frivolous.
Id. at 95-96 (emphasis added).
Numerous courts have found prejudice to be inherent where
motions for summary judgment are filed on the eve of trial and
where adequate time to respond is not given.

See Management

Investors v. United Mine Workers of America, 610 F.2d 384, 388-89
(6th Cir. 1979); Ailshire v. Darnell, 508 F.2d 526, 528 (8th Cir.
1974); and Mustang Fuel Corp. v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 480
F.2d 607 (10th Cir. 1973) .
The potential for prejudice to a party from last minute
motions for summary judgment is also reflected in Rule 4(d) of the
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Rules of Practice of the Third Judicial District Court.

Rule 4(d)

governs the instant case, and clearly is intended to discourage and
restrict the filing of motions for summary judgment on the eve of
trial.

Rule 4(d) provides:
All motions for summary judgment or other
dispositive motions must be heard at least
thirty (30) days before the day set for
trial. No such motion shall be heard after
that date without leave of court.
The lack of adequate notice and time to respond was

particularly prejudicial to Fire Insurance in the instant case.
At the hearing on the bank's motion for summary judgment, counsel
for Rocky Mountain States Bank reviewed for the court the
circumstances surrounding their settlement with the plaintiffs and
the subsequent filing of the motion for summary judgment on
Friday, May 22, 1986.

(R. at 2996-98)

Trial counsel for Fire

Insurance immediately objected to the notice and timing of the
motion:
Mr. Roybal: Well, your Honor, the unfortunate thing about this particular aspect of
this case is the timing. It is very difficult for all parties to take the position on
it. Number 1, I have not had time to go
through the memorandum and research the
issues that the bank has raised relative to
whether contribution and indemnity go to
anything other than purely negligence, but I
will submit to the court that under Rule
56(c), I must be given at least ten days
notice before the hearing is set to respond
to a motion for summary judgment, which is
what the bank has filed, is a motion for
summary judgment.
I have not been given that, and on that
ground alone, I think the court should not
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require me to even respond in any way, shape
or form to it, and should the bank take the
position that this is a motion to dismiss
rather than a motion for summary judgment,
Rule 2-7(b) of the Rules of Practice in the
district and circuit court also require at
least five days1 notice prior to the notice
of hearing which I have not had.
(R. at 2998-99)
The improper timing of the bank's motion was also
acknowledged by counsel for both the plaintiffs and the bank.
(R. at 2997, 3000-01)

The trial court noted Fire Insurance's

objection to the notice and timing of the motion for summary
judgment, but ruled as follows:
I am of the view that in light of the
exigent circumstances that have now been
prompted principally by the result of the
settlement that the opportunity to respond,
as provided in the Rules, can be and should
be appropriately be waived in light of what
I deem to be no showing of unfair prejudice
to a party, and, accordingly, the notice
requirement is waived. It is my judgment
that being Tuesday, there has been some adequate or at least available time within
which Mr. Roybal, the memorandum, which is
not lengthy in this matter, could have been
reviewed and an argument at least presented
to this court as to what additional theories
you thought might be appropriate or what
evidence might be appropriate to allow you
to assert a cross-claim for contribution or
indemnity.
Therefore, it is my view, counsel, in
light of the settlement that's been effected
and the arguments that have been presented
here, that the motion for summary judgment
is granted, and I think that, too, in light
of what appears to me to be a very slim, if
any, likelihood of any basis for asserting a
cross-claim or indemntification against the
bank that serves merely to unduly prolong
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these proceedings and the issues that the
jury will have to consider, in any event.
So the bank's motion is granted.
(R. at 3006)

Following the court's ruling, counsel for Fire

Insurance moved for a continuance in order to prepare a possible
third-party complaint against the defendant bank.
The motion to continue was denied.

(R. at 3007)

(R. at 3012)

In choosing to act as it did on the bank's motion for
summary judgment, the trial court disposed of a complex case
without even permitting Fire Insurance the benefits of applicable
procedural rules.

Rule 56(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure

should have allowed Fire Insurance at least ten days after the
motion for summary judgment was served to respond.

Similarly,

local Rule 4(d) should have prohibited the filing of such a motion
on the very eve of trial.

In this case, however, the motion was

not served upon Fire Insurance's counsel until late in the evening
of Friday, May 22, 1986.

Hearing on the motion was held on the

next business day, the same day previously set for the beginning
of a six-day trial.

Counsel for Fire Insurance objected to the

timing and the lack of notice of the defendant bank's motion.
Counsel requested additional time to respond to the motion.
Although the court heard argument on the motion and in that sense
granted a hearing, the hearing was little more than an empty
gesture since counsel for Fire Insurance effectively had been
deprived of his opportunity to respond to the motion.
Both the Constitution of the State of Utah and the United
States Constitution guarantee due process of law.
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U.S. Const.

Amend. XIV, §1, and Utah Const. Art. I, §7.

The Utah Rules of

Civil Procedure and the local Rules of Practice define what minimum
procedural safeguards are due in a given circumstance.

The trial

courtfs refusal to require strict compliance with the notice and
time limitations of those rules, after counsel objected and
requested additional time to respond, prejudiced Fire Insurance
and denied defendant its due process right to be heard.

See

Management Investors v. United Mine Workers of America, 610 F.2d
384, 390 (6th Cir. 1979).

Fire Insurance respectfully submits

that the trial court's actions in entertaining and granting the
motion for summary judgment after less than five days1 notice and
on the eve of trial constitutes reversible error.
POINT XII.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT FIRE
INSURANCE HAD NO RIGHT OF CONTRIBUTION
AGAINST ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK.
The question squarely presented to the trial court below
was whether there was any ground to support a right of contribution
in favor of Fire Insurance against Rocky Mountain State Bank.
Counsel for the bank took the position in the lower court that
there is no basis for contribution or indemnity for either
intentional torts or breaches of contract.

(R. at 1243-49, 2997)

The trial court, having found that the plaintiffs did not intend
to pursue any claims sounding in negligence against Fire Insurance
at trial, held that the bank was entitled to summary judgment in
its favor as a matter of law on the ground that there is no right
of contribution between intentional tortfeasors.
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(R. at 1257,

1538-40, 3007)
At common law there was no contribution among joint
tortfeasors.

Merryweather v. Nixon, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng.

Rep. 1337 (1799).
(1936).

See also, Restatement of Restitution §102

Utah, as well as many other jurisdictions, adhered to the

common law rule until the legislature abrogated the prohibition
against contribution.

The legislature's enactment of Utah Code

Ann. §78-27-39 in 197 3 abolished the common law rule on
contribution in the State of Utah.
725 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Utah 1986).

See Krukiewicz v. Draper,

Section 78-27-39 of the Utah

Code, now repealed, provides for contribution among joint
tortfeasors:
(1) The right of contribution shall
exist among joint tort-feasors, but a joint
tort-feasor shall not be entitled to money
judgment for contribution until he has, by
payment, discharged the common liability or
more than his pro rata share thereof.
Section 78-27-40(3) of the Utah Code defines "joint tortfeasor" as follows:
As used in this action, "joint tort-feasor"
means one of two or more persons, jointly or
severally liable in tort for the same injury
to person or property, whether or not judgment
has been recovered against all or some of them.
The determination of whether Fire Insurance has a right
of contribution against the bank turns not on what might have been
the rule at common law, but whether such a right exists under
§§78-27-39 and 78-27-40, now repealed, of the Utah Code.
determining whether such a statutory right exists, a wellestablished rule of statutory construction, Utah Code Ann.
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In

§68-3-2 (1953), controls:
The rule of the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed
has no application to the statutes of this state.
The statutes establish the laws of this state
respecting the subjects to which they relate,
and their provisions and all proceedings under
them are to be liberally construed with a view
to effect the object of the statutes and to
promote justice. Whenever there is any variance
between the rules of equity and the rules of
common law in reference to the same matter
the rules of equity shall prevail. (Emphasis
added)
The Court in Krukiewicz v. Draper, 725 P.2d 1349 (Utah
1986), had occasion to determine whether a defendant was a "joint
tortfeasor" as that term is defined in Utah Code Ann. §78-27-40(3)
(repealed 1986).

In Krukiewicz, the plaintiffs were injured in an

automobile collision with an automobile driven by defendant Holm.
At the time of the accident, Holm was acting in the course of his
employment by defendant Draper.

Pursuant to a settlement

agreement, Holm paid the plaintiffs $40,000, and the plaintiffs
released Holm from further liability, but expresssly reserved all
rights against Draper.

Subsequently, plaintiffs sued Draper.

Draper then moved for summary judgment.

The trial court held that

the plaintiffs release of Holm also released Draper from liability
as a matter of law, and plaintiffs appealed.
On appeal, the court was asked to determine whether a
master in the context of a master-servant relationship is a "joint
tortfeasor" under Utah Code Ann. §78-27-40(3), now repealed.

The

court, noting the origin of the Utah statutes abrogating the common
law prohibition against contribution, stated:

-102-

The background of §78-27-42, enacted in
1973 as part of the Utah Comparative
Negligence Act, §§78-27-39 to -43, indicates
that it was designed to reverse the common
law rule. It was patterned after the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act,
first promulgated by the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1939.
Id. at 1351 (emphasis added).
The Court in Krukiewicz looked to the decisions of other
jurisdictions with statutes patterned after the 1939 version of
the Uniform Act to determine whether a master is a "joint
tortfeasor" under the Utah contribution statute.

The court,

citing with approval the Delaware Supreme Court decision in
Blackshear v. Clark, 391 A.2d 747, 748 (Del. 1978), stated:
The Delaware Supreme Court, in discussing why
the 1939 Uniform Act's definition of joint
tortfeasor included the master-servant relationship, stated:
The basis of liability is not relevant,
nor is the relationship among those
liable for the tort. In short, it makes
no difference whether the [master's]
liability is based upon the doctrine of
respondeat superior or any other legal
concept. The point is that both it and
the [servant] are (at least) "severally"
liable for the same injury to plaintiff.
Therefore the Uniform Contribution Among
Tort-feasors Act applies. We so hold.
Id. at 1351-52 (emphasis added).
The Court reversed and remanded the matter, holding that
the defendant employer was a "joint tortfeasor" since he was
severally liable with his servant for the same indivisible injury
to the plaintiff,

id.

Similarly, the Court in Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723
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(Utah 1983), noted that the right to contribution is not limited
under Utah law to actions sounding solely in negligence.

Cruz

arose from an incident in a Salt Lake City cafe where Mr* Cruz
sustained personal injuries as a result of a fight with Val
Montoya and Mike Montoya.

Cruz brought suit against the Montoyas.

The jury awarded a verdict against Val Montoya in excess of
$21,000.

The trial court directed a verdict in favor of Mike

Montoya because the plaintiff had failed to prove a prima facie
case against him.

Several other defendants were not present at

the trial.
On appeal, Val Montoya contended that he was unfairly
required to answer for the acts of all the defendants and not just
his own.

Montoya also contended that he was being forced to bear

a disproportionate amount of the damages because all of the
defendants were not similarly brought to trial.

The Court

rejected his arguments by stating:
This statute [Utah Code Annotated §78-27-40(2)]
applies to joint tortfeasors' rights of contribution. It does not support Valfs argument
nor mandate that the plaintiff must obtain
jurisdiction over all the tortfeasors and
bring them to trial so that the proportion
of fault of each may be there determined.
Further, the manner in which the Montoyas were
brought to trial does not diminish the damage
[Cruz] suffered or Val's participation in and
liability for the assault. With respect to
general and special damages, [Cruz] concedes
that the maximum amount that he can collect
from all of the defendants is $9,000 general
damages and $869.80 special damages. If these
amounts are paid by Val, he is not precluded
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from exercising his right to seek contribution
from the other Montoyas.
Id. at 727-28 (emphasis added).
As already noted, the Utah contribution statute was
patterned after the 19 39 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act-

Krukiewicz, 725 P.2d at 1351.

Other jurisdictions still

retaining the substance of the original Uniform Act of 1939
include:

Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Maryland, Mississippi, New

Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and South Dakota.
12 Uniform Laws Ann. 62 (1975).

A review of the history

surrounding the promulgation of the 19 39 Act, as well as an
analysis of cases arising in jurisdictions with contribution
statutes patterned after the 19 39 Act provide persuasive evidence
that intentional tortfeasors have a right of contribution under
Utah law.

See Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, 679 P.2d 903

(Utah 1984) (construction placed on similar statute by sister
states is a valuable aid in determining legislative intent); and
Valley National Bank v. Avco Development Co., 14 Ariz.App. 56, 480
P.2d 671 (1971) (comments of Commission on Uniform State Laws are
highly persuasive and should be adopted unless contrary to the
settled policy of a state).
Due to the existence of numerous variations and
exceptions to the common law rule prohibiting contribution, the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
recommended the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in
19 39.

The pertinent sections of the 19 39 Act are as follows:
Section 1.

For the purposes of this Act the
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term joint tortfeasors means two or more
persons jointly or severally liable in tort for
the same injury to persons or property, whether
or not judgment has been recovered against all
or some of them.
Section 2. (1) The right of contribution exists
among joint tortfeasors; (2) A joint tortfeasor is not entitled to a money judgment for
contribution until he has by payment discharged
the common liability or has paid more than his
pro-rata share thereof.
12 Uniform Laws Ann. 57 (1975).
It should be noted that the Act itself makes no
distinction between intentional tortfeasors and those

who are

merely negligent.

In fact, the commissioners purposely omitted

any distinction.

The Act was to apply to all joint tortfeasors,

regardless of the theory or basis of their liability.

In

commenting upon the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of
19 39, the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws state:
This subsection creates the right of contribution among joint tortfeasors. It does not,
in any way, qualify the creation of this right
by confining it to joint tortfeasors in any
narrower sense than that indicated in section 1.
Nor does it confine contribution to merely
negligent tortfeasors or to those in any way
inadvertently harming others. It permits contribution among all tortfeasors whom the injured
person could hold liable for the same damage or
injury to his person or property.
1938 Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, p. 393 (emphasis added).

See also, 1939

Handbook of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, p. 136 et seq; Comment, Contribution - Willful
Tortfeasors - Common Law and Under Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, 62 Dick. L. Rev. 262, 264 (1957-58); and F.
-106-

Harper and P. James, The Law of Torts, §10.2 at 722 (1956).
Those jurisdictions which have patterned their
contribution statutes after the 19 39 version of the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act generally hold that intentional
tortfeasors have a right of contribution.

In Judson v. Peoples

Bank and Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954), the New Jersey
court held that intentional tortfeasors have a right to
contribution.

In Judson, the plaintiffs brought suit against five

defendants for fraudulently conspiring to oust the plaintiffs from
control of a corporation by inducing them to part with their stock
at an unconscionable price.

Plaintiffs accepted $2,500 from two

of the defendants, Peoples Bank and Trust Company and from a Mr.
Smith, an officer of Peoples Bank.

Summary judgments were

thereafter entered in favor of the remaining defendants, and
plaintiff appealed.
On appeal, the New Jersey Supreme Court with Judge
William J. Brennan, Jr., authoring the majority opinion, held that
the summary judgments were improvidently granted since genuine
issues of material facts remained.

The court went on to address

whether the New Jersey contribution statute, patterned after the
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939, establishes a
right of contribution among intentional tortfeasors.

The court

noted that over time the traditional common-law prohibition
against contribution had given way to a number of judicially
created exceptions permitting contribution under limited
circumstances.

Speaking of these exceptions, and the effect of
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the New Jersey contribution statute on the common law rule, the
court stated:
These judicially created common-law and
equitable principles are, of course, vulnerable
to extinction or modification at the hands of
the Legislature, the ultimate arbitor of public
policy. Our problem is whether the Legislature
in enacting the Contribution Law of 1952 adopted
the policy of allowing contribution not only
among unintentional co-tortfeasors but even
among intentional including fraudulent joint
wrongdoers. If the Legislature has enacted
the broader right, our judicial function is to
declare it however we may deplore the necessity
of lending the aid of the courts to suitors
guilty of intentional wrongdoing.
The framers of the draft uniform act made clear
the recommendation that Sections 1 and 2(1) of
the draft act embraced the creation of a right
of contribution among tortfeasors without regard
to whether the tort for which the liability
arose was intentionally or unintentionally
inflicted. Section 1 provides that "for the
purpose of this act the term 'joint tortfeasors1
means two or more persons jointly or severally
liable in tort for the same injury to person
or property, whether or not judgment has been
recovered against all or some of them."
Section 2(1) provides, "the right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors." That
the inclusiveness of all torts implicit in
this wording is intended is confirmed by the
commissioner's note dealing with the
sections . . . .
* * *

The legislative history prior to the enactment
of our act of 1952 buttresses the conclusion
that our Legislature adopted the provisions of
the draft act in this regard to effect the
comprehensive coverage recommended by the
framers of the draft act. Assembly bills
introduced in 1949, 1950 and 1951, as bills
numbered 104, 267 and 242 for the respective
years, would have limited contribution to
tortfeasors guilty of negligence, and all
failed of passage.
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•

*

*

The more reasonable interpretation [of the New
Jersey contribution statutes] leave[s] no doubt
that all torts of commission and omission were
with the ambit of the law.
Judson, 110 A.2d at 34-36 (emphasis added).
Likewise, the court in McLean v. Alexander, 449 F.Supp.
1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d
Cir. 1979), held that the Delaware contribution statute, also
patterned after the 19 39 Uniform Act, affords an intentional
tortfeasor the right of contribution.

The plaintiff in McLean

brought suit after purchasing stock in reliance on a misleading
report prepared by an accountant.

The accountant cross-claimed

for indemnification and contribution against various other
defendants who were parties to the stock transaction.

The

plaintiff contended that the defendant accountant was not entitled
to contribution, since such a right was limited to liability
arising solely out of negligence.

The district court rejected the

plaintiff's position by applying Delaware law:
In contrast to federal right for contribution,
there is ample guidance with respect to the
state claim. Defendant's cross-claim for
contribution based on the finding of common
law fraud must be resolved on the basis of
the Delaware statute which permits apportionment by comparative fault. Delaware was one
of the first states to adopt the 19 39 Uniform
Joint Tortfeasors Act providing that:
When there is such a disproportion of
fault among joint tortfeasors as to
render an equitable and equal distribution among them of the common liability
by contribution, the relative degrees of
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fault of the joint tortfeasors shall be
considered in determining the pro rata
shares. 10 Del. C. §6302(d).
Although plaintiff argues that the statute is
limited to cases of negligence, there is no
limitation expressed within the terms of the
statute. Rather, there is evidence that no
such qualification was intended. Instructive
are comments to the 1955 version of the Uniform
Joint Tortfeasors Act noting that Delaware by
adoption of the 1939 Act applies the principle
of relative culpability to non-intentional and
intentional torts. Commentators writing at the
time of its passage understood the statute to
apply to intentional wrongdoing as well as nonintentional torts agreeing that principles of
apportionment were inherently more fair in
either case and therefore basic to a wellordered system of loss allocation. Gregory,
Contribution Among Tortfeasors: A Uniform
Practice, 1938 Wise. L. Rev. 365, 380.
* * *

Finally, plaintiff asserts that the apportionment
of damages which results in a reduction of
damages for some defendants will undermine the
principle of deterrence. This is the same
argument found to be unpersuasive by the overwhelming majority of states which now permit
contribution. Although one defendant's damages
are reduced, another's are increased; Thus a
system which holds all wrongdoers liable for
some damages, the amount of which depends on
the extent of his involvement, will in all
likelihood increase deterrence. Under such a
system, one cannot embark on an unlawful course
with the hope or expectation that someone less
culpable will foot the bill. Thus, vigilance,
if affected at all, is more likely increased
than decreased.
McLean, 449 F.Supp. at 1274-1275 (emphasis added).
The Federal District Court in Testa v. Winquist, 451
F.Supp. 388 (D. R.I. 1978), likewise held that under the Rhode
Island contribution statute, patterned after the 19 39 Uniform Act,
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an intentional tortfeasor has a right to contribution.

In Testa,

the plaintiffs brought action against several police officers to
recover for alleged deprivations of their constitutional rights.
The defendant police officers filed a third-party claim against
various parties for contribution and indemnity.

The court, in

holding that intentional tortfeasors have a right of contribution
under Rhode Island law, stated:
In Rhode Island, contribution is generally
available between joint tortfeasors for negligent acts that are the concurring causes of
plaintiff's injury. Third-party defendants
urge that contribution is only available to
the non-intentional tortfeasor and, thus,
third-party plaintiffs charged with false
arrest, imprisonment and constitutional wrongs
cannot recover against them for their negligent
acts. Third-party defendants correctly state
the rule in some states which have abrogated
the common law prohibition against contribution
but still deny the right of contribution to an
intentional tortfeasor. See generally, 18 Am.Jur.
2d §§33-40 (1965). However, Rhode Island has
adopted, without material alteration, the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act which contains
no such limitation on the right of contribution
between joint tortfeasors, nor makes any distinction between negligent or intentional torts.
F. Harper and FT James, The Law of Torts, §10.2
at 722 (1956). The moving party has failed to
provide any Rhode Island case law suggesting
such a narrow interpretation of the act, nor
has this court found any. Of course, intentional conduct is more likely to constitute a
superseding unforeseeable cause for which the
initial negligent tortfeasor is not liable.
But there is no reason to institute a hard and
fast rule denying contribution to the party who
commits an intentional tort such as false arrest
and imp r i s onment.
Testa, 451 F.Supp. at 392-393 (emphasis added).
The court in Boyles v. Hyder, 22 B.R. 851 (N.D. Tex.
1982), held that under Texas law intentional tortfeasors also have
-111-

a right of contribution.

The Texas court stated:

The Texas statute is broadly worded to allow
contribution in favor of any tortfeasor.
Absent a clear mandate by the Texas legislature
or Texas courts to limit the provisions to unintentional tortfeasors, I will construe the
statute literally. Also, from a policy standpoint, this result is sensible. The common law
rule has been justified as deterring wrong-doers,
but allowing one tortfeasor to go scot-free while
penalizing a joint tortfeasor does little to
deter the wrong-doer who pays nothing. Further,
it seems questionable that the majority of those
who conspire, commit fraud, and inflict other
wrongs intentionally are deterred by a rule
they probably never consider and indeed do not
know until long after the intentional wrong is
committed. When contribution among intentional
tortfeasors is allowed, all wrong-doers are
punished to some extent for their actions.
Allowing contribution in no way prejudices the
injured party who remains free to seek full
satisfaction from any one of the tortfeasors.
Contribution only affects the rights of the
wrong-doers among themselves.
Id. at 854 (emphasis added).
Other jurisdictions have similarly held under statutes
comparable to the Utah contribution statute, Utah Code Ann.
§78-27-39, that intentional tortfeasors have a right of
contribution.

See, Webster Motor Car Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co.,

234 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1956) (under Maryland law co-conspirators
are liable to one another for contribution as joint tortfeasors);
Shultz v. Young, 205 Ark. 533, 169 S.W.2d 648 (1943) (damages may
be apportioned among intentional tortfeasors); Schauer v. Joyce,
54 N.Y.S.2d 1, 429 N.E.2d 83 (1981) (right of contribution applies
even to intentional tortfeasors); Roma v. Buffalo General Hosp.,
103 A.D.2d 606, 481 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1984) (right of contribution
arises where intentional tortfeasor is jointly liable for the same
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injury); Helmrlch v. Eli Lily and Co., 89 A.D.2d 441, 455 N.Y.S.2d
460 (1982) (right of contribution arises where plaintiff sues
each defendant for the same injuries); Taft v. Shaffer Trucking,
Inc., 52 A.D.2d 255, 383 N.Y.S.2d 744 (1976) (a claim for
contribution arises when intentional tortfeasors share in the
responsibility of causing injury); and Taylor v. Kinston Free
Press Co., 237 N.C. 551, 75 S.E.2d 528 (1953) (cross-complaint for
contribution between intentional tortfeasors held to state a cause
of action).
As the Utah Supreme Court stated in Krukiewicz v. Draper,
725 P.2d 1349, 1351 (Utah 1986), a joint tortfeasor is defined
under Utah law in terms of liability, not negligence.

Under Utah

law, a joint tortfeasor is simply "one of two or more persons,
jointly or severally liable in tort . . . ."
§78-27-40(3).

Utah Code Ann.

The particular basis of a defendant's liability to

a plaintiff is not relevant to the determination of who is a joint
tortfeasor under Utah law.

The sole requirement is that the joint

tortfeasor be "severally" liable for the same indivisible injury.
See, Thode, Comparative Negligence, Contribution Among Tortfeasors,
and the Effect of a Release—A Triple Play by the Utah Legislature,
1973 Utah L.Rev. 406, 420.

See also, Lang v. Gunn, 23 Ala.App.

574, 129 So. 318, 319 (1930) (where a wrong is jointly
participated in or contributed to by each defendant, they are
"joint tort-feasors" and responsible severally for the injury);
Hollls v. School Board, 384 So.2d 661, 663 (Fla.Dlst.Ct.App. 1980)
(general rule is that persons who combine to commit a wrong are
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"joint tortfeasors"); and Young v. Dille, 127 Wash. 398, 220 P.
782 (1923) (to be a joint tortfeasor, the parties must either act
together in committing the wrong, or their acts, if independent of
each other, must unite in causing a single injury).
That the Utah Legislature intended the term "joint
tortfeasor" to include intentional tortfeasors is clearly
demonstrated by the legislative debates on the contribution
statute.

During debate in the Utah Senate, the question was

posed by Senator Warren Pugh, "What's a tortfeasor?"

One of the

bill's proponents, Senator Richard Howe, answered:
He's a person that commits a personal
wrong, such as someone who negligently
drives his automobile into you or hits you
with his fist, someone who inflicts personal
damage upon you and is wrongful, he's
called a tortfeasor.
Utah Senate Floor Records, Utah State Legislature, 197 3 General
Session, Mar. 8, 1973, Record No. 319.
In the instant case, plaintiffs at trial pursued claims
of intentional tort against defendant Fire Insurance.

Eventually,

the jury returned a verdict in excess of $4.8 million against Fire
Insurance on several counts, including fraud and
misrepresentation, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress.

The Utah contribution statute provides for the right of

contribution among all joint tortfeasors.

In order to obtain

contribution, the tortfeasor need only establish that he is
"severally" liable with another for the same injury.

Plaintiffs'

Second Amended Complaint clearly indicates their belief that Fire
Insurance and the bank acted in concert and individually to cause
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a single indivisible injury or damage to plaintiffs.

Fire

Insurance's Cross-claim against the bank sought contribution for
those injuries and damages.

Contrary to the trial court's ruling,

Utah law does provide Fire Insurance with a right of contribution
against the bank.

The trial court erred as a matter of law in

holding that such a right did not exist under Utah law.
POINT XIII.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW REQUIRES THIS COURT TO
CONSIDER WHAT EFFECT THE ILL-TIMED AND
ERRONEOUS GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK HAD ON
THE TRIAL OF THE INSTANT CASE.
While the foregoing Points XI and XII were raised in
Appeal No. 870252, currently pending before this Court, the issues
raised therein are of such critical importance that they must be
considered and addressed in the instant appeal.

Fire Insurance

respectfully claims that the granting of summary judgment in favor
of the bank on the morning of trial, and the denial of Fire
Insurance's motion to continue, effectively denied Fire Insurance
its right to due process.

The interrelationship between the

claims and defenses of Fire Insurance and Rocky Mountain State
Bank were such that the last minute dismissal of one party
defendant, Rocky Mountain State Bank, unduly prejudiced Fire
Insurance at the trial of the instant case.

The trial judge,

Judge Frederick, has also recognized the impact of his ill-timed
granting of summary judgment:
Counsel, I recognize had the dismissal of
the Bank not occurred, that is, had this
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Court ruled that there was indeed contribution . . . between intentional tortfeasors,
the complexion of the trial and the issues
submitted to the jury may well have been
different than they are.
In the Matter of the Possession of Rocky Mountain State Bank,
C87-5743, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County;
Transcript of Motion to Lift Stay, April 8, 1988, at p. 20.
The trial court abused its discretion in denying Fire
Insurance's motion to continue following the last minute dismissal
of Rocky Mountain State Bank from the litigation.

Under such

circumstances, Fire Insurance should have been given adequate
opportunity to prepare its defense in an action where it was the
sole remaining defendant.

The trial court's actions on the morn-

ing of trial created great prejudice to Fire Insurance, and warrants reversal and remand to the trial court for a new trial.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, justice requires that this
Court reverse the actions of the trial court in the instant case.
DATED this

C&tf

<z^O&n

day of

, 1988.

STRONG & HANNI

By
Philip R. Fishier

C^tg#nwi J . Trayherc:
Attorneys for Defendant
F r r e Insurance Exchange
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that 4 true and correct copies of the
foregoing document were hand delivered on the
_ , 1988, to:
Francis M. Wikstrom
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
185 South State, #700
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
510 Clark Learning Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

F5-BOA7/20/88DC
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ADDENDUM
Determinative Authorities
Cross-Claim of Fire Insurance Exchange,
December 3, 1986
Cross-Claim of Rocky Mountain State Bank,
March 17, 1987
Plaintiffs

1

Al
A6
A12

Second Amended Complaint

January 16, 1987
Correspondence, May 22, 1987
Rocky Mountain State Bank's Motion for
Summary Judgment, May 22, 1987
Transcript of Hearing on Rocky Mountain
State Bank's Motion for Summary Judgment,
May 26, 1987
Order, June 9, 1987

A16
A35
A37
A40
A59

Judgment, June 11, 1987

A62

Order, April 22, 1983

A66

Minute Entry, December 18, 1986

A6 8

Order, May 19, 1987

A69

Findings of Fact, January 11, 1988

A74

Additional Judgment

A78

DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITIES
Constitution of the United States Amend. VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
Constitution of the United States Amend. XIV §1
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §2
All political power is inherent in the people; and all
free governments are founded on their authority for their equal
protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter or reform
their government as the public welfare may require.
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §7
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property,
without due process of law.
Constitution of Utah, Art. I, §9
Excessive bail shall not be required; excessive fines
shall not be imposed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted. Persons arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated
with unnecessary rigor.
Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2 (1953)
68-3-2.

Statutes in derogation of common law liberally construed
— Rules of equity prevail.

The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation
thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the
-Al-

statutes of this state. The statutes establish the laws of this
state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their
provisions and all proceedings under them are to be liberally
construed with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to
promote justice. Whenever there is any variance between the rules
of equity and the rules of common law in reference to the same
matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
Utah Code Ann. §§78-27-37 (Supp. 1987)
78-27-37.

Definitions.

As used in §§78-27-37 through 78-27-43:
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit
who is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking
recovery.
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty,
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to injury or
damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, including, but not
limited to, negligence in all its degrees, contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of express or implied
warranty of a product, products liability, and misuse, modification
or abuse of a product.
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking
damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf of
another for whom it is authorized to act as legal representative.
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38 Supp. 1987)
78-27-38.

Comparative negligence.

The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any defendant or
group of defendants whose fault exceeds his own. However, no
defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for any amount
in excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that defendant.
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-39 (repealed 1986)
78-27-39. Contribution among joint tort-feasors
—Discharge of common liability by joint tort-feasor required.
— ( 1 ) The right of contribution shall exist among joint tortfeasors, but a joint tort-feasor shall not be entitled to a money
judgment for contribution until he has, by payment, discharged the
common liability or more than his prorata share thereof.
-A2-

Utah Code Ann. $78-27-40 (Supp. 1987)
78-27-40•

Amount of liability limited to proportion of fault
No contribution.

—

Subject to §78-27-38, the maximum amount for which a
defendant may be liable to any person seeking recovery is that
percentage or proportion of the damages equivalent to the
percentage or proportion of fault attributed to that defendant.
No defendant is entitled to contribution from any other person.
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-40 (repealed 1986)
78-27-40. Settlement by joint tort-feasor —
Determination of relative degrees of fault of joint tort-feasors
— "Joint tort-feasor'1 defined. —
(1) A joint tort-feasor who
enters into a settlement with the injured person shall not be
entitled to recover contribution from another joint tort-feasor
whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished by that
settlement.
(2) When there is a disproportion of fault among joint
tort-feasors to an extent that it would render inequitable an
equal distribution by contribution among them of their common
liability, the relative degrees of fault of the joint tort-feasors
shall be considered in determining their prorata shares, solely
for the purpose of determining their rights of contribution among
themselves, each remaining severally liable to the injured person
for the whole injury as at common law.
(3) As used in this section, "joint tort-feasor" means
one of two or more persons, jointly or severally liable in tort
for the same injury to person or property, whether or not judgment
has been recovered against all or some of them.
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Instructions to jury;
objections
At the close of the evidence or at such earlier time as
the court reasonably directs, any party may file written requests
that the court instruct the jury on the law as set forth in said
requests. The court shall inform counsel of its proposed action
upon the requests prior to instructing the jury; and it shall furnish counsel with a copy of its proposed instructions, unless the
parties stipulate that such instructions may be given orally or
otherwise waive this requirement. If the instructions are to be
given in writing, all objections thereto must be made before the
instructions are given to the jury; otherwise, objections may be
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made to the instructions after they are given to the jury, but
before the jury retires to consider its verdict. No party may
assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction
unless he objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an
instruction, a party must state distinctly the matter to which he
objects and the grounds for his objection. Notwithstanding the
foregoing requirement, the appellate court, in its discretion and
in the interests of justice, may review the giving or of failure
to give an instruction. Opportunity shall be given to make
objections, and they shall be made out of the hearing of the jury.
Arguments for the respective parties shall be made after
the court has instructed the jury. The court shall not comment on
the evidence in the case, and if the court states any of the
evidence, it must instruct the jurors that they are the exclusive
judges of all questions of fact.
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time fixed for the hearing.
The adverse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing
affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on
the issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as
to the amount of damages.
Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, New trials; amendments
of judgment
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a
new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all
or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided,
however, that on a motion for a new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court may open the judgment if one has been
entered, take additional testimony, amend findings of fact and
conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions, and
direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or
abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented
from having a fair trial.
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(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any one or
more of the jurors have been induced to assent to any
general or special verdict, or to a finding of any question submitted to them by the court, by resort to
determination by chance or as a result of bribery, such
misconduct may be proved by the affidavit of any one of
the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence
could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the
party making the application, which he could not, with
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced at
trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to
have been given under the influence of passion or
prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7)

Error in law.

Rule 4(d), Rules of Practice of the Third Judicial District Court
(d) All motions for summary judgment or other
dispositive motions must be heard at least thirty (30) days before
the date set for trial. No such motion shall be heard after that
date without leave of court.
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FRANK A. ROYBAL [A2816]
Attorney for Defendant
Fire Insurance Exchange
442 North Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone:[801]292-1483
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
V

v

ft

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

S. LARRY CROOKSTON & RANDI L,
CROOKSTON, his wife,
Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation, and
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK,
a Utah corporation,

C R O S S

-

C L A I M

Defendants.

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
reciprocal or interinsurance
exchange,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

C i v i l No. C 8 3 - 1 0 3 0
J u d g e D a v i d B . Dee

vs.
JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H.
BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT,
Third-Party
Defendants.
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r'v;:

-2BERT BERRETT,

:
Fourth-Party z
Plaintiff,

vs.
SYRO STEEL COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,

:

Fourth-Party :
Defendant.

COMES NOW the above-named defendant and crossclaimant, FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a reciprocal or interinsurance exchange, [hereinafter referred to as cross-claimant],
and cross-claims against the above-named defendant, ROCKY
MOUNTAIN STATE BANK, a Utah corporation, [hereinafter referred
to as cross-claim defendant], pursuant to the provisions of
Rule 13(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Utah Code
Annotated [1953], as amended, and alleges as follows:
1.

That on or about the 8th of February, 19 83,

plaintiffs commenced an action against cross-claimant and
cross-claim defendant by filing a Complaint, Civil No. C83-1030
in the above-entitled court alleging that cross-claimant,

-3among other things, contracted with plaintiffs for purchase
of a standard form insurance policy, thereafter, a partially
constructed building collapsed causing property damage, and
that cross-claimant was in breach of contract and implied
covenants of good faith and fair dealing.

Subsequently, a

Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint was filed,
2.

That cross-claim defendant is now and at all

relevant times hereafter mentioned a corporation doing
business within the State of Utah.
3.

That cross-claim defendant, after receiving

payment from cross-claimant, was negligent in failing to
res_tore and. make the necessary repairs to plaintiffs' damaged
structure, therefore, is liable to cross-claimant and
plaintiffs for plaintiffs' alleged property damage.
4.

That if it is determined cross-claimant is neg-

ligent or is found in breach of contract and implied covenants
of good faith and fair dealing, then cross-claimant is entitled
to the right of contractual and statutory contribution and
indemnity from cross-claim defendant.
5.

That the negligence, if any, of cross-claimant

was passive and secondary, whereas the negligence of the
cross-claim defendant was active and primary.
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That by reason of the foregoing, should plaintiff

recover a judgment against cross-claimant, then cross-claimant
is entitled to full indemnification from cross-claim defendant,
pursuant to §78-27-41, Utah Code Annotated [1953], as amended;
in the alternative, should the court determine that such negligence was a proximate cause of the alleged damages suffered
by plaintiff, then cross-claimant and cross-claim defendant
are joint tort-feasors as that term is defined in §78-27-40(3),
Utah Code Annotated [1953] , as amended.
7.

That cross-claimant is entitled to an adjudication

of the relative degrees of fault as between itself and crossclaim defendant pursuant to the provisions of §78-27-40(2), Utah
Code Annotated [1953] , as amended, and for a money judgment
for contribution against cross-claim defendant upon payment
by cross-claimant of the common liability or more that its
prorata share thereof pursuant to the provisions of §78-27-39(1),
Utah Code Annotated [1953] , as amended.
WHEREFORE, cross-claimant prays for judgment against
cross-claim defendant for any and all sums that may be recovered
by plaintiff from cross-claimant in the present action, for
indemnification and, in the alternative, a determination by the

-5Court of the relative degrees of fault of cross-claimant and
cross-claim defendant for the purpose of determining their
rights of contribution among themselves, for money judgment
in favor of cross-claimant against cross-claim defendant upon
payment by cross-claimant of the common liability or more
than her prorata share thereof, for reasonable attorney's
fees, costs of court incurred herein and such other and
further relief as the court deems proper and just in the premises.
DATED this 3rd day of December, 1986

mK A.RtttfBALY\Attornfey^
DefWndantAmd Jfross -Claimant,
Fire Insurance Exchange

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, J'LYNNE H. WOLFLEYT hereby certify that on the
3rd day of December, 1986, a copy of the foregoing CrossClaim was properly mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
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v. •••

-6L. Rich Humpherys
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys at Law
900 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Carman E. Kipp
Karen J. McClurg
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
Attorneys at Law
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Francis M. Wikstrom
Daniel W. Hindert
PARTONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys at Law
185 South State Street
Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Melvin G. Larew, Jr.
Attorney at Law
1095 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84105

John M. Chipman
Andrea C. Alcabes
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Attorneys at Law
1300 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Stephen G. Morgan
John E. Hansen
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys at Law
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Dennis C. Ferguson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, #1100
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

-All-

FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM (A3462)
DANIEL W. HINDERT (A1497)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
Rocky Mountain State Bank
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

7^
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

S. LARRY CROOKSTON and RANDI
L. CROOKSTON, as individuals,
and ANNA W. DRAKE, as Trustee
of the Estate of S. Larry
Crookston and Randi L.
Crookston,

DEFENDANT ROCKY MOUNTAIN
STATE BANK'S AMENDED
CROSSCLAIM

Plaintiffs,

vs
FIRE INSURANCE"^;XCHANGE7"a
California corporation, and
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK,
a Utah corporation,

Civil No. C83-1030
Judge David B. Dee

Defendants,

S. LARRY CROOKSTON AND RANDI
L. CROOKSTON, as individuals,
and ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK,
a Utah corporation,
Secaad-PattY
Plaintiff,

Civil No. C84-7061
[Consolidated]

vs.
JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H.
BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT,
Second-Party
Defendants.
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BERT BERRETT,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,
vs.

)
)
)

SYRO STEEL COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,

)
)

Third-Party
Defendant,

)
)
* * * * * * *

Defendant Rocky Mountain State Bank (the "Bank") hereby
crossclaims against defendant Fire Insurance Exchange ("Insurance
Company") as follows:

2.

Insurance Company is a California

corporation

that

transacts business as an insurance company in the State of Utah.
2.

On June 16, 1982, the Bank accepted the sum of

"Thrrrty-Two -Thousand Seven—Hundred- Forty-Four -and—7-6/LQQ—Do Liars($32,744.76) from Insurance Company in settlement of the Bank's
rights as loss-payee under a policy of insurance which covered
damages resulting from the collapse of plaintiffs' house then
under construction.
3.

The Bank accepted said settlement in reliance on

representations made by Alan Clapperton on behalf of Insurance
Company, indicating that the approximate amount of $27,830 was
the reasonable

cost of restoring

the collapsed

house

to its

pre-loss condition.

-2-
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4.

If

any

damages

alleged by plaintiffs

in their

second amended complaint are proven to have been caused by the
settlement

between

the

Insurance

Company

and

the

Bank, such

damages were caused by Insurance Company's misrepresentation to
the Bank, or by Insurance Company's failure to otherwise inform
the Bank, as to the reasonable cost of restoring the collapsed
home to its pre-loss condition,
5.

If judgment is granted in favor of plaintiffs or

any of them against the Bankf the Bank is entitled to indemnity
or contribution from Insurance Company for the entire amount of
said judgment.
WHEREFORE,

the

Bank

Insurance Company as follows:

prays

for

judgment

against

in an amount equal to any judgment

entered against the Bank in favor of plaintiffs; for reasonable
attorney's
further

fees

relief

and

costs

of

court; and

for

such other

as the Court deems just and equitable

and

in the

premises.
DATED this

/7 -

day of March, 1987.

FRAN^ShTwit STROM
DANIEL W. HINDERT
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
Rocky Mountain State Bank
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
, hereby certify that on the /7

day of

March, 1987, ^a copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT ROCKY MOUNTAIN
STATE BANK'S AMENDED CROSSCLAIM was mailed, postage prepaid, to
the following:
L. Rich Humpherys
M. Douglas Mayly
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorneys at Law
900 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

Carmen E. Kipp
Karen J. McClurg
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys at Law
600 Commercial Club Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Melvin G. Larew, Jr.
Attorney at Law
1095 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

Frank A. Roybal
Attorney at Law
442 North Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010

84105

Dennis C. Ferguson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Attorneys at Law
10 Exchange Place, #1100
P.O. Box 3000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

Stephen G. Morgan
John E. Hansen
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys at Law
261 East 300 South, 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Anna W. Drake
NIELSEN & SENIOR
Attorneys at Law
Beneficial Life Tower, #1100
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

John M. Chipman
Linda L. W. Roth
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
Attorneys at Law
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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L. Rich Humpherys, A1582
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL
Attorney for Plaintiff
900 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L.
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE,
Trustee of the estate of
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON
Plaintiffs,
PLAINTIFFS' SECOND
AMENDED COMPLAINT

v.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation, and
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK,
-a-U-tah-coxporat i on.*_
Defendants.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
reciprocal or interinsurance
exchange,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
v.

Civil No. C83-1030

JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H.BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT,
Third-Party Defendants,
BERT BERRETT, and KYLE H.
BREWSTER,
Fourth-Party Plaintiffs,
v.
- 1 -A16-

Judge David B. Dee

SYRO STEEL COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,

)
)

Fourth-Party Defendant. )
Plaintiffs

complain

against

defendants

and

allege

as

herein, plaintiffs

S.

follows:
1.

During

all times mentioned

Larry Crooks ton and Randi L. Crookston were residents of Davis
County, Utah.

Anna W. Drake has been appointed Trustee of the

estate of Spencer Larry Crookston and Randi Lynn Crookston, in
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, case
number 82A 01590.
2.

Defendant

Fire

Insurance

Exchange

("Insurance

Company.J. is a foreig_n_.corporation transacting insurance business
in the State of Utah.
3.

Defendant Rocky Mountain State Bank ("Bank") is a

Utah corporation, duly licensed and authorized to do business as
a banking institution in the State of Utah.
4.
and

At all times mentioned

omissions

were

performed

by

herein, defendants

said

defendants'

employees

who were at all times acting within

scope

their

of

ratified

and

agency

approved

and

employment,

the acts

of

its

actions

agents

and

the purpose and

and each

defendant has

respective

agents

and

employees relating hereto.
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FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Contract - Insurance Company)
5.

Prior to December 2, 1981, plaintiffs entered into

a contract of insurance with the Insurance Company, who issued
insurance policy no, F6076 00 92.
provides

that

In pertinent part, the policy

the Insurance Company

will

indemnify plaintiffs

from damage to plaintiffs' home that was located at 3745 Orchard
Drive,

North

Salt

Lake,

Utah,

and

also

agreed

to

pay

the

mortgagee loss payee (defendant bank) for any such damage, up to
the stated monetary limits as set forth therein.
Insurance

Company

agreed

to

indemnify

Specifically,

plaintiffs

and/or

the

mortgage loss payee for the following items:
_a^

.physical loss

to plaintiffs' home and

building

equipment, fixtures, outdoor equipment, materials and supplies
located on the described premises;
b.

the necessary increase in living expenses caused by

the loss to plaintiffs' home; and
c.

the

expenses

incurred

in

the

removal

of debris

occasioned by such loss;
6.

Throughout

the period of said policy, plaintiffs

paid the premiums and performed each act required on their part
to keep the policy in full force and effect.

Plaintiffs intended

and expected thereby to be assured of peace of mind and financial
and economic security in the event of damage to their home.
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7.

On

or

about

December

2,

1981, plaintiffs

home

sustained direct physical loss caused by the collapse of the roof
of the home.

Plaintiffs gave timely notice of the loss as pro-

vided in said policy.
policy

and

By reason thereof, under the terms of the

the laws of the State of Utah, Insurance Company

became obligated

to pay and

the mortgagee

loss payee and/or

plaintiffs became entitled to, indemnification of the losses, as
described above.
8.

Notwithstanding its obligation to do so, Insurance

Company has failed and refused, and continues to fail and refuse,
to pay the mortgagee loss payee and plaintiffs the monies owing
to them, despite demand therefor.

Such failures and refusals

constitute a material breach of the agreement with plaintiffs and
also the collateral agreement to insure and pay the"mortgagee
loss payee.
9.

As a direct and proximate result of said breach of

agreements, plaintiffs have been injured and damaged in a sum in
excess of $50,000, for which Insurance Company is liable.
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and
Fair Dealing - Insurance Company)
10.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 9 above.

11.

At all times material

hereto,

Insurance Company

agreed to act in good faith and deal fairly with plaintiffs when
they entered into the contract of insurance and accepted premiums
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from plaintiffs.

Nevertheless, Insurance Company

refused and

failed to act in good faith and deal fairly with plaintiffs, as
described below.
12.
and with

In the absence of a reasonable basis for doing so,

full knowledge and/or reckless disregard of the con-

sequences Insurance Company has failed and refused to indemnify
plaintiffs and/or the mortgagee loss payee under the policy and
the laws of Utah.
13.
engage
interest

in

a

and

The

Insurance

course

of

Company

conduct

in violation

of

to

engaged

and

further

its own

its obligations

continues

to

economic

to plaintiffs,

including, but not limited to:
a.

misrepresentation

of

pertinent

policy

provisions

upon

plaintiffs'

and coverages at issue;
b.

unreasonable

delays

in

c.

unreasonable and improper

acting

claims;
investigation of plain-

tiffs claims;
d.

unreasonable and improper settlement of claims with

the mortgagee loss payee (BanJO; and

duct

e.

other wrongful and illegal conduct.

14.

The Insurance Company pursued said course of con-

intentionally, maliciously, in conscious disregard of the

rights of plaintiffs, fraudulently, and/or with reckless disre-
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gard of the circumstances of the plaintiffs and the likelihood of
causing plaintiffs emotional and mental distress and/or at all
times to further

its own economic interest at the expense of

plaintiffs' economic interest, mental health and well-being,
15.

As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of

the Insurance Company, plaintiffs have suffered emotional and
mental trauma and other general damages in an amount not yet
determined.
16.

As a further direct and proximate result of the

conduct of the Insurance Company, plaintiffs have incurred and
will incur economic detriment, including, but not limited to, the
loss of their home and building lot, property taxes, expenses
associated with construction of the home, increased living expenses, loss of credit due to bankruptcy, attorneys^ fees, ~co3~£3"~and
expenses of litigation and other damages in an amount not yet
determined.
17.

In order to deter such conduct of the Insurance

Company in the future and prevent the repetition thereof as a
practice, by way of punishment and as an example, plaintiffs pray
that exemplary damages be awarded according to proof at the time
of trial.
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THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing —

a

Bank)

18.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 17 above.

19.

On or about December 11, 1980, Bank agreed to make

construction

loan

to

the

plaintiffs

in

the

sum

of

Sixty

Thousand Dollars ($60,000) for the purpose of constructing a home
on plaintiffs' property located at or near 3745 Orchard Drive,
North Salt Lake, Utah.
cuted

and

amount.

delivered

In connection therewith, plaintiffs exe-

to Bank a Trust

Deed Note for the same

As security for the construction loan, plaintiffs also

executed and delivered a Trust Deed, under which the Bank is both
the trustee and the beneficiary.
10^

Pursuant to the terms of said Trust Deed, plain-

tiffs obtained the policy of insurance with Insurance Company,
providing a "Mortgagee Clause" or "Loss Payee" provision in favor
of Bank.
21.

Under

said

Trust

Deed, plaintiffs, as trustors,

were required to assign all benefits under the insurance policy
to the Bank in the event of any loss.

The pertinent language

reads as follows:
Beneficiary [Bank] shall be entitled to all
compensation, awards, and other payments or
relief therefor, and shall be entitled at its
option to commence, appear in and prosecute in
its own name any action or proceedings, or to
make any compromise or settlement, in connection with such taking or damage.
All such
compensation,
awards, damages, rights of
action and proceeds, including the proceeds of

any policies of fire and other
insurance
affecting said policy, are hereby assigned to
beneficiary [Bank]. . .
22.
tiffs

In consideration for the construction loan, plain-

agreed

Thousand

to

Five

and

did

Hundred

pay

the Bank

Dollars

finance

($1,500)

charges

(2-1/2%

of

of

the

One
loan

amount) and interest on the unpaid balance at the annual percentage rate of 16.5%.

Interest was increased to 20.5% per annum in

a Note Extension Agreement dated September 11, 1981.
paid
and
with

said

finance

performed
the

mind

all other acts

terms

Plaintiffs

charge and regularly made
required

of

the

note,

loan

intended

and

expected

on

interest payments,

their part to comply

agreements

thereby

Plaintiffs

and

Trust

Deed.

to have the peace of

that the proceeds of the loan would be disbursed properly

and the Bank would comply -with all terms and conditions oT the
loan agreements and Trust Deed, and that such compliance would
ultimately result in a newly constructed home in which plaintiffs
would live.
23.
to act
they

At all times material hereto, defendant Bank agreed

in good

entered

sideration

faith and deal fairly with

into

paid

the

loan~ agreements

by plaintiffs.

and

the plaintiffs when
accepted

said

con-

Nevertheless, Bank has refused

and failed to act in good faith and deal fairly with plaintiffs,
as set forth below.
24.

In the absence of a reasonable basis for doing so,
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and with full knowledge and/or reckless disregard of the consequences, Bank has engaged and continues to engage in the course
of conduct to further its own economic interest and in violation
of their obligations to plaintiffs, including, but not limited
to:
a.

misrepresentation

of the Bank's

intended actions

concerning settlement of the claims against Insurance Company;
b.

unreasonable and improper investigation concerning

the claims against the Insurance Company;
c.

unreasonable

and

improper

settlement

of

claims

against the Insurance Company;
d.

the foreclosure or trust sale proceedings against

plaintiffs; and
e.

other wrongtul and illegal conduct.

25.

The Bank

pursued

said

course of conduct inten-

tionally, maliciously, in conscious disregard of the rights of
plaintiffs, fraudulently, and/or with reckless disregard of the
circumstance of plaintiffs and the likelihood of causing plaintiffs emotional and mental distress, and/or

at all

times

to

further its own economic interest at the expense of plaintiffs1
economic interest, mental health and well-being.
26.

As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of

said Bank, plaintiffs have suffered the following damages:
a.

emotional and mental trauma and other general dama-
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ges in an amount not yet determined;
b.

past and future economic detriment, including, but

not limited to, the loss of their home and building lot, property
taxes, expenses
increased

associated

living

with

the construction

of the loan

expenses, loss of credit due to bankruptcy,

attorneys' fees, costs and expenses of litigation and other special damages in an amount not yet determined.
27.

In order to deter such conduct of the Bank in the

future and to prevent the repetition thereof as a practice, by
way

of

punishment

and

as

an

example,

plaintiffs

pray

that

exemplary damages be av/arded according to proof at the time of
trial.
FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Breach of Fiduciary Duties —

Bank)

28.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 27 above.

29.

By reason of the assignment contained in the Trust

Deed of all rights and claims of insurance proceeds in the event
of a loss to the insured premises, and also the relationship between plaintiffs and Bank und^jr these circumstances, Bank assumed
a fiduciary obligation to plaintiffs and agreed to abide by their
fiduciary duties.

Nevertheless, the Bank engaged in a course of

conduct to further its own economic interest and in violation of
its

fiduciary

obligation

to

plaintiffs,
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including,

but

not

limited to:
a.

unreasonable and improper settlement of the claims

against Insurance Company for less than fair value;
b.

unreasonably exposing plaintiffs to needless per-

sonal liability which coverage under the policy was designed to
prevent;
c.

unreasonably acting in conflict of interest to the

detriment of plaintiffs; and
d.

other wrongful and illegal conduct.

30.

Bank pursued said course of conduct intentionally,

maliciously and in conscious disregard of the financial and emotional

circumstances

of

plaintiffs,

fraudulently

and/or

with

reckless disreqard of the likelihood of causing plaintiffs emotional and mental distress, and/or at all times to further its
economic

interest

at

the

expense

of

plaintiffs1

economic

interest, mental health and well-being.
31.

As a direct and proximate result of the conduct of

the Bank, plaintiffs have suffered the damages as stated above.
32.

In order to deter such conduct of the Bank in the

future and to prevent the repetition thereof as a practice, by
way

of

punishment

and

as

an

example,

plaintiffs

pray

that

exemplary damages be awarded according to proof at the time of
trial.
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FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Misrepresentation and Fraud —Insurance Company)
33.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 32 above.

34.

Since

the

purchase

of

the

insurance

policy,

Insurance Company made the following representations to plaintiffs:
a.

in

the

insurance

policy,

the

Insurance

Company

represented to plaintiffs that it would, in the event of certain
contingencies, pay monies to plaintiffs and/or the mortgagee loss
payee for indemnification of all losses, with certain exceptions
not relevant here.
b.
15,

1982,

Insurance

during the period of March 31, 1982, through June
Denton

Mosier

Company

and

Alan

represented

to

Clapperton,
plaintiffs

as

agents of"

and

plaintiffs

mortgagee loss payee (Bank) on numerous occasions that they did
not have authority to settle the claim.
c.

on or about June 16, 1982, Alan Clapperton as agent

of Insurance Company represented to plaintiffs that it was not
yet in a position to offer any settlement on the claim.
d.

on or about June 16, 1982, Alan Clapperton as agent

of Insurance Company

represented

to plaintiffs mortgagee loss

payee (Bank) that:
1.
relating

to

the only
the

amount

damages
- 12 -A27-

to

owing

under

plaintiffs

the policy
home

was

$32,744.76;
2.

that he was not authorized to offer any more

money;
3.

that the bid of Phipps Construction, Inc. was

reasonable, reliable and sufficient

to rebuild plain-

tiffs home to its statute prior to the loss;
4.

Insurance Company would not pay any more under

the policy.
e.
agent

of

on or
Insurance

about

June

Company,

16, 1982, Alan Clapperton, as
represented

to

plaintiffs

that

Insurance Company had settled all claims under the policy with
the Bank, and that the plaintiffs no longer had any claims under
the policy.
35.

At the time the above representations were by made

the Insurance Company, it was acting in bad faith and with the
intent to deceive and defraud plaintiffs.
36.

Said representations of material fact were false,

and Insurance Company did not intend to and do not intend to pay
any

additional

monies,

notwithstanding

plaintiffs

entitlement

pursuant to policy and the laws of Utah.
37.

Insurance

Company knew that

said

representations

were false and fraudulent at the time they were made, and made
such

false

and

fraudulent

representations

for the purpose of

inducing plaintiffs and/or plaintiffs mortgagee to rely thereon
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to their detriment.
38.

Plaintiffs and/or plaintiffs mortgagee, at the time

said representations were made, were ignorant of their falsity,
but believed them to be true.
39.

Plaintiffs and/or plaintiffs mortgagee reasonably

and justifiably relied on said representations, in view of the
superior knowledge of Insurance Company and the fiduciary relationship between the parties.
40.

Based

upon

some

of

the

above

representations,

plaintiffs were induced to enter into policy and pay premiums
therefor.

Had plaintiffs known the true facts they would not

have taken such action.
41.

Insurance ComDany pursued said course of conduct

intentionally, maliciously, oppressively, in conscious disregard
of the rights of plaintiffs, fraudulently, in constructive fraud
and/or

with

reckless

disregard

of

the

likelihood

of

causing

plaintiffs emotional and mental trauma, and/or at all times to
further its own economic interests, mental health and well-being.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray

judgment against Insurance

Company for special, general and exemplary damages, as herein set
forth.
SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Misrepresentation and Fraud - Bank)
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42.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 32 above.

43.

Defendant Bank made the following representations

to plaintiffs:
a.

at or around December 10, 1980, the closing date of

plaintiffs loan with Bank, an agent of the Bank represented to
plaintiffs that the Bank was the expert in construction and knew
how to handle all matters relating to the loan and construction
of plaintiffs home.

The Bank further represented that it would

obtain proper and adequate insurance to protect plaintiffs during
the construction loan.
b.
Bank, wherein

through the Trust Deed executed by plaintiffs and
plaintiffs were required

to assign to Bank all

rights to claims for insurance proceeds, Bank impliedly represented that it would properly pursue all claims of insurance.
44.

Said representations of material fact were false,

and Bank did not intend to properly pursue the claims against the
Insurance Company, notwithstanding the Banks entitlement thereto,
pursuant to the policy and the laws of Utah.
45.

Bank knew that said representations were false and

fraudulent at the time they were made, and made such false and
fraudulent representations for the purpose of inducing plaintiffs
to rely thereon to their detriment.
46.

Plaintiffs, at the time said representations were

made, were ignorant of their falsity, but believed them to be
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true.
47.

Plaintiffs reasonably and justifiably relied on said

representations, in view of the superior knowledge of the Bank,
and the fiduciary relationship between the parties.
48.

Based

upon said representations, plaintiffs were

induced to enter into the loan and Trust Deed agreements and paid
the Bank valuable consideration therefor.

Had plaintiffs known

the true facts, they would not have taken such action.
49.

The

Bank

pursued

said

course of conduct

inten-

tionally, maliciously, oppressively, in conscious disregard of
the rights of plaintiffs, fraudulently,

in constructive fraud

and/or

likelihood

with

reckless

disregard

of

the

of

causing

plaintiffs emotional and mental trauma^ and/or at all times to
further its own economic interests, mental health and well-being.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs

pray

judgment

against

Bank

for

special, general and exemplary damages, as herein set forth.
SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Acting in Concert —

in

Insurance Company and Bank)

50.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 49 above.

51.

In engaging in the wrongful course of conduct and

committing

complained

the

wrongful

of, defendants

acts

acted

and

practices

in concert

hereinabove

together and each

conspired with, assisted, encouraged and abetted the other, to
- 16 -A31-
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further their own economic interest at the expense of the economic

interest, peace of mind, mental health and well-being of

plaintiffs.
52.

As a direct and proximate

result of defendants'

actions and omissions, plaintiffs have suffered damages as set
forth above.

Defendants are liable to plaintiffs for all special

damages and for exemplary damages as set forth above.
EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress —
and Insurance Company)

Bank

53.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs l through 52 above.

54.

In so doing, defendants, and each of them, pursued

an outrageous course of conduct, intentionally and/or recklessly,

proximately

causing

plaintiffs

severe

emotional

distress,

~s~Tiock,

and other painful emotions.
55.

Defendants are therefore liable for plaintiffs spe-

cial and general damages and for exemplary damages as set forth
above.
NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Resulting and Constructive Trust —

Bank)

56.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs l through 55 above.

57.

As a result of the relationship between plaintiffs

and Bank, described above, a constructive and/or resulting trust
was created as it relates to the assignment of the rights and
- 17 -
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I claims to insurance proceeds, with the Bank holding said rights
| and claims as trustee for the benefit of itself and the plainI tiffs.
58.

As a result of the wrongful conduct of the Bank,

I the Bank breached its fiduciary duties as a trustee, causing said
damages to the plaintiffs.
TENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Liability for Intended Consequences
H

—

Insurance Company and Bank)
59.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 58 above.

60.

Defendants wrongful conduct was unjustified, inten-

| feional, and .generally culpable/ causing plaintiff's damages set
forth above, for which defendants are liable.
ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Liability for Tortious Conduct —

Insurance Company and Bank)

61.

Plaintiffs reallege paragraphs 1 through 60 above.

62.

Defendants

activities

and

conduct were

in other

I ways tortious and wrongful, causing plaintiff's damages set forth
I above, for which defendants are liable.
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs

pray

for

judgment

against

each

I defendant as follows:
|!

I
I

a.

for general, special and consequential damages as
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proven at the time of trial;
b.

for exemplary and punitive damages as established

at the time of trial;
c.

for reasonable attorneys' fees, costs and expenses

of litigation, as determined at the time of trial; and
d.

for such other and further relief as the court may

deem just and proper under the circumstances.
DATED this /&?* day of January, 1987.
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
^

y^/

By ^/ . / s~ y w ^ ~
^ / L . ^Ri^ch Humpherys

Attorney for

/

Plaintiffs
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May 22, 1987

FOR HAND DELIVERY

$3-

QiQ
o - -"7

The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
Third Judicial District Court
240 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Re;

Crookston v. Fire Insurance

ange, et al.

LT^ar -Judge-Frederick:
This letter is to advise you that a settlement was
reached between the plaintiffs and Rocky Mountain State Bank
late Thursday afternoon. The stipulation was not executed
by Anna Drake, as Trustee, until Friday afternoon. Enclosed
is the Stipulation, Motion and Order of Dismissal. We would
request that you sign and enter the Order of Dismissal.
In light of the settlement with
have enclosed a Motion for Summary Judgment
in Support, directed to the crossclaim of
Exchange
against Rocky
Mountain State
contribution and indemnity.

plaintiffs, we
and Memorandum
Fire Insurance
Bank seeking

Mr. Humpherys has advised us in writing that he
will pursue no claims against the insurance company which
are based on negligence theories.
Mr. Humpherys has
authorized me to represent to you that he will confirm this
in open court on Tuesday. All of plaintiffs' claims are
based on intentional torts and breach of contract. As the
attached Memorandum of Points and Authorities demonstrates,
there is no basis for contribution or indemnity under these
theories.
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The Honorable J. Dennis Frederick
May 22, 1987
Page 2
While the filing of our motion for summary
judgment may not give Mr. Roybal as much time to respond as
envisioned under the rules, we feel that it is appropriate
to have it heard before the trial begins. If we are correct
on the law, there is no point in requiring the Bank to sit
through the plaintiffs1 case in order for the plaintiffs to
demonstrate what they have already conceded, i.e., that they
will assert no claims based on negligence.
We have advised Mr. Roybal by phone on Friday
afternoon of our intention to file this motion and have
personally served him with a copy of this letter, the motion
and memorandum on Friday evening. Under the circumstances,
we would request that the matter be heard prior to
commencement of the trial on Tuesdays morning.
Sincerely,

F'r^ncis M. Wikstrom
FMW:cj
Ends.
cc: (hand delivered) Frank A. Roybal, Esq.
L. Rich Humpherys, Esq,
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FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM (A3462)
DANIEL W. HINDERT (A1497)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
Rocky Mountain State Bank
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake Cityr UT 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

S. LARRY CROOKSTON and RANDI
L. CROOKSTON, as individuals,
and ANNA W. DRAKE, as Trustee
of the Estate of S. Larry
Crookston and Randi L.
Crookston,

DEFENDANT ROCKY MOUNTAIN
STATE BANK'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation, and
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK,
a Utah corporation,

Civil No. C83-1030
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants, Crosscomplainants and
Cross-defendants.
* * * * * * *

Cross-defendant
hereby

moves

for summary

Rocky

Mountain

judgment

State

Bank

in its favor

("RMSB")

and against

cross-complainant Fire Insurance Exchange ("FIE") on all causes
of action

set forth in FIE's cross-claim against RMSB.
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This

oiv:oO

motion

is supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities

filed concurrently herewith,
DATED this 22^ day of May, 1987.

-*2o

ICIS M. WIKST^OM
DANIEL W. HINDERT
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant and
Cross-Defendant,
Rocky Mountain State Bank
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing DEFENDANT ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, this ^ ^ * day of May,
1987,

to:
Karen J. McClurg
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
175 E. 400 So., #330
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Melvin Larew, Jr.
1200 Beneficial Life Towers
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John E. Hansen
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
261 E. 300 So., 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John M. Chipman
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON S. CHIPMAN
T300 Continental Bank" Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Dennis C. Ferguson
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
And hand-delivered to:
L. Rich Humpherys
Christensen, Jensen & Powell
510 Clark Learning Building
Salt Lake City, UT "84101
Frank A. Roybal
442 No. Main St.
Bountiful, Utah 84010

^^jgcO^/

cfZ^J

DWH:052287A
•3-
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
S. LARRY CROOKSTON AND
RANDI L. CROOKSTON,
HIS WIFE,
PLAINTIFFS,

CIVIL NO. C83-1030

VS
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE,
A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION,
AND ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE
BANK, A UTAH CORPORATION,
DEFENDANTS.

BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, JUDGE
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
MAY 26, 1987
APPEARANCES:
FOR PLAINTIFF:

L. RICH HUMPHERYS
ATTORNEY AT LAW
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN S POWELL
900 KEARNS BUILDING
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 8^101
FRANK A. ROYBAL
ATTORNEY AT LAW
kk2 NORTH MAIN
BOUNTIFUL, UTAH
8^010

FOR DEFENDANT FIRE
INSURANCE EXCHANGE:

FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM
DANIEL W. HINDERT
ATTORNEYS AT LAW
PARSONS, BEHLE 5 LATIMER
185 SOUTH STATE
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH

FOR DEFENDANT ROCKY
MOUNTAIN STATE BANK:

Rocky Mountain
Reporting Service, Ire.
712 Nawhouse Building
10 Excnanga Place
Salt UKa City. Utah 84111
Phona (801) 531-0256
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Susan K. Hellberg, C.S.R., R.P.R.
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1 ,

P R O C E E D I N G S

',
THE COURT: WE HAVE A CIVIL MATTER, WHICH IS SET
i
3 j FOR TRIAL THIS MORNING, CROOKSTON VS. FIRE INSURANCE
2

EXCHANGE, ET AL.
I

COUNSEL IN THAT MATTER, PLEASE STATE YOUR APPEAR-

5
6

ANCES.

I'M NOT SURE ALL OF YOU ARE HERE, BUT LET'S HEAR

7

FROM YOU, WHOEVER IS HEREMR. WIKSTROM:

8
9

DAN HINDERT ON BEHALF OF ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK.
MR. ROYBAL:

10
11

YOUR HONOR, FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM AND

FRANK ROYBAL ON BEHALF OF FIRE

INSURANCE EXCHANGE.
MR. WIKSTROM:

12

MR. HUMPHERYS IS IN THE HALL.

IF

13

IT'S THE COURT'S INTENTION TO HEAR OUR MOTION FOR SUMMARY

14

JUDGMENT AT THIS POINT, I'M NOT SURE HIS PRESENCE IS NECES-

15

SARY.
THE COURT:

16

THAT MIGHT BE THE CASE.

I DO NOT SEE

17

HIM HERE, AND MAYBE HE OUGHT TO BE HERE TO VOICE FOR THE

18

RECORD HIS POSITION THAT YOU HAVE REPRESENTED IN YOUR MEMOR-

19

ANDUM, MR. WIKSTROM.
MR. WIKSTROM:

20
21
22

WOULD YOU LIKE ME TO SEE IF I CAN

FIND HIM?
THE COURT:

MR. HUMPHERYS, YOU ARE NOW PRESENT IN

23

THIS MATTER ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFFS?

24

MR. HUMPHERYS: YES.

25

THE COURT:

COUNSEL, THIS IS A HEARING THAT'S BEENl
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1 J SOUGHT BEFORE WE BRING THE JURY

IN, AND

I WOULD LIKE TO HAVE

2 • YOU STATE FOR THE RECORD, MR. WIKSTROM,

YOUR

3 j THIS MATTER,

HEARING.

SINCE YOU ARE SEEKING

THIS

POSITION

IN

i

4 J

MR. WIKSTROM:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

BY WAY OF

i

5 j BACKGROUND, YOUR HONOR, AT ABOUT U:3 0 P.M.
AND

LAST

THURSDAY,

I REACHED A SETTLEMENT OF THE PLAINTIFFS 1

6

MR. HUMPHERYS

7

CLAIMS AGAINST

8

TIME, EXECUTED A STIPULATION

9

THE PLAINTIFFS 1

ROCKY MOUNTAIN

STATE BANK.
PROVIDING

WE, AT THAT

FOR THE DISMISSAL

CLAIMS AGAINST THE BANK, AND

IMMEDIATELY

NOTIFIED MR. ROYBAL OF THAT FACT, EVEN THOUGH THE

10

H

! IN BANKRUPTCY, ANNA DRAKE, DID NOT SIGN OFF ON THE

12

! TION AND DID NOT DO SO ON FRIDAY

13 j

OF

TRUSTEE
STIPULA-

AFTERNOON.

I THINK THAT'S CRITICAL,

I THINK, TO OUR MOTION

14

THAT'S PRESENTLY

15

CONFIRMED HE WAS NOT PROCEEDING AGAINST THE

16

COMPANY ON ANY THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE.

IN OTHER WORDS,

IT'S

17

NOT OUR SETTLEMENT THAT MAKES OUR MOTION APPROPRIATE;

IT'S

18

HIS ELECTION TO PROCEED AGAINST

19

SOLELY ON THE THEORIES OF

20

CONTRACT,

2i I TAINS AN
22

BEFORE THE COURT, AT THAT TIME MR. HUMPHERYS

BREACH OF
IMPLIED

FIRE

INSURANCE

INSURANCE

EXCHANGE

INTENTIONAL TORT AND BREACH OF

INSURANCE CONTRACT

INSOFAR AS

COVENANTS OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR

IT CONDEALING.

SO AS THIS CASE WILL GO TO THE JURY THIS

23

THERE ARE TWO NEGLIGENT CLAIMS, AND PLAINTIFFS WILL

24

ON THAT BASIS.

25

HAVE MADE THE ELECTION, NO RECOVERY AGAINST

MORNING,
STAND

IN OTHER WORDS, THERE CAN BE, NOW THAT THEY
THE
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INSURANCE

1 ! COMPANY

BASED ON NEGLIGENCE, ONLY FOR

INTENTIONAL

\

TORT OR

i

i

2 | BREACH OF CONTRACT.
3

J

AS WE SET FORTH

IN OUR MEMORANDUM,

SHORT

MEMORAN-

4 i DUM WHICH WE FILED WITH THE COURT, WE SERVED ON MR. ROYBAL
5

LATE FRIDAY

6

INDEMNITY

EVENING, THERE

FOR EITHER

IS NO BASIS FOR CONTRIBUTION OR

INTENTIONAL TORT OR BREACH OF CONTRACT,

7 J AND SINCE THAT'S ALL WE HAVE LEFT
8

THINK

9

OF THE

10

IN THIS CASE, WE WOULD

IT'S APPROPRIATE AT THIS POINT THAT THE CROSS-CLAIM
INSURANCE
LIKE

COMPANY AGAINST THE BANK BE DISMISSED.

I SAY, THE DELAY

IS UNFORTUNATE, BUT IT

11

WASN'T

12

HAVING COMPLETED DISCOVERY AND TAKING A HARD LOOK AT HIS

13

THEORIES AND THE EVIDENCE, AND MR. HUMPHERYS AND BOTH HIS

14

INSTRUCTIONS AND THEN LATER

15

FACT TO US, HAS

16

PRINCIPLE OF NEGLIGENCE.

17

IT, THAT THE BANK CAN BE LIABLE FOR FIRE

18

UNDER CONTRIBUTION OR

19

HAVE.

20

AND ARTICULATE ANY BASIS AND KEEP US

21

CLAIM.

22

OF THE LAWSUIT, AND THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO DO THAT IS NOW.

23

REALLY A FACTOR SO MUCH OF THE SETTLEMENT, BUT AFTER

IN THE LETTER CONFIRMED

THAT

INDICATED THAT HE ! S NOT PROCEEDING ON THE
THERE'S NO WAY, AS

I UNDERSTAND

INSURANCE

EXCHANGE

INDEMNITY THEORIES AND THAT'S ALL WE

I DON'T BELIEVE THAT MR. ROYBAL CAN REALLY STAND UP
IN UNDER THAT CROSS-

SO IT'S OUR POSITION THAT THE BANK OUGHT TO BE OUT

IF V.'E

STAY

IN, IF WE GET

INVOLVED

IN THE EVIDENCE,

IN THE OPENING

24

STATEMENTS AND INVOLVED

I ANTICIPATE

25

WOULD BE A FAIR AMOUNT OF MUD SLUNG BACK AND FORTH
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THERE

BETWEEN

I
1 I THE BANK AND THE

INSURANCE

2

CONFUSE THE JURY

IN THIS CASE, AND PERHAPS CAUSE SOME PROB-

3

LEMS WITH THE RECORD.

4

MIGHT BE, BUT I KNOW WHEN WE GET THREE PARTIES

5

THAT, AND THEN ONE PARTY GETS OUT OF THE LAWSUIT, SAY, AT

6

THE CONCLUSION OF THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE, THAT THERE

7

POTENTIAL FOR SOME CONFUSION ON THE PART OF THE JURY.

8

THE LEGAL THEORIES, AT LEAST THE AUTHORITIES, SEEM TO BE

9

CLEAR ON THE THEORIES OF CONTRIBUTION AND

10

WILL SUBMIT THAT NOW

11

OUT OF THIS CASE.

COMPANY WHICH

I DON'T KNOW

IS ONLY GOING TO

SPECIFICALLY

THAT

FIGHTING

LIKE

IS A

INDEMNITY.

SINCE

WE

IS THE APPROPRIATE TIME TO CUT THE

12

THE COURT:

13

FOR THE RECORD,

14

IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY

15

OF THE BANK AGAINST THE

16

CLAIM.

THANK

YOU, MR. WIKSTROM.

I HAVE REVIEWED THE MEMORANDUM

INSURANCE

JUDGMENT

AND

AFFIDAVIT

FILED ON

CONCERNED,

MR. HUMPHERYS, TO STATE FOR THE RECORD THAT YOUR

19

WILL NOT PURSUE, DURING THE COURSE OF THIS TRIAL, ANY

20

AGAINST THE

CARRIER

21

MR. HUMPHERYS:

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. ROYBAL:

THAT

FOUNDED

MR.

PLAINTIFFS
CLAIMS

IN NEGLIGENCE?

IS CORRECT, YOUR

VERY WELL.

BEHALH

CARRIER ON THE CROSS-

18

INSURANCE

BANK

I MIGHT STATE,

IS IT ACCURATE, AS FAR AS YOU ARE

17

WHAT

HONOR.

ROYBAL?

WELL, YOUR HONOR, THE

UNFORTUNATE

24

THING ABOUT THIS PARTICULAR ASPECT OF THIS CASE

25

TIMING.

IS THE

IT IS VERY DIFFICULT FOR ALL PARTIES TO TAKE THE
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1 I POSITION ON IT.

NUMBER ONE, I HAVE NOT HAD TIME TO GO

2 I THROUGH THE MEMORANDUM AND RESEARCH THE ISSUES THAT THE
3 j BANK HAS RAISED RELATIVE TO WHETHER CONTRIBUTION AND
4

j INDEMNITY GO TO ANYTHING OTHER THAN PURELY NEGLIGENCE, BUT

5

I WILL SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT UNDER RULE 56(C), I MUST

6

BE GIVEN AT LEAST 10 DAYS NOTICE BEFORE THE HEARING IS SET

7

TO RESPOND TO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WHICH IS WHAT

8

THE BANK HAS FILED, IS A MOTION FOR SUMMARY

9

JUDGMENT.

I HAVE NOT BEEN GIVEN THAT, AND ON THAT GROUND

10

ALONE, I THINK THE COURT SHOULD NOT REQUIRE ME TO EVEN

11

RESPOND IN ANY WAY, SHAPE OR FORM TO IT, AND SHOULD THE

12

BANK TAKE THE POSITION THAT THIS IS A MOTION TO DISMISS

13

RATHER THAN A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, RULE 2.7(B) OF

14

THE RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS

15

ALSO REQUIRE AT LEAST FIVE DAYS NOTICE PRIOR TO THE NOTICE

16

OF HEARING WHICH I HAVE NOT HAD.

17

NUMBER THREE, YOUR HONOR, THE STIPULATION AND

*8

MOTION AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL ENTERED INTO BY AND WITH THE

19

BANK AND THE PLAINTIFFS CLEARLY STATES A BENEFIT, THAT THEY

20

THROUGH ME, IN THEIR PARAGRAPH 3, THIS SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

21

SHALL NOT AFFECT THE CROSS-CLAIMS OF FIRE INSURANCE

22

EXCHANGE AGAINST THE BANK.

23

AGREED TO THAT, AND I WILL TAKE THEM AT THEIR WORD, AND I

24

WILL TAKE THEM AT THEIR WRITTEN WORD, AND WE WILL SUBMIT IT

25

ON THAT BASIS, YOUR HONOR, BUT I DO NOT WANT THE COURT TO

THAT'S PRETTY CLEAR.
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TEN EXCHANGE PL \CE N U T E ' I :
SALT LAKE C i n I T \ H s - i l l l

-A45-

THEY

1 » CONSTRUE MY REMARKS TO BE ANYTHING OTHER THAN INFORMING THE
2 j COURT OF WHAT MY POSITION IS RELATIVE TO RULE 56(C), 2.7(B)

I
3 J OF THE RULES OF PRACTICE.
4 -

IN ADDITION TO THAT, I HAVE BEEN GIVEN

BY

5

PLAINTIFFS1 COUNSEL, AND SHOULD THE COURT CUT THE BANK LOOSE

6

FOR SOME OTHER KNOWN REASON AND NOT REQUIRE THEM TO SIT IN

7

THIS, THAT HE'S GOING TO MAKE A MOTION THAT I CANNOT EVEN

8

BRING UP ANY FAULT ON THE PART OF THE BANK AT TRIAL, WHICH

9

I FIND TO BE LUDICROUS AND UNBELIEVABLE, BUT NEVERTHELESS,

10

THAT'S HIS INTENTION.

11

THE COURT:

12

TAKE THESE ISSUES AS THEY COME.

13

AT THE MOMENT HERE, IT IS ACCURATE TO STATE THAT THE RULES

14

REQUIRE ADDITIONAL TIME THAN WHAT HAS BEEN GIVEN AT THIS

15

POINT FOR YOU TO PROPERLY RESPOND.

18

THE WAY WE ARE STRUCTURED

DO YOU WISH TO RESPOND TO THAT ARGUMENT, MR.

16
17

WELL, OF COURSE, MR. ROYBAL, I WILL

WIKSTROM?
MR. WIKSTROM:

YES, YOUR HONOR, JUST BRIEFLY.

19

SINCE WE ARE ON THE MORNING OF TRIAL, THERE'S EFFECTIVELY

20

NO WAY THAT I CAN GIVE MR. ROYBAL THE APPROPRIATE NOTICE.

21

HOWEVER, WITH RESPECT TO THE TIMING, HE FILED THESE CLAIMS

22

SOME TIME AGO, AND ONE WOULD EXPECT THAT COUNSEL WOULD KNOW

23

WHAT THE LEGAL BASIS FOR HIS THEORY WAS.

24

THE COURT KNOWS, WAS ONLY A SMALL PART OF THIS CASE AND HAS

25

BEEN ONLY A SMALL PART OF THIS CASE FOR SOME TIME.

NEGLIGENCE IS, AS
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1 j

MR. HUMPHERYS HAS MADE NO SECRET OF THE FACT THAT

2 j HIS PRIMARY

ISSUE WAS SURROUNDING

INTENTIONAL

TORT AND

BUT AS LONG AS NEGLIGENCE WAS

I

3

BREACH OF CONTRACT,

IN THERE, -

4

IT PRECLUDED US FROM BRINGING ANY SORT OF A MOTION FOR

j

5

SUMMARY

j

JUDGMENT.

6

SO I WOULD THINK THAT EVEN THOUGH COUNSEL HAS

|
I

7

BEEN SOMEWHAT HAMPERED BY NOT HAVING THIS UNTIL FRIDAY

8

NIGHT, AND

9

BASIS FOR HIM TO KEEP US IN UNDER HIS THEORIES THAT HE

IT'S TUESDAY MORNING, THAT

IF THERE WAS ANY

!

LEGAL

10

WOULD BE ABLE TO STAND UP AND ARTICULATE THIS TO THE COURT

H

vJUST BECAUSE WE CAN'T GET THE TIMING REQUIREMENTS OF THE

12

I RULES,

IT DOESN'T SEEM THAT WE OUGHT TO TAKE THE RISK OF

13

I AFFECTING THE RECORD

IN THIS CASE, NUMBER ONE, OR FORCING

14

THE BANK TO SIT THROUGH AT MINIMUM THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE,

15

WHICH PROBABLY MR, HUMPHREYS CASE WILL GO

16

SOMETIME, AT GREAT EXPENSE TO THE BANK,

17

THE TIME REQUIREMENT OF THE RULES.

18

INTO NEXT WEEK

SIMPLY TO EXALT

I BELIEVE THE COURT HAS INHERENT AUTHORITY

AS

19

LONG AS THERE'S NO SUBSTANTIAL PREJUDICE

20

THIS MATTER

21

OUT, YOUR HONOR,

22

WITH THE BANK AND THE CROOKSTONS DOES NOT AFFECT THE CROSS-

23

CLAIM.

24

THAT WE CONTEND AFFECTS THE

25

ON

THAT BASIS-

SHOWN TO DEAL WITH

ONE OTHER THING

I AGREE WITH MR. ROYBAL, THE

IT'S ONLY THE ELECTION OF REMEDIES

MR. ROYBAL:

I WOULD POINT
SETTLEMENT

BY MR.

HUMPHERYS

CROSS-CLAIM.

YOUR HONOR,

I WOULD LIKE TO JUST
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1

SPEAK A WORD HERE.

2

WHEN

J

OF THE FILING OF THE SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT, I HAVE NOT

4

I|

IN THE TIME

I WAS

INVOLVED

IN THE CASE,

I FILED THE AMENDED COMPLAINT AND UP THROUGH THE TIME

PLED ANY THEORY OF NEGLIGENCE.

I HAVE PURPOSELY NOT PLED

|
!
i

i

5

THIS TO AVOID THE CONTEXT OF COMPARATIVE FAULT AND COMPARA- |

6

TIVE NEGLIGENCE.

7

OF

8

INTENTIONAL TORT AND ONE THAT

9

RESTATEMENT THAT EVEN THAT CAUSE OF ACTION

I PLED A CAUSE OF ACTION ENTITLED TORT

INTENDED CONSEQUENCES, WHICH

I INTERPRET

IT TO BE AN

IS RATHER OBSCURE

IN THE

I AM DROPPING

10

AND LEAVING ONLY THE ISSUES OF BREACH OF CONTRACT, THE

11

EXPRESS TERMS, BREACH OF THE IMPLIED TERMS OF GOOD FAITH,

12

FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, AND FINALLY THE INTENTIONAL

13

OF OUTRAGE.

14

MR. ROYBAL:

15

YOU FORGOT TO MENTION

MR. HUMPHERYS:

17 j

THE COURT:

IN ANY E V E N T —

THE ESSENTIAL POINT BEING THAT THERE

18

j ARE CLAIMS OTHER THAN THOSE CATEGORIZED AS

19

I TORT OR BREACH OF CONTRACT?

21
22
23

LIBEL AND

TORTIOUS CONDUCT, COUNSEL, THE ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION.

'6 i

20

TORT

MR. HUMPHERYS:

INTENTIONAL

THAT IS CORRECT, AND FINALLY

ARE THE ONLY CAUSES OF ACTION WE ARE PROCEEDING
THE COURT:
AND MEMORANDUM,

MR. ROYBAL:

25

THE COURT:

UNDER.

MR. ROYBAL, YOU HAVE HAD THE MOTION

IN SPITE OF IT, SINCE FRIDAY

24

THOSE

9 O'CLOCK
WHAT

LAST?

IN THE EVENING.

IS YOUR THEORY,

IF ANY, AGAINST
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1

THE BANK WITH REGARD TO THE INDEMNITY OR CONTRIBUTION?

2

MR. ROYBAL:

I REALLY HAVEN'T HAD TIME TO EXPLORE

3

WHAT MY THEORIES WOULD BE, YOUR HONOR, EXCEPT THAT I WILL

4

REPRESENT TO THE COURT THAT I THINK THE COMMON LAW THEORY

5

OF LIABILITY WOULD EXTEND IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE.

THAT'S

6 J JUST MY INITIAL REACTION TO THE MEMORANDUM, HAVING PERSON7 | ALLY READ IT.
8
9

ALSO, I BELIEVE THAT SHOULD THE CROSS-CLAIM BE
DISMISSED, THAT I SHOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO FILE A THIRD-PARTY

10

COMPLAINT AGAINST THE BANK, SHOULD--AFTER I HAVE HAD AN

11

OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW ALL OF MY OPPORTUNITIES FOR OPTIONS

12

FOR VARIOUS CAUSES OF ACTION, THAT I MAY WANT TO BRING THE

13

BANK IN TO INDEMNIFY FOR US THEIR ACTIONS AS AGAINST THE

14

PLAINTIFF.

15

MOTIONS STATED BY THE PLAINTIFFS THAT THEY KNOW THAT THE

16

BANK HAD DONE A NUMBER OF THINGS TO THEM THAT THEY FELT

17

CAUSED THEM HARM, WHETHER THEY COMPORT TO LEGAL THEORIES OF

THERE'S AMPLE EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD IN THE

18 I THEIR COUNSEL, I DON'T KNOW, BUT I THINK THEIR TESTIMONY IS
19

PRESENT HERE, THAT THEY WERE UNDER THE IMPRESSION THAT THE

20

BANK, NUMBER ONE, WAS HANDLING THEIR ENTIRE AFFAIRS RELA-

21

TIVE TO THE CONSTRUCTION, FOR ONE THING, AND AS A RESULT,

22

THERE

23

ONE OTHER ISSUE THAT POSSIBLY I CAN BRING UP WITH A LITTLE

24

MORE THOROUGH ANALYSIS, AND THAT IS THE DISTRIBUTIONS BY THE

25

BANK TO THE GENERAL CONTRACTOR, THE SUBCONTRACTORS, AND TO

IS A RELIANCE TO THEIR DETRIMENT, AND THERE'S JUST

10
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1

THE PLAINTIFFS THEMSELVES AND WHETHER OR NOT--

2 ,
3

(

THE COURT:

WELL, YOUR CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST THE

BANK, ALLEGING CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION, HAS BEEN

i

4 j OF RECORD FOR SOME CONSIDERABLE TIME; HAS IT NOT?
5 j

MR. ROYBAL:

6 j

THE COURT:

THAT IS CORRECT.
AND YOU AGREE, DO YOU NOT, WITH THE

7 j PROPOSITION THAT THERE IS NO CLAIM AGAINST THE BANK OVER
8

ON YOUR CROSS-CLAIM OTHER THAN FOR CONTRIBUTION

9

TION?

INDEMNIFICA-

DO YOU AGREE WITH THAT?

10

MR. ROYBAL:

11 I

THE COURT:

I WOULD AGREE TO THAT.
IT APPEARS TO ME, COUNSEL, THAT WHILE

12 I THE TIMING ISSUE IS ONE OF SOME IMPORTANCE, HOWEVER, OF
13 ' COURSE, OUR LOCAL RULES OF PRACTICE ALLOWS FOR THIS COURT
14

TO HEAR MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

IN LESS THAN THE

15

TYPICAL 30 DAYS PRIOR TO THE COURT HEARING, PRIOR TO THE

16 ! TRIAL, DISPOSITIVE MOTIONS,
THE QUESTION OF COMPLIANCE, HOWEVER, WITH THE

17

18 | RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56(C) IS AT THIS STAGE AN IMPOSSI- I
19

BILITY BY VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT WE HAVE THE JURY HERE THIS

20

MORNING, AND THESE EVENTS, I TAKE IT, AROSE TO SOME EXTENT

21

BY VIRTUE OF THE SETTLEMENT HAVING BEEN AFFECTED, AND IT

22

FURTHER APPEARS TO ME THAT THE ARGUMENT RAISED IN THE

23

MEMORANDUM

24

REALLY NOT ALL THAT COMPLEX.

25

HAVE HAD, MR. ROYBAL, SOME DAYS TO REVIEW THIS MATTER, WHAT

l

j

IN SUPPORT OF THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT IS .
I AM JUST INQUIRING, SINCE YOU

11
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1

YOU ARE SAYING TO ME.

AT LEAST, IT APPEARS TO ME THAT IF YOU

2 i WERE PRESENTED THE OPPORTUNITY TO FILE A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT OVER AGAINST THE BANK, YOU WOULD ASSERT NOTHING MORE

3
i

4 j THAN THE CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNIFICATION THEORIES THAT ARE
!
ALREADY EXISTENT IN YOUR CROSS-CLAIM?
5
6

MR. ROYBAL:

I'M NOT SAYING THAT, YOUR HONOR.

7

I HAVEN'T HAD TIME TO EXPLORE ALL THEORIES, AND, IF I WOULD

8

FILE A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT, AT LEAST I WOULD BE GIVEN THE

9

OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO, AND I HAVEN'T EXPLORED ALL THOSE

10

THEORIES, BUT I CAN RELATE TO THE COURT THAT THEY WOULD NOT

11

BE STRICTLY CONTRIBUTION AND/OR

12

THE COURT:

13

INDEMNITY.

YOU HAVE NOT HERETOFORE SOUGHT TO

AMEND YOUR CROSS-CLAIM TO ADD ADDITIONAL THEORIES?

14

MR. ROYBAL:

15

ANY REASON TO UP TO THIS POINT.

16

THE COURT:

THAT IS CORRECT, BUT I HAVE NEVER HAD

THINKING THAT THE CLAIM OF CONTRIBU-

17

TION AND/OR INDEMNIFICATION WAS SUFFICIENT IN YOUR JUDGMENT

18

AGAINST THE BANK?

19

MR. ROYBAL:

SAME AS THE BANK'S WAS AGAINST MINE.

20

THEY HAVE EXACTLY THE SAME THEORIES AGAINST ME ON YOUR

21

CROSS-CLAIMS, YOUR HONOR.

22
23

THE COURT:

IS THERE ANYTHING FURTHER IN THIS

MATTER, GENTLEMEN, THAT YOU WISH TO ADD?

24

MR. WIKSTROM:

25

MR. HUMPHERYS: NOTHING FURTHER, YOUR HONOR.

NO, YOUR HONOR.

12
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1

I

THE COURT:

I AM OF THE VIEW THAT IN LIGHT OF THE

i

2 j EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES THAT HAVE NOW BEEN PROMPTED PRINCI3
PALLY BY A RESULT OF THE SETTLEMENT THAT THE OPPORTUNITY TO •
4
RESPOND, AS PROVIDED IN THE RULES, CAN BE AND SHOULD APPRO5
PRIATELY BE WAIVED IN LIGHT OF WHAT I DEEM TO BE NO SHOWING
6
OF UNFAIR PREJUDICE TO-A PARTY, AND, ACCORDINGLY, THE NOTICE
7
REQUIREMENT IS WAIVED. IT'S MY JUDGMENT THAT BEING TUESDAY,!
8

THAT THERE HAS BEEN SOME ADEQUATE OR AT LEAST AVAILABLE TIME

9

WITHIN WHICH MR, ROYBAL, THE MEMORANDUM, WHICH IS NOT

10

LENGTHY IN THIS MATTER, COULD HAVE BEEN REVIEWED AND AN

11

ARGUMENT AT LEAST PRESENTED TO THIS COURT AS TO WHAT ADDI-

II

12 ! TIONAL THEORIES YOU THOUGHT MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE OR WHAT
13 I EVIDENCE MIGHT BE APPROPRIATE TO ALLOW YOU TO ASSERT A
14

CROSS-CLAIM FOR CONTRIBUTION OR INDEMNITY.

15

THEREFORE, IT IS MY VIEW, COUNSEL, IN LIGHT OF

16 | THE

SETTLEMENT THAT'S BEEN EFFECTED AND THE ARGUMENTS THAT

17

HAVE BEEN PRESENTED HERE, THAT THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY

18

JUDGMENT IS GRANTED, AND I THINK THAT, TOO, IN LIGHT OF WHAT

19

APPEARS TO ME TO BE A VERY SLIM, IF ANY, LIKELIHOOD OF ANY

20

BASIS FOR ASSERTING A CROSS-CLAIM OR INDEMNIFICATION AGAINST

21

THE BANK THAT SERVES TO MERELY UNDULY PROLONG THESE PRO-

22

CEEDINGS AND THE ISSUES THAT THE JURY WILL HAVE TO CONSIDER,,

23

IN ANY EVENT.

i

24
25

J

I

SO THE BANK'S MOTION IS GRANTED.

MR. WIKSTROM:

THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.

|
MAY I

1

ORALLY MOVE, AT THIS TIME, TO DISMISS THE BANK'S CROSS-

i

13
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1

CLAIM AGAINST THE INSURANCE COMPANY AND PROVIDE AN ORDER TO
I

2 j THE COURT TO THAT EFFECT?
3
4

THE COURT:

I PRESUME THERE'S NO RESISTANCE TO

THAT REQUEST?

5

MR. ROYBAL:

NO.

WE WOULD ALSO MOVE FOR A CON-

6

TINUANCE, YOUR HONOR, AT THIS TIME, IN ORDER TO EXPLORE THE

7

THEORIES OF A THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT AGAINST THE BANK.
THE COURT:

8
9

FIRST OF ALL, YOUR MOTION TO WITHDRAW

THE CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST THE CARRIER, MR. WIKSTROM, IS

10

GRANTED.

11

ORDER OF DISMISSAL WITH REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF THE

12

SETTLEMENT HAVING BEEN RAISED WITH THE BANK AND THE

13

PLAINTIFFS.

14

SECONDLY, FOR THE RECORD, I WILL EXECUTE NOW YOUR

DO YOU RECALL THE APPROXIMATE DATE, MR. ROYBAL,

15

THAT YOU FILED YOUR CROSS-CLAIM AGAINST THE BANK?

16

AMENDED ANSWER TO THE PLAINTIFF'S FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT

17

WAS FILED BACK IN JULY OF 1986.

18

MR. ROYBAL:

19
20

DECEMBER OF

f

THERE WAS A CROSS-CLAIM FILED IN

86, YOUR HONOR, DECEMBER 3RD.

MR. HUMPHERYS:

I THINK, YOUR HONOR, THERE WAS

21

ANOTHER CROSS-CLAIM FILED BEFORE THAT.

22

NOT POSITIVE, FRANK.

23
24
25

YOUR

MR. ROYBAL:

THAT IS CORRECT.

THERE WAS A — I f M

THERE WAS--I NIT I ALLY)

THERE WAS, WHEN THE INITIAL PLEADINGS BEGAN.
THE COURT:

WHEN WAS THE INITIAL CROSS-CLAIM

14
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I

1 , FILED, AS BEST YOU CAN REMEMBER, MR. ROYBAL?
2

MR. ROYBAL:

(

I'M SURE IT WAS FILED WHEN WE FILED

!

;

I

3 | OUR ANSWER TO THE INITIAL COMPLAINT.

J

4 |

THE COURT:

I

5

MR. ROYBAL:

WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN?
WAY BACK IN 1983.

6 j
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT, AND SINCE THAT TIME, YOU
HAVE MADE NO REQUEST TO THIS COURT TO AMEND TO ASSERT
7
8

ADDITIONAL OR OTHER THEORIES THAN THE CONTRIBUTION AND

9

INDEMNIFICATION?

10

MR. ROYBAL:

11

THE COURT:

12

THE RECORD IS CLEAR ON THAT.

YOUR REQUEST, NOW, IS TO CONTINUE,

FOR PURPOSES OF —
MR. ROYBAL:

13
14

NO.

TO EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF FILING

A THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT IN AS SHORT A TIME AS POSSIBLE.

15

THE COURT:

I THINK, COUNSEL — DO YOU WISH TO

16

RESPOND TO THAT, MR. HUMPHERYS?
MR. HUMPHERYS:

17

YES, YOUR HONOR.

THE ONLY THING

18

THAT, IN MY KNOWLEDGE, HAS BEEN RAISED AS IT RELATES TO A

19

THIRD-PARTY COMPLAINT IS TO HAVE, UNDER THE NEW STATUTE,

20

THE ISSUE OF PROPORTIONATE FAULT LITIGATED IN THE SAME

21

ACTION.

22

ADVANCED OR SUGGESTED BY DEFENDANT'S COUNSEL.

23

I'M UNAWARE OF ANY OTHER THEORY WHICH HAS BEEN

FOR THE PURPOSE OF FILING THAT THIRD-PARTY

24

COMPLAINT, FIRST OF ALL, YOUR HONOR, THE NEW STATUTE, I

25

THINK, CLEARLY DOES NOT HAVE RETROACTIVE APPLICATON.

SECOND

15
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1 , OF ALL, EVEN
2

IF IT DID, CERTAINLY THAT WAS WITHIN THE REALMS'

AND CONTEMPLATION OF THE CROSS-CLAIM AND WAS THE VERY

INTENT

3 t AND PURPOSE OF THE CROSS-CLAIM, WAS TO HAVE PROPORTIONATE
* ! FAULT
5

LITIGATED.
YOUR HONOR,

IF THE COURT HAS DETERMINED THAT THERE

6

IS SOME RESPONSIBILITY ON THE PART OF THE BANK TO THE

7

INSURANCE COMPANY

8

A DEEP PREJUDICE, SIGNIFICANT

9

FROM THE DATE OF THE WRONGFUL ACTION NOW TO CONTINUE THE

BY WAY OF A CROSS-CLAIM, THERE WOULD BE
PREJUDICE AFTER FIVE YEARS

10

TRIAL FURTHER FOR PURPOSES OF ALLOWING THEM TO BRING A

11

THIRD-PARTY ACTION, WHICH THEY HAVE HAD AMPLE TIME TO CON-

12

SIDER AND REVIEW OVER THE PAST THREE YEARS.

13

FINALLY, YOUR HONOR,

IT SEEMS TO ME THAT IF THERE

14

IS GROUNDS FOR SOME THEORY OF WHICH

15

I WOULD NOT HAVE ENTERED

16

THAT THIS WOULD HAPPEN,

17

INSURANCE COMPANY

18

OF A CLAIM, AND

19

OF SOME SORT, UNDER THE THEORY, THEN, YOUR HONOR,

20

THAT THEY HAVE NOT BEEN PREJUDICED BY ALLOWING THEM TO

21

PROCEED AT SUCH TIME AS THEY CAN PROVIDE A CLAIM.

22

j

I DO NOT KNOW, OR ELSE

INTO THIS AGREEMENT

ANTICIPATING

IF THERE WAS SOME GROUNDS WHICH THE

CAN ASSERT AGAINST THE BANK FOR SOME TYPE

IT HAS TO BE SOME THEORY OF

THE STATUTE

IS CLEAR THAT

IF THERE

CONTRIBUTION,
IT APPEARS

IS SUCH A

23

CLAIM, THEY ARE NOT REQUIRED OR TIME-BARRED UNTIL THEY

24

HAVE PAID EITHER MORE THAN THEIR PROPORTIONATE

25

SOME AMOUNT

FOR WHICH THEY CAN SEEK

SHARE OR PAID

INDEMNIFICATION,

AND

16
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1 , FOR THAT REASON, THEY

SUFFER

NO DAMAGES

2 ' REQUIRED TO RESPOND TO THE PLAINTIFFS,
3 I CAN BRING THEIR CLAIM THEREAFTER, AND

UNTIL THEY ARE

IN WHICH CASE THEY

IF THEY CAN FIND SUCH

!

4

A CLAIM, THEY CAN BRING

5

THEY WILL, BUT THERE f S NO JUSTIFICATION

6

HERE TO BE DEFERRED ANY

7
8

THE COURT:
DO YOU WISH TO SAY

WELL, YOUR HONOR,

11

ORIGINALLY

FILED,

12

DEFENDANTS

IN THIS ACTION THAT

IN EFFECT TODAY WERE
I WOULD HAVE

13 j CULPABLE RELATIVE TO THE

IF THE STATUTES

BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN
I THINK ARE

DAMAGE THE PLAINTIFF

PARTY COMPLAINT TO BEGIN WITH.

OTHER

ABSOLUTELY
SUFFERED,

I SUED UNDER A THIRD-

THE COURT

IS AWARE OF ALL

BACK AND FORTH THAT'S GONE ON, BUT I

17 1 BELIEVE THE COURT, AS WELL AS OTHER COURTS
18 1 DISTRICT, A R E T A K I N G T H E

20

MR. ROYBAL,

IN EFFECT WHEN THIS CASE WAS

INDIVIDUALS WHO

14 1 THAT BEING THE THREE

19

PROCEEDINGS

ANYTHING?

THAT ARE

16 j OF THE BANTERING

FOR THE

FASHION

LONGER.

10

15

IT IN WHATEVER

ALL RIGHT, MR. HUMPHERYS.

MR. ROYBAL:

9

IT AND ASSERT

IS NOT APPLICABLE

IN THE THIRD

POSITION THAT THE TORT REFORM

IN A RETROACTIVE

ACT

MANNER.

THEREFORE, WE ARE STILL FUNCTIONING UNDER

THE

21

OLD RULE WHICH ALLOWS FOR THIRD- PARTY COMPLAINTS AND IF

22

ANY THIRD-PARTY

23

THAT'S MY RIGHT, UNDER THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, AND

24

IF I'M NOT GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO THAT,

25

AFTER TODAY'S RULING,

COMPLAINT ALLEGES AN ACTION FOR NEGLIGENCE,

I--ESPECIALLY

I CONSIDER MYSELF EXTREMELY

VULNERABLE

17
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1 | AND PREJUDICED BY ALL THAT'S OCCURRED UP TO THIS POINT TO
I
; DENY ME THE RIGHT TO ASSERT AN ACTION AGAINST THE BANK.
2

I
3 J I THINK
4

IT IS SEVERELY PREJUDICING MY CLIENT.
THE COURT:

I MIGHT STATE, WHILE WE'RE ON THE

5
RECORD HERE, GENTLEMEN, THAT THE DECISION THAT I MADE WITH
6
REGARD TO THE REQUEST FOR A DE FACTO SEVERENCE WAS BASED ON
7
THE FACT THAT

IT WOULD TEND TO CONFUSE THE JURY WITH

REGARD

TO THE

IN THE PRESENT CASE, THAT SPECIFICALLY

BEING

8
ISSUES

9
AN

INTENTIONAL TORT, WRONGFUL REFUSAL TO SETTLE AND BREACH

10
11

OF CONTRACT CLAIM.
IT SEEMS TO ME TO SERVE NO VALID PURPOSE TO TRY

j

12

THE ENTIRE CASE AT THIS TIME.

I

13

IN ADDITION TO THE THIRD-PARTY CLAIMS OFFERED FOR NEGLIGENCE.!

BY THE ENTIRE CASE, I MEAN

MR. ROYBAL, THERE HAVE BEEN ASSERTED, ACCORDINGLY,

14
IS

THAT WAS THE RATIONALE FOR MY RULING ON THAT SPECIFIC

16

HOWEVER, OF COURSE, YOUR CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENCE

17

VARIOUS SUBS, CONTRACTORS, ETC., ARE VIABLE, AND THEY WILL

18

BE TRIED AT THE CONCLUSION OF THIS

19

TRIAL.

21

NEGLIGENCE

22

WILL BE RESERVED.

24
25

AGAINST

INITIAL PHASE OF THE

SO YOUR POSITION WITH REGARD TO CLAIMS FOR

20

23

ISSUE.

IN THE CREATION OF THOSE CIRCUMSTANCES,

MR. ROYBAL:

REALLY,

AGAINST THOSE DEFENDANTS, BUT NOT

AGAINST THE BANK, YOUR HONOR?
THE COURT:

WELL, THAT ASPECT OF THE CLAIM

IS

18
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1 I PENDING INSOFAR AS THE NEGLIGENT TORT-FEASORS YOU ARE
f
2 i ALLEGING CAUSED THE CAVE-IN.
3 I

SO THE BANK'S MOTION BEFORE ME THIS MORNING

4 J BASED STRICTLY UPON THE AFFIDAVIT

THAT THERE

IS

IS NO CONTRIBU-

i

5 | TION ON THE
I

INDEMNIFICATION ON ANY THEORY, SO THE MOTION,

6 j THEREFORE, TO CONTINUE THE TRIAL

IS DENIED.

7 I

NOW, BEFORE WE BRING THE JURY

8

MR. ROYBAL:

9

I WOULD L I K E T O M O V E , YOUR HONOR, AT

THIS TIME, ALSO, TOO, IN ADDITION TO DISMISSING THE SEVENTH

10

CAUSE OF ACTION, WHICH

11

ACQUIESCED TO, ACTING

12

IN, COUNSEL--

I ANY RELEVANCE

I TAKE IT MR. HUMPHERYS
IN CONCERT, WHICH

IT NO LONGER

HAS

TO THIS CASE, AND ALSO THE TENTH CAUSE OF

13

ACTION, WHICH HE

14

NO

15

LIABILITY

16

WHAT THOSE ARE, IF THEY HAVE ANY RELEVANCE

17

RULING.

18

HAS

INDICATED HE WAS WILLING TO DROP, WILL BE

INTENDED CONSEQUENCES, AND THE ELEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION,
FOR TORTIOUS CONDUCT.

MR. WIKSTROM:

19

CAUSES OF ACTION.

20

ON FOUR THEORIES.

I WOULD LIKE THOSE NOTED,

YOUR HONOR, WE ARE DISMISSING

SO I'M NOT EXACTLY

21

THE COURT:

22

MR. WIKSTROM:

23

THE COURT:

TO THE COURT'S

SURE WE ARE

THOSE

PROCEEDING

ALL RIGHT, THAT SETTLES THAT.
MAY WE BE EXCUSED, YOUR

MR. WIKSTROM,

HONOR?

YOU MAY BE EXCUSED.

24
NOW, YOU FILED A MOTION IN LIMINE, MR. ROYBAL.
25 I LET'S DEAL WITH THAT.
I HAVE REVIEWED THE MOTION.

19
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FRANCIS M. WIKSTROM (A3462)
DANIEL W. HINDERT (A1497)
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
Rocky Mountain State Bank
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234

o
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
* * * * * * *

S. LARRY CROOKSTON and RANDI
L. CROOKSTON, as individuals,
and ANNA W. DRAKE, as Trustee
of the Estate of S. Larry
Crookston and Randi L.
Crookston,

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation, and
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK,
a Utah corporation,

Civil No. C83-1030
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendants, Crosscomplainants and
Cross-defendants.
* * * * * * *

Cross-defendant Rocky Mountain State Bank's Motion for
Summary

Judgment,

having

come

before

the

Court

on

Tuesday,

May 26, 1987, Francis M. Wikstrom and Daniel W. Hindert appearing
on behalf of Rocky Mountain State Bank, Frank A. Roybal appearing
on

behalf

of

cross-complainant

Fire

Insurance

Exchange

(the

"Insurance Co."), and L. Rich Humpherys appearing on behalf of
plaintiffs; the Court having reviewed the Motion and Supporting
Memorandum, having confirmed that said pleadings were served upon
attorneys for plaintiffs and the Insurance Co. on Friday evening,
May 22, 1987, having heard an objection by counsel for Insurance
Co. as to the timeliness of this Motion and hearing on same,
having waived the timing requirement on grounds that the basis
for said Motion did not arise until a settlement had been reached
between plaintiffs and the Bank on May 21 or 22, 1987, and having
found that no unfair prejudice would result from waiver of the
timing requirement for hearing and ruling on said Motion;
IT

IS

cross-defendant
Judgment

HEREBY

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

Rocky Mountain State Bank's Motion for Summary

is granted and, further, that the crossclaim of the

Insurance Co. against Rocky Mountain State Bank in the captioned
action is hereby dismissed with prejudice.

Pursuant to Rule 54B

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, this Court finds that there
is no just cause for delay and hereby certifies the Order as
final.
DATED t hlis
i

ji^day of JftM

, 1987

BY THE tfOURT:

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing proposed ORDER was mailed, postage prepaid, this 3-1T
day of May, 1987, to:
L. Rich Humpherys
Christensen, Jensen & Powell
510 Clark Learning Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Frank A. Roybal
442 No. Main St.
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Karen J. McClurg
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
175 E. 400 SO., #330
Salt Lake City, Utah

84111

Melvin Larew, Jr.
1200 Beneficial Life Towers
John E. Hansen
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
261 E. 300 So., 2nd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John M. Chipman
Lewis B. Quigley
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON S. CHIPMAN
1300 Continental Bank Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Dennis C. Ferguson
SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145

322:052787A
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L. Rich Humpherys, #1582
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C.
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
510 Clark Learning Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L.
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE,
Trustee of the Estate of
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON,

JUDGMENT AGAINST FIRE
INSURANCE EXCHANGE

Plaintiffs,
v.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation,

Civil No. C83-1030
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.
-Trial on the above matter came on regularly before the
court on the 26th day of May, 1987.

Each of the plaintiffs

appeared personally and were represented by their attorney, L.
Rich Humpherys; defendant Fire Insurance Exchange appeared and
was represented by its attorney Frank Roybal.

A jury of eight

people and one alternate person was regularly impaneled and sworn
to try said action.

Witnesses on the part of plaintiffs and

defendant were sworn and examined, and all evidence was submitted
by the parties.

After six days of trial and having considered

the evidence, arguments of counsel and instructions of the court,
the jury retired to consider the verdict, and after deliberating
for approximately four and one-half hours, returned its special
verdict and answered the interrogatories as follows:

<'\1.V -A62-

1.

2.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

Did the defendant Fire Insurance
Exchange breach the contract of
insurance with plaintiffs?

Answer:

Yes

If you answered question no. 1
"yes," was such breach a proximate
cause of the damages alleged by
plaintiffs?

Answer;

Yes

Did the plaintiffs breach the
contract of insurance with the
defendant Fire Insurance Exchange?

Answer:

No

If you answered question no. 3
"yes," was such breach a proximate
cause of the damages alleged by
plaintiffs?

Answer:

N/A

Did the defendant Fire Insurance
Exchange violate its duty of good
faith and fair dealing in its
treatment of plaintiffs1 claims?

Answer:

Yes

If you answered question no. 5
"yes," was such violation a
proximate cause of the damages
alleged by plaintiffs?

Answer:

Yes

Did the defendant Fire Insurance
Exchange intentionally inflict
emotional distress on plaintiffs?

Answer:

Yes

If you answered question no. 7
"yes," was such conduct a
proximate cause of the damages
alleged by plaintiffs?

Answer:

Yes

Did defendant Fire Insurance
Exchange commit fraud and
misrepresentation in its treatment
of plaintiffs' claims by clear and
convincing evidence?

Answer:

Yes

If you answered question no. 9
"yes," was such conduct a proximate
cause of the damages alleged by
plaintiffs?
Answer:

Yes

In light of the foregoing answers,
what if any total damages do you
award the plaintiffs

-A63~
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Compensatory damages
Punitive damages

$ 815,826
4,000,000

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs S.
Larry Crookston, Randi L. Crookston and Anna W. Drake, Trustee,
shall

have

judgment

against Fire

Insurance

Exchange

for

the

amount of $815,826 compensatory damages and $4,000,000 punitive
damages.

In addition, plaintiffs shall be awarded attorney's

fees and court costs to be determined at a later date.
This judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 12%
per annum from the date hereof.
DATED

this

llthZay of

J u n e , , 1987.

BY THE//COURT:

A T TSST
Ctacf

OPOH^'

r

'«"

t /
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY
foregoing

JUDGMENT

AGAINST

that

a

FIRE

true

and

INSURANCE

correct
EXCHANGE

copy

of

was

delivered this / t h day of June, 1987, to:
Frank Roybal
Attorney at Law
442 North Main St.
Bountiful, UT
84010

{<')>•"'•
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the
hand
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H. RALPH KLEMM
Attorney for Plaintiffs
500 Clark Learning Office Center
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 328-2206

H.DIX0H His..

istf/

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
S. LARRY CROOKSTON & RANDI L.
CROOKSTON, his wife,
Plaintiffs,

;
i
t,|

O

R

D

E

R

i

-vs-

\
(
<
<

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation, and
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK,
a Utah corporation,
Defendants.

Civil No. C83-1030

(

The Motion for Necessary and Permissive Joinder of Parties
Defendant of defendant Fire Insurance Exchange came before the court
for hearing on April 12, 1983. Plaintiffs and defendants were represented by their respective attorneys of record.

The court having

heard arguments of counsel relative to the issues raised by the Motion,
and the court being fully advised in the premises, and good cause
appearing therefor,

-A66-

- 2 -

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion For Necessary and
Permissive Joinder of Parties Defendant is denied.

BY THE COURT:

ATTEST
H. DIXON BJMDLEY

^P^JlUA, (jfyfa^lSTpXtt

JVVGE ' *

Deputy C'*fk

NOTICE OF SERVICE
*rV^L

On the/-^—xiay of April, 1983, I served the foregoing Order
on the defenda^ts by having true copies thereof delivered to their
respective cou^ se ^ as follows:
Kathleen M. Nelson
505 South Main
Bountiful, Utah 84010

Frank A. Royba^
442 North Main Street
Bountiful, Utah- 84010

; * > •

/,

/

Attorney for/Plaintiffs
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County of Salt Lake - State of Utah

c^v UUXM

OrtzLih^
Plaintiff

AinS

1Kb A KOANCXCfefendant '

CASE NO:

Sk.d

Cg3- [C30

\ \"V A
Type of hearing: Div
Present^ Pltf.

Annul.
Deft.

lined: ^nxv^fti
*3^**
Others:

ORDERS:
•
Custody Evaluation Ordered
D Visitation Rights
•
•
•

•

D

D

7~

Supp. Order.
OSC
Other.
Summons
Stipulation.
Waiver
Publication.
-w
waiver
PUD
<5JU CtujyfT-Defanit oLPItf/Deft Entered
rv\*s» fWv\dX%^Date i^-* lo- 5t>
VA^.
Date:
Judge: P&Qa*^
Clerk: J ^ f t ^ t l L C / * .
Reporter:
Bailiff: _ f V u > K , . S v v H v ^

Custody Awarded To

Pltf/Deft Awarded Support $
x
«
Per Month/Year
Pltf/Deft Awarded Alimony $
Payments to be made through the Clerk's Office:.
Atty. fees to the.
Home To:

Per Month
D Alimony Waived
•

in the amount of

. Automobile To:
Each Party Awarded their Personal Property
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Debts and Obligations
Pltf/Deft. to Maintain Insurance on Minor Children
Restraining Order Entered Against.
Pltf/Deft. Granted Judgment for Arrearage in the Sum of $.
90-Day Waiting Period is Waived
Divorce Granted To
As.
• 3-Month Interlocutory
Decree To Become Final: • Upon Entry
Former Name of

Deferred

-Enrnichings T O !

D

•
•
D
•
•

n
a
a

. Is Restored

•

Based on the failure of Deft to appear in response to an order of the court and on motion of PItfs counsel, court
orders
/
shall issue for Deft.
Returnable
.Bail.

D

Based on written stipulation of respective counsel/motion of Plaintiff's counsel, and good cause appearing therefor,
court orders the above case be and the same is hereby dismissed without prejudice.

Kfl Based on imillui jtipulition of respective

Ii'inulimywf riiiiiiliff't mi

il court orders

V-s m^ftrvvi, Jrrv _ A e ^ ^ t L 4 r i a £ v to* £t£vug.cl" t K L Y w e ^ o - \<JV /rfofeefive rxd*
L? v

t/Q~
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\hic\
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L. Rich Humpherys, A1582
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.
Attorneys for Crookston
510 Clark Learning Building
175 South West Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L.
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE,
Trustee of the estate of
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON,
Plaintiffs,
v.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation, and
ROCKY MOUNTAIN STATE BANK,
a Utah corporation,

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGED
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

Defendants.
FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
reciprocal or interinsurance
exchange,
Third-Party
Plaintiff,

v.
JIMMIE L. JONES, JR., KYLE H.
BREWSTER and BERT BERRETT,
Third-Party
Defendants.

Civil No. C83-1030

Judge J. Dennis Frederick
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BERT BERRETT, and KYLE H.
BREWSTER,

)
)

Fourth-Party
Plaintiffs,

)
)

v.

)

SYRO STEEL COMPANY, a Utah
corporation,

)
)

Fourth-Party
Defendant.

)
)

Defendant Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion for Summary
Judgment came on regularly before the court on the 4th day of
May, 1987 at the hour of 10:00 a.m.

Plaintiffs were represented

by their attorney L. Rich Humpherys; defendant Fire Insurance
Exchange

was

represented

defendant

Rocky

attorney

Daniel

Mountain
W.

by

its

State

Hindert;

attorney

Bank

was

second

Frank

A.

represented

party

Roybal;
by

plaintiffs

its
were

represented by Andrea Alcabes; second party defendant Jimmie L.
Jones, Jr. was represented by Karen J. McClurg; Bert Berrett was
represented by John E. Hansen; and third-party defendant Syro
Steel was represented by Dennis C. Ferguson.
The

Court,

having

considered

argument

of

counsel,

memoranda and all other information contained in the file, denied
the motion for summary judgment.
IT

IS

HEREBY

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

defendant Fire Insurance Exchange's Motion for Summary Judgment
is denied.

2
-A7 0-

DATED t h i s J J ^ d a y of
#

, 1987.

ATTEST
H CVXOHINOLEY
CK»ff

DeooTy Clem
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

This is to certify that on this O ^

day of

1987, a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER DENYING
DEFENDANT FIRE EXCHANGE'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed,
postage prepaid, to:
Carman E. Kipp
Karen J. McClurg
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.
Attorneys for Jimmie L. Jones
600 Commercial Club Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
John M. Chipman
BAYLE, HANSON, NELSON & CHIPMAN
1300 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Melvin G. Larew, Jr.
Attorney at Law
Suite 285
1095 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah

84106

Stephen G. Morgan
John E. Hansen
MORGAN, SCALLEY & READING
Attorneys for Bert Berrett
Second Floor
261 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Frank A. Roybal
Attorney at Law
Attorney for Fire Insurance Exchange
442 North Main Street
Bountiful, Utah 84010
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Francis W. Wikstrom
Daniel W. Hindert
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Rocky Mountain
State Bank
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P.O. BOX 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Dennis C. Ferguson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN 6 MARTINEAU
Attorney for Syro Steel Company
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor
P.O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145
Anna W. Drake
NIELSON & SENIOR
1100 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

^.v^gO
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L. Rich Humpherys, #1582
M. Douglas Bayly, #0251
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C.
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
510 Clark Learning Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L.
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE,
Trustee of the Estate of
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON,

]
]
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
REGARDING REASONABLE
ATTORNEY'S FEES

|
t

Plaintiffs,
v.

;i

Civil No. C83-1030

i

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation,

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.

Plaintiff's Motion to Determine Award of Attorneys' Fees came
on regularly before the court on the 14th day of December, 1987
at the time of 1:30 p.m.
attorney,

L.

Rich

Plaintiffs were represented by their

Humpherys,

and

defendant

Fire

Insurance

Exchange was represented by its attorneys, Philip R. Fishier,
Stephen J,
considered

Trayner, and Frank A. Roybal,
the

plaintiff's

motion,

The court, having

Affidavit

of

L.

Rich

Humpherys, Deposition of L. Rich Humpherys, memoranda filed by
the parties, together with all other information contained in the
court's file, and having further been present during the trial of
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the above matter, roiled in plaintiff's favor by a Minute Entry
Ruling

dated

December

22, 1987.

The

court

now

enters

its

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

H. Ralph Klemm, a licensed attorney, represented the

plaintiffs as it relates to the present action from September,
1982, until approximately June, 1984.
2.

Because of a conflict of interest, it was necessary

that Mr. Klemm withdraw as counsel for the plaintiffs and L. Rich
Humpherys was retained to represent the plaintiffs from June,
1984 to the present.
3.

Both

litigation
special

attorney

attorneys.

expertise,

Klemm

and

Humpherys

Mr. Humpherys

experience

and

are

and his

knowledge

law

experienced
firm have

relating

to the

procedures and practices of insurance companies and the area of
bad faith insurance law.
4.
parties

Because of the numerous witnesses, exhibits, number of
in

the

third

party

action,

the

factual

and

legal

complexities of the case, and the lack of significant

legal

precedent, the litigation was difficult and novel, and the time
and expenses incurred by plaintiffs' attorneys were not excessive
and were reasonably incurred.
5.
presented

At trial, plaintiffs attorneys were well prepared and
plaintiffs' case effectively

and

efficiently, using

among other things, visual aids, transparencies of exhibits on an
overhead projector, and photographs.
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6.

The plaintiffs in this case were financially bankrupt

and unable to finance the litigation and pay the attorneys' fees
without recovery.

These kinds of cases are customarily handled

on a contingency fee basis of at least one-third of any recovery.
The amount

of $175,000 represents less than 4% of the total

judgment against the defendant Fire Insurance Exchange.
7.

The amount of plaintiffs' damages claimed in this case

were substantial and the judgment obtained is one of the largest
verdicts in Utah history.
8.

In order to pursue litigation of this kind, there are

substantial expenses and costs (in addition to the court costs
customarily

allowed

under

Rule

Procedure) that are necessarily

54(d)

Utah

Rules

of

Civil

incurred and charged to the

clients as part of the attorneys1 bill, such as expert witness
fees, depositions, photocopies, photographs, trial aids, and
other miscellaneous expenses.

In addition to the court costs in

the amount of $2,870.32 as described in plaintiffs Memorandum of
Costs and Disbursements and in the amount of $1,320 as described
in plaintiffs Supplemental Memorandum of Costs and
Disbursements,

plaintiffs

have

necessarily

and

reasonably

incurred an additional $11,126 in costs and litigation expenses.
This amount reflects a set off for the court costs otherwise
awarded pursuant to Rule 54(d).
9.
in

The amount of $175,000 for attorneys' fees and $11,126

necessary

litigation

expenses

circumstances of this case.
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are

reasonable

under

the

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The

amount

of

$175,000

constitutes

reasonable

and

necessary attorneys1 fees and the amount of $11,126 constitutes
reasonable

and

necessary

litigation

expenses

incurred by the

plaintiffs in prosecuting their action herein.
Defendant is liable to plaintiffs for said attorneys1

2.

fees and litigation expenses.
DATED this

day of December, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

J. Dennis Frederick
Third District Judge
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Philip R. Fishier
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

hereby

foregoing
REASONABLE

certify

that

a

OF

FACT

AND

CONCLUSIONS

ATTORNEYS'

FEES

was

hand

FINDINGS

true

and

correct
OF

delivered

copy
LAW
to

of the

REGARDING
Philip

R.

Fishier, Strong & Hanni, 6th Floor Boston Building, Salt Lake
City, Utah and a copy mailed to Frank Roybal, 442 North Main
Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010 this

dav of December, 1987.
i

-All-

L. Rich Humpherys, #1582
M. Douglas Bayly, #0251
Christensen, Jensen & Powell, P.C.
ATTORNEYS FOR PLAINTIFFS
510 Clark Learning Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 355-3431
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
S. LARRY CROOKSTON, RANDI L.
CROOKSTON, and ANNA W. DRAKE,
Trustee of the Estate of
SPENCER LARRY CROOKSTON and
RANDI LYNN CROOKSTON,

)
i
i

ADDITIONAL JUDGMENT
AGAINST FIRE INSURANCE
EXCHANGE

l

Civil No. C83-1030

Plaintiffs,

v.

]i

FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE, a
California corporation,

Judge J. Dennis Frederick

Defendant.

Based upon the court1s Minute Entry Ruling, it Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law dated this same day, the court awards
as additional judgment against defendant Fire Insurance Exchange
as follows:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:
1.

The courts previous order dated June 11, 1987, awarding

attorneys' fees to plaintiffs is affirmed.
2.
defendant

Plaintiffs
Fire

shall have

Insurance

an

Exchange
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additional
of

judgment

$175,000

against

for attorneys1

fees, $4,190,32

for court costs and $11,126.00 in litigation

expenses for a total additional judgment of $190,316,32.
3.

This additional

judgment

shall bear interest at the

legal rate of 12% per annum from the date hereof until paid.
DATED this /rdav

of W ^ S ^ e ^ " l 9 8 ^
*

BY THE COURT:

APPROVED AS TO FORM:
Philip R. Fishier
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I

hereby

certify

that

a true

and correct

copy

of the

foregoing ADDITIONAL JUDGMENT AGAINST FIRE INSURANCE EXCHANGE was
hand delivered to Philip R. Fishier, Strong & Hanni, 6th Floor
Boston Building, Salt Lake City, Utah and a copy mailed to Frank
Roybal, 442 North Main Street, Bountiful, Utah 84040 this-^ 7 day
of December, 1987.

\&&ry^
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